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In this dissertation, the term “haunting” describes not just an experience of the 
supernatural, but a wide range of encounters that are uncanny or unsettling, in which 
unacknowledged connections and enduring differences come—often urgently—to the 
fore.  Recent U.S. and postcolonial literature is replete with such hauntings, both literal 
encounters with embodied specters and metaphorical contacts with the ghostly presence 
of the past or future.  In the texts I consider, the depictions of haunting function as 
compelling literary devices, but the encounters across difference that they describe also 
provide a model for understanding the ways that they engage their readers, especially 
readers who approach the works from the position of cultural outsiders.  Informed by 
theories of poststructuralist ethics, I argue that such encounters can give rise to forms of 
profound mutual implication that are founded on, rather than diminished by, difference 
and imperfect understanding, and that in doing so, they provide a model for the study of 
world literature.  Despite their locations within distinct national and ethnic canons, the 
U.S. and postcolonial texts I consider become world literature through the reading 
positions they construct, inviting readers to take responsibility for the stories they tell, but 
also marking the limits of readers’ imaginative access. 
The comparative readings in each chapter of “Haunting Encounters” reveal the 
similar strategies that U.S. and postcolonial texts employ to engage distant readers and 
draw them into the fictional worlds they create.  Juxtaposing texts drawn from very 
different cultural and historical contexts, these comparisons also work to dislocate 
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positions of readerly authority based on insider knowledge or acquired expertise, and 
provide a model of reading that reflects the emergence of new readers, new contacts, and 
new routes of circulation in our contemporary global moment.  Through this comparative 
methodology, “Haunting Encounters” offers a definition of world literature based not on 
the national or cultural location of a given text or its author, but rather on the 




This dissertation emerged out of my own curiosity about the surprising number 
and diversity of texts in both recent U.S. ethnic literature and postcolonial literature that 
take up haunting as their central theme.  The liminal and the supernatural seem at first 
glance to be surprising subjects for these authors, writing in cultural contexts and literary 
traditions firmly rooted in the generic conventions of contemporary realism.  Many of 
these texts address topics with concrete, urgent political stakes—racism, anti-
imperialism, indigenous land rights, political persecution—that seem to run counter to the 
experiences of imaginative extension and suspension of disbelief that depictions of 
haunting require from their rationalistic readers.  How, then, do the thematics of haunting 
serve these authors’ political and aesthetic purposes, and what does haunting allow them 
to accomplish? 
In these texts, time and space are rendered out-of-joint in a way that productively 
undermines certainties about the here-and-now.  In Beloved, the ghost that haunts Sethe 
and her family is at once both young and old, and the system of slavery that the ghost 
represents, although officially a thing of the past, remains very much alive.  In Leslie 
Marmon Silko’s Ceremony, the jungles of the Pacific literally come home to the 
reservation with Native American veterans of World War II, the boundaries between 
them collapsed by the logic of American imperialism.  In writing Anil’s Ghost, Michael 
Ondaatje provides international readers with a portrait of Sri Lanka’s civil war that is 
both distinctive and universal, creating a space that is at once everywhere and nowhere.  
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And in The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, Ayi Kwei Armah depicts his own present 
moment as the intersection of the past’s failed vision and the future’s elusive promise.  In 
different ways and different contexts, these texts ask a similar set of questions: What does 
it mean for conflicting temporalities—for instance, Western modernity and indigenous 
cultural memory—to overlap with one another?  And what possibilities, both exciting and 
troubling, are opened up when spaces such as the nation, the reservation, the village, or 
the home become increasingly permeable?  These defining questions, equally central to 
both U.S. ethnic literature and postcolonial literature, distinguish these fields from other 
contemporary literature and place them in productive conversation with one another. 
By using haunting to construct comparisons across these two bodies of literature, 
I hope to draw out the fundamental and significant similarities between them.  Haunting 
is not only a theme in these works, but also a shared set of formal strategies which allow 
them to engage their readers in profound and personal ways.  Unlike canonical texts 
addressed to supposedly homogenous audiences and shaped by ostensibly universal 
standards of value, works of ethnic and postcolonial literature have never been safe in 
such assumptions.  Addressing audiences at the margins, these texts are already engaged 
in cultural contestations in the effort to claim voice, identity, sovereignty, or equality.  
And addressing international or cross-cultural audiences, they are subject to the pressures 
of a majoritarian literary marketplace, which either ignores or fetishizes the “difference” 
they represent.  The logic and language of haunting allows these texts to respond to the 
problematics of their circulation and reception.   
Haunting has the power to make the strange familiar, and the familiar strange, and 
in the hands of these authors, it provides a means of managing ethical engagement and 
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imaginative access of diverse global readerships.  These works of fiction not only depict 
hauntings, but strive to haunt their readers through formal strategies like magical 
realism, traumatic narrative, and utopian vision that resist readers’ efforts to distance 
themselves from the stories that confront them.  By drawing readers in affectively and 
imaginatively, these works insist that the problems and questions they raise cannot be 
contained within their fictional frames, in a way that echoes the immediacy and intensity 
of being “possessed” by a ghost or specter.  But they also, simultaneously, mark the 
limits of the knowledge or insight that can be gained by reading a work of fiction.  Like 
hauntings, which are risky and always temporary, these texts do not allow their readers 
easy or comfortable access to the worlds they depict.  This set of strategies responds to 
the position that U.S. and postcolonial texts occupy relative to the multiple audiences that 
read them, audiences made up of both cultural insiders and cultural outsiders, whose acts 
of reading reflect their distinct contexts and differential positions of power.  Although the 
authors I consider may not conceive of their writing as works of “world literature,” I 
argue that the mode in which they write is perfectly suited to our contemporary global 
moment.  In a world that is increasingly interconnected, the reading position these texts 
construct—one which is broadly and deeply responsible, yet alert to and respectful of 
enduring forms of difference—offers a model for traversing the ever-growing diversity of 
our contemporary literary landscape. 
Theoretical Encounters 
In the texts I consider, haunting takes a range of forms, both literal and 
metaphorical.  Both Toni Morrison (Beloved) and Mahasweta Devi (“Pterodactyl, Puran 
Sahay, and Pirtha”) imagine embodied ghosts or specters whose impossible appearance 
 
4 
challenges rational definitions of the here-and-now.  For Leslie Marmon Silko 
(Ceremony) and Arundhati Roy (The God of Small Things), the past itself becomes a 
haunting presence that disrupts our notions of temporality and influences the production 
of historical memory in the present.  Michael Ondaatje (Anil’s Ghost) and Costa-Gavras 
(Missing) grapple with the present absence of the “disappeared,” who haunt society and 
public discourse through their highly visible erasure.  And for Ayi Kwei Armah (The 
Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born) and Don DeLillo (Falling Man) it is the possibility of a 
different and unrecognizable future itself that haunts the dismal present.  These hauntings 
all represent encounters across difference—metaphysical, temporal, and interpersonal—
that are profoundly unsettling for those involved and which, perhaps most importantly, 
carry profound political and ethical stakes.   
The intense, imperfect encounters across difference in these texts resonate with 
the kind of relationship philosopher Emmanuel Levinas describes, in which the encounter 
between the self and the other becomes the constitutive site of ethical responsibility.  
Levinas’s definition of “difference” is broadly inclusive, encompassing not only the 
difference that separates any individual from another, but also the radical alterity of God, 
death, and knowledge.  In the context of the specific, situated, and politicized 
“differences” these novels depict, the capaciousness of Levinas’s definition risks effacing 
the forms of power that define such inevitably asymmetrical relationships.  But the 
inclusiveness of this definition also offers a valuable counterpoint.  By emphasizing 
difference as the constitutive condition of any encounter with another, Levinas theorizes 
an ethics of the encounter that is powerful and a priori, and it is the forcefulness of this 
ethical claim that I draw on here.  Taking Levinas’s model of the ethical encounter as a 
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challenge, I suggest, can help us imagine how encounters across difference—both within 
literary texts, and beyond them—might take place on a more equal footing. 
For Levinas, the face-to-face encounter with the other gives rise to an ethical 
responsibility derived not from one’s ability to know or understand the other, but instead 
from the very difference that makes any other person separate and distinct from oneself 
and therefore, in his terms, “radically other” (64). This difference requires one to reach 
out and address the other, and the result is a reciprocal relationship grounded in the moral 
force of not-knowing.  Most importantly, for Levinas, the obligation to address the other 
and enter into dialogue is neither enabled by, nor undertaken in service of, gaining 
complete or perfect knowledge of the other.  Instead, it is the very fact that the other 
remains fundamentally different from oneself—and therefore unknowable—that is the 
source of one’s responsibility.  This unknowability is a fundamental and defining element 
of the encounters I define as hauntings, in which the force of the relationship derives in 
large part from the impossible, ungraspable nature of the specters which characters in 
these texts confront.   
A similar recognition of the limits of our ability to know informs Freud’s notion 
of the uncanny, or unheimlich.  Notably, Freud’s exploration begins with a consideration 
of the uncanny as an aesthetic phenomenon, explicitly connecting it with the effects 
produced by some kinds of literary fiction.  As he describes it, the uncanny is an 
experience of unexpected and unsettling recognition, the return of something “secretly 
familiar” which has been repressed (244).  To illustrate the phenomenon, Freud offers an 
anecdote: alone in his train compartment, he is startled by his own reflection in a mirror 
when a sudden jolt causes the bathroom door to swing open.  Briefly, he believes a 
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stranger has entered his compartment, and after recognizing his mistake, Freud recalls 
that he “thoroughly disliked” the appearance of the supposed intruder.  The uncanny, as 
exemplified by Freud’s moment of (mis)recognition, points to the way in which we can 
become strange to ourselves, and by seeing ourselves through another’s eyes, unsettle the 
boundaries between self and other.  Indeed, as the anecdote reveals, the element of the 
stranger or the other we recognize in ourselves may not cast us in the most flattering 
light, and may provide an opportunity for reflection and critique.  
Jacques Derrida’s remarkable treatise, Specters of Marx, draws together both 
Levinas’s understanding of the ethical encounter and the unsettling recognition of 
Freud’s uncanny, along with a typically diverse range of other thinkers and theories.  
Derrida turns to the concept of haunting to make sense not only of the kinds of ethical 
relationships that are Levinas’s central concern, but also the relationship between past, 
present, and future.  Using the ghost of Hamlet’s father as an example, Derrida 
underscores the ghost’s power to disrupt and invalidate the practices of looking and 
knowing that “scholars” embrace: “As theoreticians or witnesses, spectators, observers, 
and intellectuals, scholars believe that looking is sufficient.  Therefore, they are not 
always in the most competent position to do what is necessary: speak to the specter” 
(Specters of Marx 11).  In proposing “hauntology” as a deconstructive alternative to 
ontology, Derrida imagines a way of being that is productively out-of-joint.  Only 
through the kind of not-knowing that characterizes the relationship between self and 
other, he suggests, can we make sense of the past, envision the future, or allow for the 
possibility of justice.  He writes: 
If there is something like spectrality, there are reasons to doubt this 
reassuring order of presents and, especially, the border between the 
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present, the actual or present reality of the present, and everything that can 
be opposed to it: absence, non-presence, non-effectivity, inactuality, 
virtuality, or even the simulacrum in general, and so forth. (Specters of 
Marx 48) 
Thus, for Derrida, the ghost or specter becomes a figure for all that disrupts, interrupts, or 
deconstructs, and possesses all the productive potential that such interventions promise.   
Building on both the post-positivist rejection of truth and knowledge that 
underlies Derrida’s “hauntology” and Freud’s notion of the uncanny, sociologist Avery 
Gordon argues for the value of haunting as a scholarly paradigm.  In Ghostly Matters, 
Gordon contends that haunting reveals the silences and omissions that define both the 
social world we inhabit and the critical frameworks we use to describe and analyze it.  As 
she writes, “[t]he ghost or the apparition is one form by which something lost, or barely 
visible, or seemingly not there to our supposedly well-trained eyes, makes itself known or 
apparent to us” (8).  In this definition, haunting is an act or process of disruption that both 
reveals and unsettles “the complicated workings of race, class, and gender, the names we 
give to the ensemble of social relations that create inequalities, situated interpretive 
codes, particular kinds of subjects, and the possible and impossible themselves” (4).  
Gordon’s formulation emphasizes the productive power of haunting as a manifestation of 
tension and contradiction: pushed to the edges of our collective social consciousness, but 
never completely contained, marginal subjects (women or political prisoners) and ugly 
chapters in history (dictatorship or slavery) continue to make their presence felt in life, 
literature, and culture.  Importantly, she argues for haunting as not merely a figurative 
trope, but as a foundational practice for the production of knowledge about others in and 
beyond the study of sociology.  Writing during a moment in which the rise of 
poststructuralism inspired, in her own words, “an optimism in the humanities and social 
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studies that the older institutional edifices were crumbling, [and] that new knowledge and 
modes of knowledge production were possible,” Gordon takes seriously the insights that 
can derive from experiences of silencing, liminality, and aporia (xviii). 
Several other recent works addressing haunting as both a literary theme and a 
critical paradigm form the context for this project, informing my use of the concept, but 
also diverging from it in important ways.  In Raising the Dead, Sharon Patricia Holland 
explores the experiences of liminality that mark African American literature and culture.  
Thinking in somewhat broader terms, Kathleen Brogan understands the rise of haunting 
in U.S. ethnic literature in the 1980s and ’90s as a “pan-ethnic phenomenon, registering a 
widespread concern with questions of ethnic identity and cultural transmission” (4).  
Although Brogan’s analysis reflects the limitations of multiculturalist frameworks, which 
risk treating ethnic identities as simply “flavors” of a broader minoritarian paradigm, she 
nevertheless points to a concern with ethnic identity and cultural memory that cuts across 
racial divides.  Finally, Ann Laura Stoler’s introduction to the edited collection Haunted 
by Empire uses haunting to describe how the legacies and consequences of imperialism 
reemerge in the most unexpected places.  Focusing on the frequently unacknowledged 
ways in which intimate relations are shaped by and reflective of structures of imperial 
domination, Stoler lays the groundwork for a transnational analysis of imperialism and its 
aftereffects.   
These theoretical formulations all contribute to the definition of literary haunting I 
draw on in the work that follows.  By using the concept of the other, a hallmark of 
poststructuralist theories, I aim to take advantage of the fluidity and flexibility that 
defines it.  The expansiveness of this concept of otherness allows it to inform the wide 
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range of encounters and experiences I categorize here as haunting.  It also has the 
potential to unsettle the kinds of directional flows of knowledge and power that 
categorize cross-cultural contacts.  Freud’s concept of the uncanny similarly has the 
potential to challenge hegemonic distinctions between the “knowers”—white, Western 
intellectuals—and the “known”—the racialized, gendered other of that Western self.  
Recognizing the other as one’s own uncanny double renders such distinctions, on which 
relationships of power and privilege are constructed, tenuous at best.  Finally, following  
Gordon’s model, I endeavor to address the unknown and the unknowable as the object of 
serious study.  Attending to the silences that mark both literary and social texts, the 
haunting presence of that which we cannot know becomes as foundational as our 
obligation to address it. 
Critical Contexts    
 My initial observation—that haunting was a recurrent theme in a wide array of 
U.S. and postcolonial texts—reflects the relevance of a concern with boundaries and 
definitions within each of these two literary fields.  More than ever, both postcolonial 
studies and American studies are haunted by their own past identities, as well as by their 
at times uneasy relationship to one another.  Postcolonial studies faces the challenges 
posed by the temporal structure that the “post-” in postcolonial implies: the period that 
follows the definitive end of European colonization in the Third World.  On the one hand, 
that teleological narrative of progress stakes a crucial claim, rejecting as a thing of the 
past the political domination, economic exploitation, and institutionalized racism that 
defined colonial rule.  Theorist Kwame Anthony Appiah points to this resistant narrative 
when he describes the “post-ness” of the postcolonial as a “a space-clearing gesture” 
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(348).  But half a century after the nationalist revolutions that ended formal colonial rule, 
teleological narratives pose challenges for those still committed to political, economic, 
and social transformations in the Third World that remain at best only partially realized.  
Simon Gikandi points to the problems of embracing a culturally defined postcoloniality 
that purports to transcend narratives of modernity and development, when the material 
needs and aspirations of many so-called postcolonial subjects remain linked to those very 
processes.  And Jennifer Wenzel insists on recognizing anti-imperialism’s powerful 
challenge to structures of colonial oppression, reminding us that, even if the hopeful 
promise of decolonization has not yet been realized, the setbacks faced by postcolonial 
nations have been neither ahistorical nor inevitable.  The work of these and other scholars 
suggests the complex temporalities with which postcolonial studies must now grapple: in 
order to preserve the political engagements entailed in narratives of revolutionary 
transformation, while recognizing the ongoing injustices that remain unaddressed even 
after the end of official colonial rule, the “post-colonial” must be both present and absent, 
both a contemporary reality and a future promise.   
 American studies, too, finds itself in a moment of redefinition.  The so-called 
“transnational turn” in American studies has pointed scholars in the field toward 
investigations of spaces, contacts, and movements beyond the U.S. nation, or at its 
borders; and toward literatures written in languages other than English, or in other 
Englishes.  As John Carlos Rowe has pointed out, critics differ significantly in their 
understanding of precisely what a transnational American studies entails.1  For some, it 
                                                
1 In an entry in the Encyclopedia of American Studies, Rowe describes the multiple, 
intersecting meanings of the field’s so-called “transnational turn.”  By his definition, the 
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has meant an increased attention to America’s frontiers and borderlands as vibrant spaces 
for cultural innovation, where counterhegemonic definitions of national identity are 
negotiated.2  For others, the transnational networks created by trade, travel, and migration 
are a privileged frame, suggesting the impossibility of considering any national space as 
isolated and self-contained.3  What these different methodological and theoretical 
orientations share is a sense of the insufficiency of the nation—at least in its traditional 
sense—as a critical frame.  But transnational American studies has also drawn criticism 
from those who see it as reproducing an expansionistic intellectual imperialism, in which 
everyone and everything becomes the Americanist’s sovereign terrain. 
 The study of  “global,” “world,” or “planetary” literature lies at the uneasy 
intersection of these two fields, each of which seeks in some way to reflect and respond 
to the apparent insufficiency of strictly national frames for understanding cultural, 
economic, linguistic, and political relations and circulations.  While “globalization” may 
aptly describe the observed phenomena of economic and cultural exchange, it is troubling 
as a critical frame to the extent that it reproduces schematic understandings of 
development such as the World-Systems Analysis made famous by Immanuel 
Wallerstein.  In setting forth a model that divides the world between “core” and 
“periphery,” World-Systems theory effectively takes the global, rather than the national, 
as its privileged frame, but as many of its detractors have noted, reifies the Eurocentrism 
                                                                                                                                            
term encompasses scholarship which draws connections to European imperialism and 
postcolonial studies, that which interrogates the concepts of “nation” and “citizenship,” 
as well as, in a somewhat different vein, American Studies scholarship that is conducted 
outside the U.S. academy. 
2 See, for instance, Guillermo Gómez-Peña, The New World Border 
3 Paul Gilroy’s 1993 book The Black Atlantic is a prominent and frequently cited example 
of such transnational work. 
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that defined imperial cartographies and imposes a single, undifferentiated system on the 
world it describes.  For some, such as Gayatri Spivak and Wai Chee Dimock, therefore, 
the planet is a better frame, one which evokes a grander scale that transcends humans’ 
ability to know, possess, or control.  Proposing to “overwrite the globe,” Spivak contends 
that the planet “belong[s] to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan” (Death of a 
Discipline 72).  In a similar vein, Dimock turns to the planet in search of “alternative 
geographies” that challenge the assumed primacy of the nation, arguing that “[f]orging 
such geographies might be one of the most critical tasks now facing the field” of 
American studies (3).  
Scholars such as David Damrosch and Franco Moretti have responded to the call 
for a renewed and redefined world literature by taking the global circulation and 
reception of literary texts itself as their object of study.  In his influential book What is 
World Literature?, Damrosch defines the field as comprised of “all literary works that 
circulate beyond their culture of origin, either in translation or in their original language,” 
offering a critical model that accounts for the ways in which literary texts are transformed 
through this process of circulation (4).  More controversially, Moretti has advocated a 
radical transformation of literary practice, arguing that “the sheer enormity of the task [of 
studying world literature] makes it clear that world literature cannot be literature, bigger; 
what we are already doing, just more of it. . . . The categories have to be different” (55).  
The “distant reading” he proposes, an approach which stands in deliberate contrast to the 
practices of close reading on which literary study has traditionally been based, allows 
critics to “focus on units that are much smaller or much larger than the text: devices, 
themes, tropes—or genres and systems” (57).   
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Although Moretti’s model is provocative, few have heeded his call to radically 
transform the practices of literary analysis.  His model of distant reading also differs in 
important ways from the practice of reading I am proposing here.  Moretti’s “distance” 
refers not to the cross-cultural reading of an individual text, but rather to a critical 
vantage point that is powerfully abstracted; it is not a question of difference, but rather of 
scale.  Indeed, Moretti makes very few concessions to the challenges of studying a given 
literary tradition from the position of a cultural outsider, and is unapologetic in his 
reliance on other experts for more detailed analyses of the national literatures on which 
he draws.  While I recognize Moretti’s argument that distance is a “condition of 
knowledge” that yields qualitatively different and valuable insights into literature, I 
question his assertion that this is the only or the best way to adequately respond to the 
breadth and diversity of the texts that the field of world literature must take as its objects 
of study (57).  Indeed, the model he puts forward, which is premised on abstraction, 
would be entirely ill suited to a consideration of the haunting fictions that are my subject 
here: where Moretti draws back in an effort to achieve a “global” perspective, these texts 
invite the opposite motion, drawing readers in and inviting them to take direct and 
personal responsibility for the stories that they read.  And although these texts impose 
limits on their readers’ knowledge and access, those limits are grounded in the 
responsibility of the direct, one-on-one encounter, rather than the detachment which 
Moretti’s model requires. 
 In contrast to Damrosch and Moretti, critics such as Vilashini Cooppan put 
forward a model of world literature that is predicated on less schematic forms of 
comparison.  These critics respond to the problems of scale and relation that world 
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literature poses by a process of shuttling in and out, using relations mapped out on the 
level of individual texts to help formulate an understanding of just exactly what the 
“global” entails.  Cooppan undertakes to read world literature “through a sustained and 
ongoing encounter with its local points and global forms” (11).  She suggests that 
[s]eeing literature as a system that operates on the principles of movement 
and exchange means comparing and connecting one text, time, and place 
with another, and hearing the echoes of one, or indeed many, in the voice 
of another.  This is what I would call reading literature in a worldly way. 
(11) 
Working to “imagine a literary-critical version of [Stuart] Hall’s ‘relational thinking’” as 
the basis for world literature, it is no coincidence that Cooppan herself turns to the 
concept of haunting to make sense of these kinds of cross-cultural contacts (13).  For 
Cooppan, the tensions between sameness and difference that emerge in the reading of 
world literature have echoes of the Freudian uncanny, such that 
[t]o read Sumerian and Egyptian poetry, the Sanskrit or Malian epic, the 
Kenyan or Colombian novel, is to seek out the sheer unassimilable 
strangeness of difference and to open oneself to the uncanny moment in 
which difference is refracted, if only fragmentarily, as the familiar. (22) 
Cooppan is careful to warn against the kind of “imperializing model” that “aims simply 
to reveal the other as the self,” a danger of the Great Books approach to world literature 
that grounds itself in supposedly universal standards of literary value (22).  But her own 
dynamic, dialogic method of world reading resists this model and “invites us . . . to 
recognize instead a ghostly alienness animating every text,” not only those from the 
marginalized or minority traditions (24). 
 Cooppan’s framework describes not so much “world literature,” a static body of 
knowledge, but rather “world reading,” a dynamic and transactional process of contact 
and exchange, in effect providing a model of world literature that is implicitly or 
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explicitly reader-centered.  Such a reader-centered approach invites us to define world 
literature not merely descriptively, as Moretti does, or even proscriptively, as debates 
over disciplinary formations do, but aspirationally, by considering what kinds of 
relationships and engagements world texts themselves both invite and structure.  In 
arguing for a focus on world literature’s invocation and interpellation of its readers, I am 
not undertaking a sociological study of real readers’ documented responses to literary 
texts.4  Instead, my concern is with what narratologists have termed the “textual” or 
“implied” reader, who is created and structured by the text’s address.  If, as Damrosch 
suggests, the concept of world literature is grounded in the circulation of texts beyond 
their country or culture of origin, it is worth considering how certain texts themselves 
invite, anticipate, and manage the engagements and responses of diverse readerships.  In 
different ways, the texts I consider provide us with a model for cross-cultural 
comparative reading by creating a space for readers beyond their immediate national or 
cultural context.  In doing so, they consciously forge connections with distant readers, but 
also carefully structure those readers’ engagements, reminding them of the limits of the 
access or insight into another’s life and world that reading a work of fiction can provide.   
Thinking about these texts’ engagements with their readers as hauntings 
foregrounds a crucial element of their operation: the ambiguity that defines a reader’s 
encounter with any work of fiction.  As Wolfgang Iser suggests, the very concept of a 
reader-centered approach to literature is grounded in a recognition of literature as a 
                                                
4 Although readership studies is not my chosen methodology, recent work by Megan 
Sweeney, who considers incarcerated women’s use of literary texts from a variety of 
genres, and Kenneth Roemer, who uses reader-response criticism to explore the reception 
of utopian fiction, points to the valuable contributions of such approaches. 
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transaction enabled by uncertainty and ambiguity: “it is the elements of indeterminacy 
that enable the text to ‘communicate’ with the reader, in the sense that they induce him to 
participate both in the production and the comprehension of the work’s intention” (24).  
Much like a ghost, which gets and keeps our attention through the very fact of its 
incomprehensible strangeness, a work of literature engages readers who are drawn in by 
and must respond to its ambiguity.  Indeed, in Avery Gordon’s formulation, the effects of 
a haunting encounter sound a great deal like those of reading a good book: “The ghost . . . 
pulls us affectively into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to experience as 
recognition.  Haunting recognition is a special way of knowing what has happened or is 
happening” (63).  Echoing Iser, Gordon imagines a ghost whose strangeness draws us in, 
but that strangeness in turn gives way to a transformative recognition that initiates us into 
a “special way of knowing,” the circumscribed, imperfect, projective knowing that 
reading a work of fiction can produce.  Like the haunting encounters depicted by the 
works of fiction I consider, the texts themselves challenge us to make contact across 
boundaries of difference and, despite imperfect knowledge or understanding, to become 
responsible through the act of reading.  
Comparative Practice 
The comparative readings that comprise each chapter of this dissertation 
constitute yet another form of haunting, working to destabilize both the national 
narratives within which they are situated and, as Cooppan suggests, calling into question 
the hierarchical structures of value and visibility that define their relationship to one 
another.  Each of these comparisons is driven by formal and thematic similarities that 
connect texts drawn from distinct national, ethnic, and cultural contexts, and makes an 
 
17 
argument for the continuities between them.  Like haunting encounters, which challenge 
us to confront the limits of our knowledge, these comparisons unsettle critical positions 
grounded in cultural authenticity or acquired expertise, since few readers will find 
themselves equally familiar with all of the texts under consideration.  Like literary ghosts, 
which traverse temporal and geographic boundaries, comparative readings such as these 
challenge the illusions of isolation and self-containment that form the boundaries of 
academic fields and disciplines, providing the basis for meaningful connections across 
difference while making even the most familiar texts and contexts strange.  
Chapter 1, “Encounters with Ghosts: The Ethics and Politics of the Supernatural,” 
centers on the depictions of the supernatural in Toni Morrison’s Beloved and the novella 
“Pterodactyl, Puran Sahay, and Pirtha” by the Indian author and activist Mahasweta Devi.  
Although the apparitions these two authors imagine—the ghost of a murdered child and a 
prehistoric winged creature—differ in important ways, both test the limits of readers’ 
willingness to believe.  Echoing poststructuralist formulations of the ethical encounter, 
the characters within these texts confront the ghosts that haunt them across boundaries of 
insuperable difference, and in those encounters become both singular and responsible.  
By challenging readers to take their hauntings seriously, these texts also challenge us to 
take seriously the realities their characters occupy: a world in which the threat of 
slavery’s dehumanization justifies the taking of a child’s life, or in which relentless 
drought and famine are not enough to drive one away from the land where one’s 
ancestors are buried.  But by foregrounding the moments of intentional infidelity that 
mark their own texts as stories not to be passed on, both Morrison and Devi also remind 
us that our entrance into the world of the text has only been provisional. 
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Chapter 2, “Haunting Pasts: Telling the Traumas of History,” uses trauma theory 
to explore how imperial domination lives on in the present.  Focusing on the novels 
Ceremony, by Leslie Marmon Silko, and The God of Small Things, by Arundhati Roy, I 
argue that trauma is not a depoliticizing framework, but can in fact serve to reinforce the 
connections between the ostensibly “private” sphere of affective experience and the 
“public” sphere of the political.  Because of the paradoxical nature of traumatic memory, 
the fictional representations of trauma in these two novels raise important questions about 
the stakes of narrating the past.  By inviting identification with its protagonist, Ceremony 
encourages its readers to embrace an alternate narrative of history and share in a healing 
ceremony that the text itself enacts.  The God of Small Things, by contrast, expresses a 
greater suspicion about revisionary narratives, which it suggests may allow one to dodge 
responsibility for the past. In doing so, it also reminds its readers of their responsibility to 
the past and cautions them against identifying too easily with its victims.  
Chapter 3, “Invisible Victims, Visible Absences: Imagining Disappearance for 
and International Audience,” places the novel Anil’s Ghost, by Michael Ondaatje, 
alongside the American film Missing (1982).  These texts center around disappearance, 
an act of political violence that leaves behind either a body without a name, as in the case 
of Anil’s Ghost, or a name without a body, as in Missing.  In different ways, both texts 
rely on the unique properties of fictional narrative to fill the gaps and silences that 
disappearance produces, making its victims visible and laying the groundwork for real-
world intervention.  But in doing so, they inevitably reproduce the limitations of their 
authors’ or their readers’ imaginations.  Written at a remove from the conflicts they 
depict, and reflective of the distant audiences for which they are produced, Missing and 
 
19 
Anil’s Ghost rely on the conventions of realism to establish their authority and 
truthfulness.  The lives and experiences they cannot imagine, however, haunt them from 
the margins. 
Chapter 4, “Dystopian Presents, Haunting Futures,” considers how 
representations of the present are haunted by futures that they cannot envision.  
Comparing Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born with Don DeLillo’s 
Falling Man, this chapter draws on theories of dystopian literature to make sense of the 
way these two texts invite their readers to imagine a different and better future.  Writing 
in moments of social crisis, these two authors must balance the desire to imagine change 
and transformation with a recognition of the danger that hopeful visions will merely 
reproduce the conditions of the present.  Inasmuch as the power of their social critique is 
grounded in the unrelenting pessimism of their outlooks, Beautyful Ones and Falling 
Man cannot themselves imagine or depict hopeful futures.  But through their cyclical 
structure and ambiguous, open-ended narrative, these texts allow readers to take up the 
challenge of imagining the kinds of social transformation that the texts themselves cannot 
provide. 
Ultimately, I argue that it is through comparisons such as these, shaped by the 
logic of haunting, that we might best approach the practice of reading world literature. 
These haunting encounters insist on the importance of making contact across difference 
in our contemporary global moment, when such contacts are both urgent and inevitable.  
But just as importantly, they also work to unsettle and destabilize the asymmetrical 
structures of knowledge and power at work within these relationships.  The chapters that 
follow provide an opportunity, in Cooppan’s words, “to witness through the distorted lens 
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of a partial familiarity, a version of the temporal, linguistic, or cultural difference with 





Encounters with Ghosts: The Ethics and Politics of the Supernatural 
In Mahasweta Devi’s novella, “Pterodactyl, Puran Sahay, and Pirtha,” a 
progressive Indian journalist travels to an impoverished tribal village where he comes 
face-to-face with something impossible: a creature with wings and claws that regards him 
with a “glance . . . so prehistoric that Puran’s brain cells, spreading a hundred antennae, 
understand nothing of that glance.  If tonight he’d seen a stone flying, with its wings 
spread, would he have been able to speak to it?” (141)  Puran’s encounter with the 
pterodactyl is an encounter with incomprehensible difference, that which is absolutely 
other.  But Puran cannot walk away or disregard what he has seen; instead, he knows 
instantly that the pterodactyl has come to him as a “supplicant” and that he is responsible 
for protecting it from the prying eyes of the world (142).  The appearance of the 
pterodactyl—not a ghost in the strict sense, but rather an “ancestral spirit”—not only 
challenges Puran’s understanding of the modern world he occupies, but also tests and 
stretches the credulity of Devi’s rationalistic readers.  Like the supernatural phenomena 
that occur throughout the body of fiction described as magical realism, Devi’s pterodactyl 
is definitively not a symbol or a metaphor, but a material fact which readers of her text 
must accept—at least provisionally—as part of the novella’s central premise. 
In this chapter, I explore the consequences of Devi’s choice to make a 
supernatural apparition central to a work of fiction that explicitly addresses the 
immediate, pressing needs of India’s oppressed tribal minority communities.  
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“Pterodactyl,” like Devi’s other fiction and journalistic writing, articulates a scathing 
critique of India’s government and its Hindu majority, who are responsible for 
perpetuating the structural inequalities that condemn tribal communities to poverty, 
illiteracy, and starvation.  At first blush, asking readers to accept the possibility that an 
embodied ghost or specter inhabits this present-day world would seem to detract from the 
force of such a critique.  Examining “Pterodactyl” alongside another equally surprising 
and provocative depiction of the supernatural, Toni Morrison’s Beloved, helps bring the 
effects of this strategy into sharper focus.   
In both “Pterodactyl” and Beloved, fictional characters model the response to the 
supernatural that readers themselves are invited to adopt.  By confronting the ghosts face-
to-face, these characters recognize a form of mutuality that connects them with the ghosts 
across unbridgeable boundaries of difference.  The relationships with ghosts these texts 
depict echo poststructuralist formulations of ethics, which define the encounter with the 
other as the source of ethical responsibility.  As readers, we too are confronted with 
stories that challenge rationalist assumptions about the nature of reality and test our 
ability to believe.  Like the characters within them, readers of these two texts must learn 
to connect across boundaries of difference: to recognize their implication in the stories 
they read, but also to respect the limits that the texts themselves enforce.   
Encounters with the Other 
In Devi’s “Pterodactyl,” Puran is transformed by his encounter with an 
impossible, prehistoric creature that appears in an impoverished tribal village in 
contemporary India.  As a journalist for a local newspaper in the city of Patna, Puran 
travels to the town of Pirtha at the request of an old friend, Harisharan, who is now a 
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local official, to document the ongoing crisis there.  Although the government refuses to 
acknowledge it, the tribal people living in Pirtha and other neighboring towns are dying 
from a man-made famine and from pesticide poisoning; by inviting Puran, Harisharan 
hopes to publicize the humanitarian crisis and obtain relief supplies for his starving 
constituents.  In the town, however, a mysterious creature has been sighted—part reptile, 
part bird—and a tribal boy named Bikhia has carved its image in stone.  When Puran first 
arrives in Pirtha, the local people are mistrustful of him, and his attempts to win their 
acceptance only further mark him as an outsider.  But everything changes on Puran’s first 
night in the village, when the pterodactyl appears seeking shelter in the hut where he is 
sleeping.  His obligation to protect and conceal the pterodactyl, which he believes to be 
an ancestral spirit of the tribal community, allies him with Bikhia, and together they 
struggle to care for it and protect the secret of its presence.  During his stay in Pirtha, 
Puran witnesses the dignity and integrity of the tribals in the face not only of starvation, 
but also exploitation by labor contractors and objectification by international aid workers 
who seek to capture the tribals’ abjection on film.  But the pterodactyl’s death brings 
Puran’s time in Pirtha to an end.  Together, he and Bikhia hide its body in a deep cavern, 
and Puran prepares to return to his own life and his work as a journalist.  The article he 
writes about Pirtha is scathing; it makes no mention of the pterodactyl and focuses 
exclusively on the government neglect and corruption that is responsible for the tribals’ 
suffering.  At the novella’s close, Puran is hailing a truck on the road leaving Pirtha, to 
return to his life, his profession, and his family. 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved is perhaps the most well-known ghost story in 
contemporary American literature, and like Devi’s novella, it depicts an encounter with 
 
 24 
the supernatural that challenges characters’ assumptions about the world they occupy.  
Morrison’s novel is set in the black community on the outskirts of Cincinnati in the 
period following emancipation.  At the center of the novel is an event that occurred years 
before, when Sethe, an escaped slave, attempted to kill her own children rather than allow 
them to be recaptured and returned to slavery.  At the time the novel begins, Sethe is 
living in isolation with her surviving daughter, Denver, her two sons having fled the 
uneasy atmosphere of a house purported to be haunted by the ghost of their dead sister.  
The arrival of Paul D., a former slave from the same plantation, promises to bring Sethe 
out of her isolation and back into the world.  When the two begin a romantic relationship, 
Sethe hesitantly ventures beyond the house at 124 Bluestone Road, and the black 
community which had ostracized her begins to show signs of acceptance.  But the arrival 
of another visitor, a mysterious young woman named Beloved, changes all that.  At once 
a helpless, demanding child and a sinister, knowing presence, Beloved drives Paul D. 
away, but is embraced by Sethe and Denver, who come to believe that she is the 
embodied ghost of Sethe’s murdered daughter.  Despite their efforts to “make up for the 
handsaw,” Beloved’s insatiable need for love and attention drains the women dry; on the 
brink of starvation, Denver ventures into the outside world to seek help from the women 
of the local community, who drive Beloved off (Beloved 263).  At the novel’s close, 
Denver has matured into an independent and capable adult, Paul D. begins to reconcile 
with Sethe, and Beloved’s ghost is gradually, but uneasily, forgotten. 
In many important ways, relationships with ghosts or specters in these two texts 
echo the face-to-face encounter with the other that lies at the heart of poststructuralist 
formulations of ethics.  For theorists such as Levinas and Derrida, the one-on-one 
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encounter between oneself and any other gives rise to a profound, personal obligation that 
exceeds the subject’s volition.  The responsibility this relationship engenders is not based 
on any kind of calculated exchange; it is a “responsibility that goes beyond what I may or 
may not have done to the Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed” 
(Levinas 83).  But despite that profound responsibility, the other remains fundamentally 
different and inherently unknowable.  As Levinas reminds us, 
The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious 
relationship of communion, or a sympathy through which we put 
ourselves in the other’s place; we recognize the other as resembling us, but 
exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a 
Mystery. (43) 
What Levinas describes as “a Mystery,” and Derrida identifies as “the secret,” remains 
the defining characteristic of the ethical encounter, and this residue of secrecy is, in part, 
what leads Gayatri Spivak to describe ethics itself as “the experience of the impossible” 
(“Imaginary Maps” xxv).1   
For these poststructuralist thinkers, the difference of the other is absolute, and not 
a matter of degree: inasmuch as the other is distinct from the self, every other is entirely 
other.  This assertion of radical alterity allows the relationship between the self and the 
other to extend beyond the interpersonal and encompass other kinds of otherness, such as 
the otherness of God, death, futurity, and knowledge.  At the same time, however, an 
element of mutuality lies at the foundation of the ethical obligation that makes one 
responsible to “the naked face of the first individual to come along” (Levinas 83). The 
                                                
1 Spivak, a formidable postructuralist theorist in her own right, translated and introduced 
the collection Imaginary Maps, which includes “Pterodactyl.”  Spivak’s framing of 
Devi’s fiction, as well as her translation, places it explicitly in the context of 
postructuralist ethics, reflecting but also glossing the dynamics at work in the text itself.  
For explorations of Spivak’s role as translator and the implications of her arguably 
heavy-handed interpretive presence, see Iuliano, Salgado, and Wenzel. 
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mutuality of such a relationship reflects what Levinas describes, borrowing the 
terminology of philosopher Martin Buber, as the “I-Thou” relationship: addressing the 
other as “Thou,” rather than the more formal “You” or the objectified “It,” the subject’s 
relationship to the other is a dialogue defined by both intimacy and reciprocity.  In 
assuming responsibility for the other, the subject stands alone as singular and 
irreplaceable.  For Derrida, mortality is the source of this singularity, since in the moment 
of one’s death no one else can be substituted in one’s place.  Thus, “[i]t is from the site of 
death as the place of my irreplaceability, that is, of my singularity, that I feel called to 
responsibility.  In this sense only a mortal can be responsible” (Derrida, The Gift of Death 
41).  It is this stance of “ethical singularity,” which entails a recognition of both 
difference (“singularity”) and responsibility (“ethical”), that allows one to enter into 
mutual relationships with others. 
 Derrida imagines the dialogue between the self and the other as an offer of 
welcome or hospitality, citing Levinas’s claim that “[t]o approach the Other in discourse 
is to welcome his expression” (qtd. in Adieu 27).  However, as Derrida goes on to 
suggest, this radical openness to the other exposes the subject to the risk of being 
haunted: 
When someone questioned Levinas about the “phantomatic character” of 
his philosophy, especially when it treats “the face of the other,” Levinas 
did not directly object. . . . [H]e clearly specified “welcomed,” especially 
in an “immediate,” urgent way, without waiting, as if “real” qualities, 
attributes, or properties (everything that makes a living person into 
something other than a phantom) slowed down, mediatized, or 
compromised the purity of this welcome.  It is necessary to welcome the 
other in his alterity, without waiting, and thus not to pause to recognize his 
real predicates.  It is thus necessary, beyond all perception, to receive the 
other while running the risk, a risk that is always troubling, strangely 
troubling, like the stranger (unheimlich), of a hospitality offered to the 
guest or ghost or Geist or Gast.  There would be no hospitality without the 
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chance of spectrality.  But spectrality is not nothing, it exceeds, and thus 
deconstructs, all ontological oppositions, being and nothingness, life and 
death—and it also gives.  It can give, give order(s), and give pardon, and it 
can also not do so . . . . (Adieu 111-2) 
Derrida seems to describe precisely the fate that befalls both Puran and Sethe, who in 
offering hospitality, end up playing host to the ghostly.  The ghosts that haunt them, like 
the ones that Derrida describes, undermine and transform the oppositions that defined 
their realities, giving and withholding orders and pardon.  These ghosts’ deconstructive 
spectrality is indeed “strangely troubling,” and by “troubling” the boundaries of Puran’s 
and Sethe’s self-declared isolation, the ghosts make them sensible for the first time of 
their obligation to others.  By offering hospitality to the ghosts that haunt them, Puran 
and Sethe learn to recognize the limits of their ability to know another, and in doing so, 
become truly responsible. 
Both Puran and Sethe mistakenly believe that they know others, and their 
inappropriate claims to knowledge only serve isolate them and limit their ability to be 
truly responsible.  Although Puran thinks of himself as progressive, his inability to 
understand the realities of tribal life leads him to produce reductive representations of 
tribals that arguably do more harm than good.  Moreover, in his personal life, Puran finds 
himself unable to form meaningful bonds with those he most cares about.  Sethe, too, is a 
victim of her own misplaced certainty about those around her.  Years later, she still fails 
to recognize that it is not only the violence of her actions, but also the claim she exercised 
over her children and her certainty about their future, that troubles her family and friends.  
Sure that she will be judged by others for her “rough choice,” Sethe never gives them the 
opportunity, cutting herself off from the kinds of reciprocal relationships that define a 
sustaining community (Beloved 188).  In opening themselves to ghosts, however, these 
 
 28 
characters are forced to confront a form of radical alterity that frustrates and invalidates 
their attempts to know, to explain, or to interpret.  After the ghosts’ departure they are 
much closer to the kinds of ethical responsibility that Derrida and Levinas describe: they 
begin to recognize the limits of their ability to know another, and in doing so, become 
able to enact their responsibility to others and to accept the singularity that makes them 
answerable for their own actions.  
A Dinosaur in Pirtha 
At the start of Devi’s novella, Puran is portrayed as a man isolated from family 
and community and adrift in his own life.  A middle-aged widower whose wife died in 
childbirth, Puran has allowed his son to be raised primarily by his own mother, and 
although he has been in a romantic relationship with his girlfriend Saraswati for years, he 
is unwilling to commit to marriage.  Although Puran prides himself on his efforts to 
defend and advocate for tribals and other oppressed groups through his journalism, 
Devi’s text makes clear how little Puran understands about the experiences and values of 
the tribal people he attempts to represent.  Reflecting on an article he wrote about a tribal 
man who attacked another man in a conflict over a water buffalo, Puran remembers later 
that he “had not grasped the desperation behind his urgent and troubled message” (103).  
Despite the man’s attempt to explain that a water buffalo is invaluable to a successful 
farmer, Puran fails to understand the desperation that would push this tribal man to 
murder.  Puran intends well, but Devi ironizes the self-congratulatory attitude with which 
he recalls turning the man’s life-and-death story into “a most compassionate small news 
item” (103).  By failing to recognize his own ignorance of the man’s experience, Puran 
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succeeds only in transforming him into an object of compassion for an audience of 
educated and comparatively privileged newspaper readers. 
 Puran embarks on his trip to Pirtha with similar assumptions about the poverty he 
has been sent to document.  As he packs his belongings, he seems to pride himself on his 
own expert and practiced minimalism: “A sarong, a towel, jeans and kurta top . . . , 
‘Monkey’ brand tooth powder (he can’t bear a toothbrush), soap, shaving gear, comb, 
camera, a small tape recorder, a notebook, three ballpoints” (107-8).  When he arrives in 
Pirtha along with a desperately needed shipment of relief supplies, however, the extreme 
poverty and famine there make a mockery of his carefully prepared travel bag.  
Confronted with the tribal community’s desperation, Puran is moved to respond, but his 
initial attempts to do so prove hollow and misguided.  Understandably troubled by the 
idea that he should have better food and accommodations than the members of the 
community who are his hosts, he insists that he will sleep on the floor of an abandoned 
hut rather than at the house of a local leader, the Sarpanch, and asks for only simple, 
minimal food to eat.  But this self-denial misses the point: when Puran tries to avoid 
eating dinner, Shankar, an educated tribal man, frankly informs him that “[y]ou people 
understand nothing.  Will our hunger lessen if you don’t eat?” (136)   
After only a few hours in Pirtha, Puran begins to realize how little he understands 
about the lives of the tribals whose suffering he has come to document, and the futility of 
gestures such as refusing food or theatrically handing over his camera in an attempt to 
earn their trust: 
He had always thought he was altogether self-reliant since he set out with 
nothing but a sarong and a toothbrush in his shoulder bag.  Now he sees 
that’s not enough.  He feels inadequate.  It’s true that he can’t reach 
Shankar’s people by eating little or sleeping on grass mats.  There is a 
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great gulf fixed between Puran’s kind and Shankar’s kind.  But he does 
want to get close. (140) 
Whereas before Puran believed he could understand and even ally himself with the tribals 
by approximating the conditions under which they live, he now understands that the 
difference separating him from them is far more profound than their different lifestyles.  
With the recognition of this difference, however, comes a new, strengthened desire to 
connect with the tribals in a more legitimate and respectful way: no longer entirely “self-
reliant,” Puran now begins to feel the desire to “get close” to the people about whom he 
previously wrote from a distance, knowing that he will never be able to “reach” them 
completely.  
Puran’s relationship to the tribal community is transformed by the arrival of the 
pterodactyl, which appears to Puran in the abandoned hut where he is sleeping on his first 
night in Pirtha.  The pterodactyl singles Puran out, and as in the confrontation with the 
naked face of the other that initiates the subject into responsibility, the obligation Puran 
feels to the creature is immediate and profoundly personal.  Spivak, who translated the 
novella, is certainly inspired by this parallel in her reading of the text, describing the 
pterodactyl as an “ungraspable other” who calls forth “ethical responsibility-in-
singularity” from Puran (“Afterword” 200).  The pterodactyl’s prehistoric gaze shatters 
Puran’s isolation and ostensible self-sufficiency, for in it he sees a personal appeal and 
call to responsibility: “It wants refuge with Puran.  Puran cannot betray this, for any 
reason at all” (142).  Unlike Puran’s vague if justified sense of collective social guilt as a 
member of the nation’s middle class and privileged Hindu majority, his obligation to the 
pterodactyl singles him out as an individual.  His contact with the pterodactyl is intense 
and one-on-one: in order to protect the creature, Puran must conceal it in the private, 
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domestic space of the hut where he is staying.  He must provide for it from among his 
own personal possessions and feed it with his own food: when Puran asks for fish the day 
after the pterodactyl’s arrival, Harisharan assumes it is for him to eat, but a careful reader 
realizes that it is intended to feed the pterodactyl.  The intense, personal obligation that 
Puran feels toward the pterodactyl stands in stark contrast to his earlier compassion for 
the tribals, and by meeting and returning the pterodactyl’s gaze, Puran begins to 
understand a form of responsibility before another that is far more meaningful than his 
earlier gestures of altruism. 
 Despite the profound and personal obligation that Puran feels when faced with the 
pterodactyl’s gaze, however, the creature’s thoughts remain inscrutable to him.  Puran’s 
first reaction to the pterodactyl is utter incomprehension; it is as if he had seen “a stone 
flying” (141).  Later, as he tries to provide it with food and shelter, he is forced to 
recognize that he understands nothing of its wants and needs.  Consulting a reference 
book on dinosaurs provides little insight, since the book describes no creature quite like 
the one that he has witnessed: 
 Pterodactyl—a flying reptile of the pterosauria class from the 
Mesozoic era, extinct species . . . .  Their earlier editions, e.g. the 
rhamphorynchus, still had the long tail of a reptile and innumerable teeth.   
 [This creature has no teeth.  It does not have a long tail, Puran is 
certain, for he has taken a good look in the half-light.]  The pterodactylus 
of the earth’s Jurassic age was as big as a sparrow, with a very small tail, 
and teeth in the front part of the mouth.  [This one is larger in size.] (154, 
brackets in original) 
 
Earlier, Puran prided himself on having “done his homework” by reading about the 
history and geography of the Madhya Pradesh region and “the characteristics of the 




 The taxonomy in Puran’s reference book not only fails to describe the creature he 
has encountered, but also provides no insights into the reason for its appearance or the 
message that he believes it carries.  Although the text itself is careful not to authorize 
Puran’s assumptions, Puran believes the pterodactyl is an ancestor of the tribal 
community that has returned to communicate an important message to modern India in 
general, and himself in particular.  “It wants to say something, to give some news, Puran 
does not understand.  No point of communication” (158 italics in original).  Puran 
considers many possible messages, including that man-made famine is a crime, that the 
“collective being” of tribal peoples has been crushed, and that humans, like dinosaurs, are 
becoming an endangered species (157).  Against the backdrop of the crisis in Pirtha that 
Puran is witnessing, all of these messages are compelling and all of them are urgent, but 
to each question that Puran poses, “the dusky lidless eyes remain unresponsive” (157).  If 
indeed the pterodactyl has come from the past with a message, its inability to 
communicate that message only strengthens Puran’s sense of obligation to it.  In the end, 
Puran poses to the pterodactyl, and in effect confirms to himself, the explanation that 
human and dinosaur are bound together by the very difference that separates them: “You 
have come to me for shelter, and I do not know how to save you, is that why I’ll see your 
death?” (158)  In this final interpretation of the pterodactyl’s inscrutable gaze, Puran 
bases the obligation he feels to the pterodactyl—to remain with it and witness its death—
on his own inability to understand it.  In this moment, Puran seems to see his 
responsibility to the pterodactyl as being derived from rather than diminished by the 
unbridgeable difference that makes self-disclosure and understanding between them 
impossible.      
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In its supernatural, impossible existence, the pterodactyl frustrates all claims at 
knowing: Puran cannot learn about it from a book or interpret its gaze, and on the most 
basic level, he cannot even succeed in finding any plant or animal that the creature will 
eat.  Indeed, Devi’s text suggests that attempting to know or represent the pterodactyl can 
have unsettling or even dangerous consequences.  As Harisharan and the Sub-Division 
Officer assert, echoing one another, to believe in the pterodactyl is nothing less than to 
“deny reality,” for “if we acknowledge the pterodactyl, where will homo-sapiens-mapiens 
be?  Their two worlds are different after all” (113, 159).  In an important sense, these 
men’s assessments are correct: the pterodactyl’s existence does pose a radical challenge 
to modern, rationalist definitions of reality.  Rather than embracing that challenge, 
however, both men, as government officials, concern themselves only with “what can be 
done within the administrative framework” of the modern Indian state (112). 
By contrast, the fate of the journalist Surajpratap demonstrates the costs of 
attempting to reconcile the pterodactyl’s existence with the “administrative framework” 
that Harisharan and the Sub-Division Officer represent.  Surajpratap, who arrives in 
Pirtha shortly after Bikhia’s first sighting of the pterodactyl, takes photographs of the 
carving that Bikhia has created and plans to publish them.  Devi’s text describes 
Surajpratap as an idealist and a reformer who made a reputation for himself in the Dalit 
movement, and who came to Pirtha committed to documenting the injustices suffered by 
the people there.  When he insists on publishing a report on the pterodactyl, however, 
Harisharan and the Sub-Division Officer confiscate his film and he loses his job at the 
newspaper he works for, which has indirect ties to the government.  In the end, 
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Surajpratap suffers a nervous breakdown; a man who “had great promise,” he drops off 
the map and achieves nothing for the people of Pirtha (112).   
The “explosion in . . . Surajpratap’s head” when he first sees Bikhia’s carving 
exemplifies the cost of trying to know the inscrutable pterodactyl (159).  Unlike 
Surajpratap, Puran seems to understand the limitations of his contact with the 
supernatural creature.  Whereas Surajpratap is eager to document the pterodactyl, Puran 
acknowledges that it is, in its absolute strangeness, beyond representation: “I won’t go 
near, I won’t touch you, I will not take your picture with the flash bulb of my camera” 
(155).  By recognizing the way that the pterodactyl’s difference places it beyond his 
reach, Puran protects not only the pterodactyl, but also his own sanity.  Rather than 
attempting to produce knowledge about the pterodactyl, as Surajpratap did, Puran 
recognizes what he had not before: the profound limitations of his ability to know 
another.  Whereas before he was satisfied with reducing tribals and their life-and-death 
struggles to “most compassionate small news item[s],” after his encounter with the 
pterodactyl he respects the integrity of their experience, however different it may be from 
his own.  When Puran first arrived in Pirtha, he refused food in sympathy with the tribal 
community, failing to recognize how his status as a (well-fed) outsider made this gesture 
hollow.  After coming face-to-face with the pterodactyl, he participates in the tribal 
community’s mourning rituals, but never forgets his difference and his status as a guest.  
Puran’s encounter with the pterodactyl changes him, forcing him to recognize the 
insuperable difference that makes it impossible to truly know another, but also revealing 
that difference to be the source of ethical responsibility rather than an impediment to it.  
The relationship Puran forges with Bikhia, in particular, exemplifies this newfound 
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understanding of difference, and it stands in stark contrast to the condescending 
sympathy or empty equalizing gestures that constituted his earlier efforts to connect with 
the tribals.  As the pterodactyl’s caretakers, Puran and Bikhia are bound together of 
necessity in a tacit partnership; nevertheless, Puran often finds the silent Bikhia as 
inscrutable as the pterodactyl itself.  By the time Puran leaves Pirtha, however, he has 
come to recognize and value the distance that persists between them, despite their 
partnership.  Meeting eyes with Bikhia, Puran takes the following cautionary message 
from him:  
Because you are involved in this incident, therefore you’ll have to stay to 
the end.  That does not mean that you will get from me the comradeship of 
the last few days.  You remain you, and I remain me, and after this heavy 
phase is over each will return to the orbit of his life. (182) 
Bikhia’s acceptance of Puran’s role in the pterodactyl’s visit is grudging, but definite, and 
despite insisting on the boundaries of difference that will continue to separate them, 
Bikhia also acknowledges their provisional partnership.  This relationship is tentative and 
circumscribed, to be sure, but it nevertheless contrasts sharply with Puran’s earlier, failed 
efforts to understand and participate in tribal life.  Puran’s compliance with Bikhia’s 
directives—that he participate in the rituals that end the period of mourning and that he 
leave as soon as they are completed—reflects the relationship of respect and obligation 
the two men share.  As Puran comes to understand, he can honor his responsibility to 
Bikhia by recognizing the difference that separates them from one another. 
 Puran’s relationship with his longtime girlfriend, Saraswati, is also transformed 
by his contact with the pterodactyl.  He himself is the first to admit that, although he has 
known Saraswati for fourteen years, “no real relationship has grown” between them (97).  
Shortly before his departure for Pirtha, Saraswati has issued Puran an ultimatum: still 
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unmarried at the age of thirty-two, she is ready to give up on him and join an ashram.  
Puran acknowledges that he is responsible for not allowing “a fleshly, hungry, thirsty, 
human relationship to grow” between him and Saraswati, but when he leaves for Pirtha 
he feels unable to do anything about it, and ponders the following “moral question”: 
“how will a person merely floating in the every-day world, who has not attempted to 
build a human relationship with mother-son-Saraswati, be able to do justice to a subject 
as a journalist?” (97)  Soon after arriving in Pirtha, however, Puran realizes that the 
reverse is true: in order to do justice “to himself or Saraswati in the Saraswati affair,” he 
must find a way to grasp the stories of tribal oppression he is being told by the people 
there (119).  His encounter with the pterodactyl allows him to understand not only his 
relationship with the tribal community, but also his relationship with Saraswati, in new 
terms.    
Puran’s thoughts repeatedly turn to Saraswati as he struggles to make sense of the 
pterodactyl’s appearance.  Reflecting on the fact that books are unable to explain the 
pterodactyl’s difference, he recalls Saraswati’s speculation that “[p]erhaps you have not 
been able to know me after so many years spent close together because there is no book 
about me” (158).  Puran’s connection with Saraswati, like his contact with the pterodactyl 
is a connection across difference that can never be completely bridged: the difference 
that, as Derrida suggests, separates any two individuals.  By demonstrating the limits of 
his ability to know another, Puran’s encounter with the pterodactyl prepares him to 
connect more meaningfully with Saraswati.  Whereas before, Saraswati was the object of 
Puran’s search for knowledge, after his encounter with the pterodactyl, he is able to 
approach her across difference, rather than attempting to “know” her as he would the 
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information in a book, and to accept the mutual responsibility that connects them to one 
another.  As Puran’s visit to Pirtha draws to a close, Harisharan offers some friendly 
advice to Puran, who he admits “has changed so in these few days” (173).  “Man!  Go 
back.  Get married.  Return to normal life,” Harisharan recommends, to which Puran 
replies with surprising ease, “I’ll do that” (185). 
Perhaps most importantly, after his time spent in Pirtha, Puran understands that he 
can only fulfill his responsibility to the people of Pirtha by respecting the difference 
between their world and his.  As he contemplates writing his article, Puran recognizes 
secrecy, rather than disclosure, as his highest form of responsibility: “Pirtha has taught 
him that, even if you are a reporter, you must not ask all the questions all the time” (180). 
On its face, Puran’s report about Pirtha may not differ greatly from his earlier 
compassionate small-news item.  Both claim to speak on behalf of tribals who are not 
themselves heard, and both speak in a language of politics that is familiar and intelligible 
to mainstream readers.  This time, however, Puran is aware of the inevitable silences and 
omissions of his report.  After his encounter with the pterodactyl, he knows all too well 
that the language of politics and social justice that he relies on in his article hardly 
reflects the tribal community’s experience, which is defined instead by the supernatural 
and the miraculous. He also recognizes, however, that reporting the appearance of a 
dinosaur in contemporary India would elicit skepticism and ridicule, and would do little 
to improve the situation in Pirtha.  When he hails a truck returning to the city, a move that 
Spivak interprets as “step[ping] . . . into action within the post-colonial new nation,” he 
also carries with him the experience of meeting Bikhia—and the pterodactyl—face-to-
face (Thinking Academic Freedom 31).  Although he accepts the limits of his own ability 
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to know—and to narrate—another’s experience, after his encounter with the pterodactyl 
he can no longer “remain a distant spectator anywhere in life” (Devi 196). 
A Ghost in Cincinnati 
Like Devi’s pterodactyl, which transforms Puran’s understanding of himself and 
the world around him, the appearance of Beloved forever changes the women living at 
124 Bluestone Road.  Beloved’s ghost is perhaps the most familiar apparition in 
contemporary U.S. literature, so familiar that her impossible, supernatural presence risks 
being taken for granted by readers of this thoroughly canonized text.  Although Beloved 
is most frequently interpreted as a novel dedicated to addressing and healing the wounds 
of slavery, Morrison’s commitment to remembering the past is counterbalanced by a 
deep-seated concern with knowledge as an exercise of power.2  Morrison’s novel is filled 
with characters who claim to know—and judge—those around them.  Sethe is made the 
object of knowledge, first by Schoolteacher, the slave master who listed her “animal” and 
“human characteristics,” and later by the black community, including Paul D., who 
accuses her of inhumanity when he learns of her past actions (Beloved 202).  But Sethe is 
also brought low by her own assumptions that she can know her children and her 
neighbors, both black and white, as well as the ghost that takes up residence in her home.  
Beloved’s ghost reveals the danger of such assumptions, consuming Sethe’s energy and 
individuality bit by bit, until she remains only a shell of her former self.  It is only after 
                                                
2 For an analysis of the politics of knowledge production in Beloved, see Ann E. 
Goldman, “ ‘I Made the Ink’: (Literary) Production and Reproduction in ‘Dessa Rose’ 
and ‘Beloved.’ ” 
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the ghost’s departure that Morrison’s characters are able to recognize and respect their 
differences, and begin to form relationships across them. 
Like the pterodactyl in Devi’s text, the young woman who appears outside the 
house at 124 Bluestone Road defies all rational explanation.  When she first arrives, 
helpless, confused, and insatiably thirsty, Paul D. and Sethe theorize that Beloved has 
fled someone or something terrible, but her clean, fine clothes and baby-soft feet seem to 
rule out an arduous escape on foot.  Her continued frailty and dependence stand in 
contrast to surprising feats of nearly superhuman strength; as Paul D. muses, Beloved 
“can’t walk, but I seen her pick up the rocker with one hand” (Beloved 59).  Her childlike 
behavior—babbling, playing games, and throwing tantrums—is at odds with her 
calculated efforts to both seduce Paul D. and drive him away from Sethe.  Most 
importantly, although both Sethe and Denver become convinced that Beloved is the ghost 
of Sethe’s murdered daughter, the two women’s certainty is never entirely endorsed by 
the novel.  Although Beloved possesses memories, like Sethe’s special song, that only her 
child could know, she also knows things that exceed Sethe’s grasp, such as her 
description of the “dark place” she was in before, which merges a vision of death with the 
experiences of slaves on the Middle Passage (Beloved 264).  After Beloved is driven off, 
the women who come together to conduct the exorcism remain uncertain about exactly 
who or what Beloved was.  And in retrospect even Denver believes at times that Beloved 
was “sure ’nough [her] sister,” but reflects that “[a]t times I think she was—more” 
(Beloved 281). 
From the moment of her arrival, Beloved makes powerful and unsatisfiable 
demands on the women at 124.  “Deep down in her wide black eyes, back behind the 
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expressionlessness, was a palm held out for a penny that Denver would gladly give her, if 
only she knew how or knew enough about her” (Beloved 124).  Similarly, Beloved’s 
unrelenting devotion to Sethe reflects Beloved’s singular claim on her.  Looking into 
Beloved’s eyes, “[t]he longing that [Sethe] saw there was bottomless.  Some plea barely 
in control” (Beloved 62).  Beloved’s intense but undefinable desire, like the pterodactyl’s 
unknowable message, exemplifies the failures of communication that define an encounter 
with a ghost.  Rather than diminishing the women’s obligation to the ghost, these failures 
of communication only intensify that obligation, moving Denver and Sethe to try to 
satisfy Beloved in any way they can, with sweets, stories, activities, and attention.   
 As Morrison’s novel makes excruciatingly clear, however, Beloved’s claims on 
the women at 124, although they may be justified, can never be satisfied.  Beloved’s 
ghost, as Denver explains, “was a greedy ghost and needed a lot of love, which was only 
natural, considering” (Beloved 220).  Separated prematurely and violently from her 
mother, Beloved is desperate not only for “the best of everything” in the house, but also 
for the attention and mother-love such small privileges reflect (Beloved 253).  Both 
materially and emotionally, however, Beloved is insatiable: “Anything she wanted she 
got, and when Sethe ran out of things to give her, Beloved invented desire” (Beloved 
253).  Whereas Puran does not know how to care for the pterodactyl and fails to find food 
for it, no amount of nurturance is enough for Beloved, who eats and eats yet is always 
hungry for more.  And the intensifying fights between Beloved and Sethe reveal that no 
amount of explanation will satisfy Beloved either. Sethe compulsively narrates and re-
narrates her past to Beloved, trying to make her daughter understand her impossible 
choice.  Despite Sethe’s desperate efforts to explain herself, however, Beloved remains 
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“[u]ncomprehending,” and rather than forgiving Sethe, Beloved’s demands and tantrums 
only intensify (Beloved 264).   
 Sethe’s determination to make Beloved see her side is a process to which, as 
Denver recognizes, “there would never be an end” (Beloved 263).  Sethe cannot 
understand Beloved’s description of her suffering in the “dark, dark place,” or the 
devastation of the infant’s loss of her mother’s face (Beloved 264).  And Beloved, in turn, 
will not be consoled by Sethe’s explanations.  Indeed, the justifications Sethe offers for 
killing her child, like the act itself, reflect a claim over her daughter that denies the 
fundamental difference between them: “The best thing she was, was her children.  Whites 
may dirty her all right, but not her best thing, her beautiful, magical best thing—the part 
of her that was clean” (Beloved 264).  As Sethe struggles to “make [Beloved] 
understand,” she refuses to relinquish the logic that led her to murder—the conviction 
that she is her daughter and her daughter is a part of her, and although she asks for 
forgiveness, she refuses to acknowledge the ethical singularity that would allow her to 
take true responsibility for her actions.  The longer Beloved and Sethe struggle, the more 
the boundaries between the two women blur.  In response to the ghost’s demands, Sethe 
gives herself over to Beloved, dressing Beloved in her clothes and, like Puran, feeding 
Beloved with her measure of food. As a result, “Beloved ate up her life, took it, swelled 
up with it, grew taller on it.  And the older woman yielded it up without a murmur” 
(Beloved 263).  Only Denver’s decision to seek help, and the community’s intervention, 
save Sethe from annihilation. 
Sethe’s brush with self-loss, like Surajpratap’s nervous breakdown, reveals the 
danger of claiming to know another.  Ultimately, it is Denver’s willingness to enter into 
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dialogue with others across boundaries of difference that saves the family at 124.  In her 
courageous ventures out into the world beyond 124, Denver learns to offer information 
and gratitude, and receives food and acceptance in exchange. The plates of food given by 
neighbors, each distinguished by an individual woman’s identifiable dish or covering and 
accompanied by a single name or mark, are given in return for Denver’s willingness to 
provide a version of her story and a personal thank-you.  Unlike Sethe, who refuses to 
explain herself for fear of being misunderstood, Denver realizes that “[n]obody was 
going to help her unless she told it—all of it” (Beloved 266).  But even then, Denver 
cannot provide a full account, and “explained the girl in her house who plagued her 
mother as a cousin come to visit, who got sick too and bothered them both” (Beloved 
267).  In exchange for her self-revelation, albeit partial and imperfect, Denver receives 
the help she desperately needs.  The community’s response, in turn, demonstrates the 
kind of responsibility that thrives across the differences between individuals.  Although 
there is much debate, and even skepticism among the women who hear Denver’s story, 
many of them come together to protect Sethe and her family from Beloved’s sinister 
“invasion” (Beloved 270). 
 After Beloved’s exorcism, the reconciliation between Sethe, Denver, and Paul D. 
reflects how each has been changed by his or her contact with Beloved.  Denver has fully 
entered the world her mother so feared, working, building relationships, and preparing to 
perhaps attend college.  When she tells this to Paul D., he resists warning her that 
“[n]othing in the world more dangerous than a white schoolteacher,” as he might have 
before (Beloved 280).  Instead, he acknowledges that Denver’s experience might differ 
from his own, and when she raises the question of his relationship with Beloved, he 
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recognizes her right to form her own opinion.  Although Sethe has been brought low by 
Beloved’s haunting, her questioning response to Paul D.’s insistance that “[y]ou your best 
thing” holds the possibility that she, too, may come to recognize and value the difference 
that separates her from her children.  These relationships reveal how Morrison’s 
characters have been changed by their contact with the ghost, brought into a recognition 
of difference that allows them to be both singular and responsible in their encounters with 
one another. 
Reimagining the Real 
As Avery Gordon describes it, “[b]eing haunted draws us affectively, sometimes 
against our will and always a bit magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we 
come to experience, not as cold knowledge, but as a transformative recognition” (8).  
Clearly, this account could quite easily describe the experiences of both Sethe and Puran, 
for whom the encounter with the ghostly is undoubtedly a captivating and transformative 
recognition of a new reality.  But Gordon’s description could also describe the experience 
of reading fiction: we are drawn in emotionally, mysteriously and perhaps unwillingly, by 
the novelist’s art; rather than gleaning “cold knowledge,” we experience another reality; 
and we are transformed, rather than merely informed, as a result.  The vision of a 
transformative rather than acquisitive practice of knowing that is central to Gordon’s 
project resonates with the poststructuralist model of the encounter with the other outlined 
earlier in this chapter.  The condition of haunting that she describes, as a model for the 
act of reading a work of fiction, suggests that encountering a text like Beloved or 
“Pterodactyl,” like encountering a ghost, might have profound ethical and political 
implications.  Indeed, if we consider the reader’s encounter with a work of fiction to be 
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another instance of haunting, the haunting relationships that are mapped out in these texts 
can also inform our own practice of reading them. 
Like encounters with ghosts, encounters with fictions elicit intense engagement 
and require us to acknowledge a particular form of responsibility to another—in this case, 
responsibility to the text itself.  Drawing on Levinas, Adam Newton theorizes the 
relationship between reader and text as a face-to-face encounter like that between the self 
and the other: “Like persons, texts present and expose themselves,” and the “claim” they 
make on us is rooted in the readerly engagement they demand (22).  Our obligation to a 
fictional text is, at least in part, to suspend our disbelief and enter into the world that the 
text invites us to imagine; in Newton’s words, such fictions “call for mimetic, 
performative acts from readers, in spite of the ontological and epistemic borders between 
fiction and reality” (22).  Although Newton goes on to distinguish between several more 
specific forms and mechanisms of readerly interpellation, his statement captures an 
essential quality of all fictional texts: the imaginative engagement that a work of fiction 
requires from its readers.  Much as, in the encounter with the other, one’s responsibility 
requires meeting and returning the other’s gaze, the reader’s encounter with a work of 
fiction requires a similar willingness to make contact.  
In addition to this willingness to engage, however, both “Pterodactyl” and 
Beloved demand something more.  Not only must we suspend our disbelief in imagining 
the novel’s characters and events to be real, we must also rise to the challenge of 
accepting, at least provisionally, the existence of ghosts.  The presence of the 
supernatural in these texts brings with it the problem of what Morrison describes as 
“accommodation”: in “Unspeakable Things Unspoken,” Morrison notes that the women 
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and children in her novel are able to accommodate the uncontrollable and 
incomprehensible presence of Beloved’s ghost (“Unspeakable Things Unspoken” 32).  
This is precisely what Beloved asks of us, as well.  Readers of Morrison’s novel must 
imaginatively accommodate a possibility that, in the world beyond the text, many would 
likely reject: the return of an embodied baby ghost carrying with it the legacies of 
slavery.  Devi’s text, which locates a living dinosaur in contemporary India, requires a 
similar leap.  And, like Morrison’s women and children, Puran models the acceptance of 
the supernatural that we as readers must also provisionally assume.  Like the appearance 
of a ghost in one’s house, being confronted with a ghost in the pages of an otherwise 
realist fiction can and should be shocking.  And much as Puran and Sethe are challenged 
to reimagine their relationship to the world around them, so too are readers who endeavor 
to take seriously the depictions of the supernatural in these two texts. 
Theories of magical realism as a genre can provide a helpful framework for 
thinking about the ways in which these texts insert supernatural elements into their 
otherwise realist narratives, as well as how they invite their readers to respond to 
elements that defy rational explanation.3  As Wendy Faris describes it, the first defining 
element of a magical realist text is what she calls the “irreducible element” of the 
supernatural, something which cannot be explained by or confined within rational 
understandings of reality (7).  Her interesting choice of terminology itself points to the 
very strangeness of such supernatural elements and their absolute incompatibility with 
                                                
3 For many, the term “magical realism” evokes the particular aesthetic (and political 
context) of the novels of the Latin American literary “boom” of the 1960s and ’70s.  In 
tracing the evolution of what she argues has become a genuinely global form, Faris 




rationalistic frames of knowing.  In magical realist fiction, although supernatural 
elements may challenge readers’ expectations, they “are well assimilated into the realistic 
textual environment, rarely causing any comment by narrators or characters, who model 
such an acceptance for their readers” (8).  Through its juxtaposition of the natural and the 
supernatural, magical realism seems to cultivate the experience of the uncanny, 
presenting a world “in which the natural appears strange, and the supernatural pedestrian” 
(Camayd-Freixas, qtd. in Faris 11).  Indeed, Faris points to the ghostly quality of the 
extended or enhanced vision that magical realism offers:  
The magical realist vision . . . exists at the intersection of two worlds, at an 
imaginary point inside a double-sided mirror that reflects in both 
directions.  Ghosts and texts, or people and worlds that seem ghostly, 
inhabit these two-sided mirrors, many times situated between the two 
worlds of life and death; they enlarge that space of intersection where a 
number of magically real fictions exist. (21-22) 
Following Faris, then, not only do ghosts haunt the characters within texts like 
“Pterodactyl” and Beloved, but, much as Gordon suggests, haunting also describes the 
relationships these texts establish with their readers, by challenging them accept the 
supernatural and embrace an expanded definition of the real. 
As Faris argues, magical realist fiction challenges the normative assumptions of 
Western rationalism in ways that allow voices from the margins to emerge and flourish, 
and both Devi and Morrison explicitly strive to give voice to the silenced through the 
medium of their fiction.  In her essay “The Site of Memory,” Morrison situates her fiction 
in relation to the autobiographical tradition of the slave narrative, whose authors were of 
necessity “silent about many things, and . . . ‘forgot’ many other things” (“The Site of 
Memory” 191).  Her task as a fiction writer, as she defines it, is thus “to find and expose 
a truth about the interior life of people who didn’t write it” (“The Site of Memory” 193).  
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Like Morrison, Devi also conceives of her fiction writing in relation to the silences of 
official records.  In the interview with Gayatri Spivak that begins Imaginary Maps, Devi 
recounts her response to the inquiry of a tribal girl, who wonders why tribals are absent 
from the official, written account of Indian history: 
“When we go to school, we read about Mahatma Gandhi.  Did we have no 
heroes?  Did we always suffer like this?”  That is why I started writing 
about the tribal movements and the tribal heroes. (xi) 
Reflecting their authors’ stated objectives, both Beloved and “Pterodactyl” invite readers 
to imagine the stories of those who are silenced in official narratives of nation and 
history.  Like Puran and Sethe, whose encounters with ghosts shatter their isolation, 
“Pterodactyl” and Beloved, as their authors frame them, might force their readers to 
acknowledge those whose voices they had been unable to or had chosen not to hear.4 
 Such efforts to expose readers to the unheard voices of tribals or former slaves, 
however, raise yet another set of problems surrounding the power to know and interpret. 
By exposing their readers to unheard or unrecognized voices, these texts challenge their 
readers to enter into a relationship across difference, and in doing so, require that we 
perceive and recognize the limits of our ability to know.  Writing about Beloved, Yung-
Hsing Wu reminds us that Sethe’s incomprehensible actions, as well as Beloved’s 
supernatural return, require an act of “accommodation” from Morrison’s readers.  
Resisting arguments that impose a single, static interpretation on the novel’s moral 
                                                
4 In making this claim, I am cautious of the assumption it would seem to imply: that the 
readers of these texts are privileged white Westerners who receive Devi’s and Morrison’s 
fictions as giving voice to the racial and national other.  It is not my intention to 
reproduce the selective vision that such an assumption entails.  But strictly speaking, it is 
safe to assume that the audiences for these works include neither former slaves nor 
illiterate tribals.  From this perspective, any contemporary reader of either Morrison’s or 
Devi’s text approaches it, to at least some extent, from a distance. 
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complexity, Wu insists that Sethe’s choice is a problem in the novel to which readers and 
critics will never be able to pose a definitive answer.5  In a similar vein, Jennifer Wenzel 
points to the ways in which “Pterodactyl” and the other stories in Devi’s collection 
Imaginary Maps foreground the challenges and dangers of misinterpreting the many 
different representational claims that circulate within them.  As she suggests, “the reader 
of ‘Pterodactyl’ as the unabridged account of Puran’s extraordinary experience feels 
herself in possession of a terrible secret, with some awareness of the awesome 
responsibility of that privilege” (“Going Global” 240).  In different contexts, both Wu 
and Wenzel emphasize the risk that readers, who are themselves coming into contact with 
these works of fiction across boundaries of difference, might overstep the texts’ 
invitations. 
 By inviting their readers to accommodate alternate realities, both in the form of 
the supernatural and in the form of experiences other than our own, these texts expose 
themselves to the risk of being misappropriated through interested readings.  Indeed, as 
Wenzel suggests, such interested readings might be inevitable.6  But texts like 
“Pterodactyl” and Beloved also face another risk: that readers will distance themselves 
and fail to acknowledge the transformative power of their encounters with the stories they 
                                                
5 In this, Wu echoes James Phelan’s contention that it would be “ethically irresponsible” 
to resolve the problem Morrison’s novel poses “by reaching for a clear and fixed 
judgment of Sethe’s actions” (311-12).  
6 As Wenzel frames it, reading Devi’s stories requires a reader to take “the necessary risk 
of bringing her own needs and desires to those of Spivak, Mahasweta, the characters, and 
their “real life” models, all already competing in the book” (“Going Global” 247).  
Wenzel is correct to argue that readers must recognize the interestedness of their 
encounters, and I would  suggest that the haunting encounters depicted in “Pterodactyl,” 
like those in Beloved, offer us models for reconciling our situated readings with the forms 
of responsibility we assume. 
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contain.  This is a challenge that Dipesh Chakrabarty grapples with in a slightly different 
context, questioning how historians might best account for nonrational ways of thinking 
that run counter to their own.  Complicating models of historiography that anthropologize 
nonrational beliefs, Chakrabarty challenges his readers to ask themselves the question, “is 
this way of being [a belief in gods or spirits] a possibility for our own lives and for what 
we define as our present?” (108)  Genuinely considering this question makes it 
impossible to hold another’s experience at arm’s length.  Crucially, however, 
Chakrabarty does not assume that historians who ask themselves this question will 
abandon the rationalism that serves as the foundation for their politically informed 
practice of telling stories from the margins.  Rather, he suggests that they coexist, and 
that “taken together, the two gestures put us in touch with the plural ways of being that 
make up our own present” (108).  Chakrabarty argues that, although the historian may 
turn to a rationalistic approach in service of promoting “social justice and democracy,” 
accepting the supernatural as a “present possibility,” and recognizing the fundamental 
human similarity that connects the historian to his or her subjects, is a prerequisite to that 
distancing move.   
 The model of Chakrabarty’s approach to subaltern history offers readers an 
alternative to the anthropologizing perspective they might otherwise adopt toward the 
black community of Morrison’s nineteenth-century Cincinnati or the tribal villages of 
rural India.  By challenging us to take their hauntings seriously, these works of fiction 
also challenge us to take seriously the realities these characters occupy: a world in which 
the threat of slavery’s dehumanization justifies the taking of a child’s life, or in which 
relentless drought and famine are not enough to drive one away from the land where 
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one’s ancestors are buried and the culture that sustained them.  But like Puran, who 
knows he must leave Pirtha and protect the secret of the pterodactyl, or like the women of 
Sethe’s community, who recognize Beloved’s return to the material world of the present 
as an intolerable “invasion,” Chakrabarty’s model also recognizes the necessity of 
maintaining a more distanced, analytical approach.  Indeed, although both Devi and 
Morrison create fictions that draw us in, fostering a sense of intimacy and interpretive 
responsibility, both authors also invite us to step away from the fictional worlds they 
have created and consider them from a more thoughtful distance. 
In a note at the end of “Pterodactyl,” Devi undermines the representative authority 
that her text had seemed to claim by explicitly identifying her own imaginative 
interventions: 
In this piece no name—such as Madhya Pradesh or Nagesia—has been 
used literally.  Madhya Pradesh is here India, Nagesia village the entire 
tribal society.  I have deliberately conflated the ways, rules, and customs 
of different Austric tribes and groups, and the idea of the ancestral soul is 
my own.  I have merely tried to express my estimation, born of 
experience, of Indian tribal society, through the myth of the pterodactyl. 
(196) 
Like Puran, who had “done his homework” on tribal India, Devi’s text has given the 
impression, up to this point, of providing a complete and transparent depiction of the 
realities of tribal life.  Her note, which declares her depiction of tribal India to be an 
imaginative, fictionalized composite, shatters this illusion, reminding readers of the limits 
of their access to the world Devi’s story seemed to transparently and accurately depict. 
Devi’s remarks in the interview included in Imaginary Maps reflect a similar 
tension between knowledge and secrecy.  In one striking move, framing her translated 
fiction for a Western audience, Devi compares Indian tribals to Native Americans: “Why 
should American readers want to know from me about Indian tribals, when they have 
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present-day America? . . . I say to my American readers, see what has been done to them 
[the Native Americans], and you will understand what has been done to the Indian 
tribals” (xi).  This comparison gives with one hand, but takes away with the other.  By 
claiming that the tribal experience is equivalent to the Native American experience, she 
suggests that American readers already know all there is to know about Indian tribals.  At 
the same time, however, this comment is a gesture of refusal, since it allows Devi to 
avoid providing readers with any information about the lives, experiences, and beliefs of 
tribal communities.  Like Puran, whose exposé on the suffering in Pirtha both exposes 
and conceals, Devi suggests that her fiction might operate in a similar fashion.  By 
inviting Western readers to recognize their connection to the experiences she depicts, but 
also cultivating a more distanced, analytical stance, Devi lays the groundwork for readers 
to be haunted by her fiction—to recognize an enduring form of responsibility that is 
grounded in a recognition of difference. 
 Like “Pterodactyl,” Beloved also insists on stepping back from the immediacy of 
the haunting past and allowing some stories not to be told.  In her novel’s well-known 
conclusion, Morrison implies that if Beloved’s stay at 124 eventually fades from the 
community’s memory, such forgetting is protective and productive, for Beloved’s is “not 
a story to pass on” (Beloved 290).  Of course, as readers we cannot fail to note the irony 
that Beloved’s story is passed on through the writing of Morrison’s novel, up to and 
including the moment in which she instructs her readers about its secrecy.  But by 
reminding us that Beloved exists only through the medium of a story that can be either 
told or untold, Morrison directs her readers to consider the ethical and political stakes of 
narrating that story. As Dean Franco points out, criticism on Beloved often makes an 
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implicit shift from the register of fictional representation to that of material reality.  
Indeed, he argues that the work of reparation for which Beloved calls can only take place 
at a remove from the novel itself: “A national discussion on the efficacy and limits of 
apology, forgiveness, compensation, and broadly conceived social redress begins when 
readers turn from the private encounter with the novel to the public history the text 
produces” (431).  This shift, I argue, is facilitated by Morrison’s conclusion, which 
reminds us that her story, like all acts of representation, is inherently compromised, and 
that our entrance into the world of the text has only been provisional.  Like Denver, who 
steps off the porch and into the world, knowing that she cannot foresee or prevent life’s 
many perils, we are invited to move beyond the haunted world of Beloved, and to 
recognize that, although we may have been touched by that world, we are not of it. 
The Power of Ghost Stories 
In arguing that magical realism is a genre particularly suited to postcolonial 
critique, Faris points to the fact that it “has participated in transculturation processes that 
have resulted from encounters between different cultures throughout the world” (134).  
One reason for this, she suggests, is that the coexistence of two distinct literary modes 
within it—realism and fantasy—echoes and reflects the process of cross-cultural contact 
and creates what she describes as “a particularly intense dynamics of alterity” (134).  
Following Faris, there is something about the mode in which texts like “Pterodactyl” and 
Beloved imagine otherness that is particularly disposed to crossing boundaries. 
Comparing these two texts allows us to recognize the common ground of similarity 
underlying the specific, situated political and historical projects that Morrison and Devi 
undertake.  For both Devi and Morrison, turning to the supernatural allows for productive 
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political engagements while also calling into question the very cultural foundations upon 
which those engagements are built.  In “Pterodactyl,” Devi’s work of fiction 
accomplishes everything that Puran’s article accomplishes, detailing the unjust laws and 
economic policies that cause tribal people to suffer.  But it also simultaneously makes a 
more personal kind of contact with its readers, urging us to recognize the common bonds 
across difference that connect Puran with the pterodactyl and bring him to understand 
that, despite their difference, they share a common fate.  In a similar way, Beloved is 
certainly a historical novel about slavery and its aftermath, which attempts to imagine the 
subjectivities of people whom history has rendered voiceless.  But like Beloved, who was 
“more” than just Denver’s sister, Morrison’s novel is also more, challenging readers to 
test themselves against the impossible moral questions Sethe faces. 
Placing these two texts side by side, and recognizing their similarity, also offers a 
model of reading world literature that challenges the kinds of hierarchies and structures 
of power that make Beloved far more familiar than “Pterodactyl” to many readers of this 
chapter.  For these readers, such a comparison has the uncanny ability to make the 
familiar strange, and the strange familiar.  For readers who have become comfortable 
with the central conceit of Morrison’s novel, comparing it with “Pterodactyl” reminds us 
that Beloved is a ghost story, and as a literary figure, Beloved’s ghost is just as strange 
and unsettling as Devi’s dinosaur.  Moreover, for those deeply engaged with the kinds of 
debates about American history and African American identity within which Beloved is 
most frequently situated, a comparison with “Pterodactyl” foregrounds the fact that 
Morrison is similarly concerned with questions of knowledge and representation.  
Conversely, comparing “Pterodactyl” to Beloved reinforces Devi’s efforts both to bring 
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her stories home to Western readers and to prevent the kinds of tokenizing claims that 
Spivak, as Devi’s translator, is so concerned with.  Comparing “Pterodactyl” to Beloved, 
like comparing tribals to Native Americans, suggests that struggles for justice in tribal 
India carry all the complexity that readers likely recognize in political contests that occur 
closer to home.  Informed by the logic of haunting, a reading of Beloved and 
“Pterodactyl” together demonstrates the comparability of two such different texts and, in 






Haunting Pasts: Telling the Traumas of History 
In Leslie Marmon Silko’s novel Ceremony, Tayo’s intrusive memories transport 
him from his quiet life at an isolated sheep camp to the jungles of the Pacific where he 
fought as a soldier in World War II, and back further to his lonely childhood as an orphan 
raised in his aunt’s family.  For Estha, one of the twin protagonists of Arundhati Roy’s 
The God of Small Things, the inky octopus that blots out his memories of the past can 
never erase one unforgettable image from his childhood, the broken body of his friend 
Velutha, who was beaten to death by the police.  For these characters, the past is indeed a 
haunting presence, one that intrudes into and dramatically alters their lives in the present.  
Despite its power over them, however, that past is also elusive, in a sense spectral.  They 
cannot name, understand, or control the past that haunts them, and although it dominates 
their consciousnesses, they cannot integrate it into their senses of themselves. This 
chapter will explore the consequences of this particular form of literary haunting—a 
haunting by one’s own past. 
The intrusive memories of the past that Tayo and Estha experience have all the 
hallmarks of psychological trauma, the uncontrollable return of a past experience so 
troubling that it could not be fully grasped or understood at the time that it occurred.  
These recurring memories are incredibly vivid and accurate, such that the trauma sufferer 
often must relive the past again and again in the present.  Despite the power of the 
traumatic events to intrude into and control the life of the trauma sufferer, however, these 
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events remain beyond the reach of his or her understanding, unable to be fitted into a 
comprehensible narrative of the past.  It is therefore no surprise that the effects of trauma 
are frequently likened in both clinical and theoretical contexts to a form of haunting or 
possession by the past.1  Like the ghosts we encountered in the previous chapter, the 
presence of the traumatic past is insistent, troubling, and disruptive, challenging the 
boundaries between then and now, here and there, real and unreal.  But for all its 
immediacy, the traumatic past, like a ghost, remains opaque and inscrutable; indeed, it is 
precisely the incomprehensibility of these past events that motivates their uncontrollable 
return.  If, as Cathy Caruth suggests, “[t]o be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by 
an image or event,” trauma throws the claims that the past can make on us into dramatic 
relief (“Trauma” 4-5).  
In both Ceremony and The God of Small Things, depictions of trauma reveal the 
damaging effects of imperialism in the realm of the personal.  Comparing the 
representations of imperial trauma in these two novels, however, requires us to traverse 
the geographically and historically distinct histories of imperialism that inform them.  
Silko’s text reflects forms of imperial violence—both physical and epistemological—that 
are rooted in uniquely American logics of civilization, modernity, and manifest destiny.  
It is shaped not only by the particular history of white racism against indigenous peoples, 
but also by the resulting concern with cultural preservation within Native communities, 
one which frequently takes the form of racial purity and social conservatism, as scholars 
                                                
1 These references are so common as to seem almost obligatory in descriptions of trauma; 
see, for example, Caruth, “Trauma” 4, LaCapra 14, Laub 63, Cvetkovich 6. 
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such as Scott Richard Lyons and Sean Kicummah Teuton have noted.2  In The God of 
Small Things, the legacies of British colonialism in India are inseparably intertwined with 
the competing and at times contradictory logics of caste and class privilege, as well as the 
specific regional identity of Kerala, a space marked by both religious and linguistic 
difference within the Indian nation.  In Roy’s novel, culture becomes the site of 
contestation in a politically independent India, where the wealthy speak English and 
aspire to study abroad, and the worldviews of children like Estha and Rahel are shaped by 
“World Hit[s]” like The Sound of Music (54).  My argument here is not that the imperial 
contexts that define these two texts are equivalent or interchangeable.  Instead, I would 
like to suggest that the very fact that both Silko and Roy respond to them through the use 
of traumatic narrative, which they employ both in similar ways and to similar ends, is 
itself the basis for considering their novels together.  The connections these texts seek to 
forge with their readers, as well as the narrative and ethical challenges they face in doing 
so, reflect the similar locations they occupy within contemporary circuits of global 
literary exchange, and point toward a new way of thinking about them, together, through 
the framework of world literature. 
In these novels, therefore, trauma serves a twofold purpose.  In both Ceremony 
and The God of Small Things, fictional representations of trauma reveal the 
unacknowledged and unaccounted-for effects of imperial domination.  Rather than 
diverting attention from the political, trauma lends added force to political critiques by 
                                                
2 In X-Marks, Lyons is critical of “culture cops” whose engagements with Native culture 
reflect a binary between traditionalism and acculturation (xii).  In a similar vein, Teuton 
resists rigid formulations of Native American identity, drawing instead on a flexible and 




demonstrating the profoundly personal impact of structural inequality and state violence.  
In the context of novels which circulate globally among diverse audiences, moreover, 
trauma not only highlights the individual suffering that results from the exercise of 
imperial power, but also elicits forms of engagement from readers for whom the novels’ 
events might otherwise seem distant or abstract.  Both Silko and Roy not only depict 
trauma, but also reproduce it in their narratives, allowing readers to share the dislocation 
and distress experienced by their protagonists.  While both rely on traumatic narrative to 
make their readers responsible, however, the two authors define that responsibility in 
distinctly different ways.  By identifying with Tayo and sharing his process of healing, 
readers of Ceremony are entrusted with the alternate history that the novel espouses.  
Readers of The God of Small Things, by contrast, are moved by the suffering of Roy’s 
characters but cautioned against identifying with them too closely, and are instead held 
responsible for constructing an accurate and critical narrative of the past. 
The Politics of Affective Experience 
Because of its focus on personal experience and the inner workings of the 
individual mind, trauma might at first seem to be either an apolitical or even 
depoliticizing framework for considering the forms of systematic and often 
institutionalized violence that novels like Ceremony and The God of Small Things depict.  
Recent scholarly work on affect and intimacy, however, has called into question any 
simple distinctions between “private” realms of sensory and emotional experience and 
the “public” world of the political.  Although the distinction between private and public 
has long been the subject of critique, it endures, as Lauren Berlant has pointed out, in the 
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constructed dichotomies that support a wide range of social and political exclusions.3 
These exclusions, such as the entrenched racism faced by the Native American veterans 
in Ceremony or the legally codified gender and caste oppression in The God of Small 
Things, are at the heart of the trauma that the two novels depict, and demonstrate how, in 
Berlant’s words, “so many institutions not usually associated with feeling can be read as 
institutions of intimacy” (3).  By identifying the qualities of affect, intimacy, sexuality, 
and bodily experience as fundamental to the workings of public projects such as nation- 
and empire-building, in the way that both Ceremony and The God of Small Things invite 
us to do, we can begin to challenge the ideological structures that are the foundation of 
the violent exclusions they depict.   
Rather than displacing a critique of the political forces, ideologies, and operations 
of power that might cause individual suffering, trauma makes those forces visible and 
opens them to interrogation.  As Ann Cvetkovich suggests, inasmuch as many forms of 
so-called “personal” trauma reflect or mobilize social power relations that are 
overdetermined by race, class, gender, or imperialism, these traumas are no less political 
than the archetypal experiences of soldiers or political prisoners.4  Indeed, an examination 
                                                
3 As Berlant suggests, the appeal of the public/private divide extends beyond the 
Victorian fantasy of a more ordered world from which it derives.  In contemporary 
society, it underlies a range of exclusionary distinctions codified in law and culture, such 
as the divisions between “male and female, work and family, colonizer and colonized, 
friend and lover, hetero and homo, ‘unmarked’ personhood versus racial-, ethnic-, and 
class-marked identities” (3). 
4 In An Archive of Feelings, Cvetkovich insists on the important connections between 
trauma’s affective and political dimensions and challenges any simple distinction 
between the implicitly masculinized “political” trauma of war and the feminized 
“personal” trauma of rape and incest.  Although her central concern is with the way that 
sexual trauma, in particular, gives rise to forms of lesbian public culture, her arguments 
 
 60 
of trauma that recognizes its underlying political significance, Cvetkovich argues, has the 
potential to challenge entrenched national narratives that efface troubling histories of 
oppression and imperial domination: 
[C]onstructing the history of the United States from the vantage point of 
trauma produces a critical American studies, one that revises a celebratory 
account of the nation and instead illuminates its emergence from a history 
that includes capitalism and economic exploitation, war, colonialism and 
the genocide of native peoples, and slavery, diaspora, and migration.  This 
version of American studies converges with transnational approaches to 
the United States, making it possible to explore the tenuous borders (both 
literal and ideological) of the United States as a nation along with the 
violences that sustain, defend, and/or expand its borders. (36) 
In suggesting that the affective experience of trauma might illuminate the workings of 
imperialism in the United States, Cvetkovich echoes a body of scholarship that has 
compellingly elaborated the ways in which affect and intimacy are both shaped by and 
reflective of the operation of empire.5  Indeed, the consonances between the 
representations of trauma in Ceremony and The God of Small Things suggest the 
interconnections between temporally and geographically distinct imperial projects that 
                                                                                                                                            
about the political significance of so-called personal traumas speak to the question of 
trauma’s value as an analytical framework. 
5 Scholars going back to Frantz Fanon have demonstrated the convergence of 
imperialism’s political and economic power and its impact on the psyche of the 
colonized. More recently, Anne McClintock has pointed out that the disciplinary 
separation between psychoanalysis and history, which occurs in concert with the 
emergence of colonial modernity, draws an artificial distinction between “the family, 
sexuality, and fantasy (the traditional realm of psychoanalysis) and the categories of 
labor, money, and market (the traditional realm of political and economic history)” (8).  
Despite their seeming separation from the political structures of empire, she argues, these 
“private” experiences and relations are in fact an essential part of Western imperial 
projects and the epistemologies that support them.  In a similar vein, Amy Kaplan’s 
pivotal article “Manifest Domesticity” reveals the ways that discourses of territorial 




Ann Laura Stoler has described.6  Placing affect at the center of an analysis of 
imperialism thus reveals not only the unacknowledged personal dimension of colonial 
violence but also the similar ways in which distinct imperial projects have sought to 
discipline the personal and the intimate. 
A more thorough consideration of affect is thus important not only because it fills 
a gap in our understanding of national or colonial history, but also because it reveals 
previously unrecognized sites and frameworks for subversion and resistance.  Berlant’s 
explorations of affect are often in service of an interrogation of various forms of national 
belonging or exclusion.  Cvetkovich, who seeks to distance the experience of trauma 
from a medicalized discourse of disease, argues that the affective experience of trauma 
can also give rise to vibrant, nurturing, and politically significant public cultures.  For 
Stoler, a focus on the intimacies of colonial rule makes visible not only the operation of 
imperial power but also the forms and strategies of resistance it generates: the “‘uncanny’ 
intimacies” she documents “may leave room for relations that promise something else, 
that activate desires and imaginaries less easily named” (14).  As these authors suggest, 
focusing our attention on the often disregarded terrain of affective experience may 
strengthen existing political critiques and provide new possibilities for imagining 
resistance.  Trauma, in particular, serves this purpose in both Ceremony and The God of 
Small Things: it functions, as Cvetkovitch describes, as a “hinge between systemic 
structures of exploitation and oppression and the felt experience of them” (12).  In both 
                                                
6 Drawing on Indonesia’s colonial history, Stoler demonstrates that proper management 
of intimate relations was an essential component of imperial rule.  As she suggests, “[t]he 
incommensurabilities between North American empire and European colonial history 




novels, trauma highlights the operation of imperial power by revealing the personal 
suffering it causes, and in doing so it becomes the means through which that power can 
be challenged and counteracted. 
Trauma in Ceremony  
 Ceremony presents a moving portrait of Tayo, a Native American veteran of the 
Second World War, who has been left shattered by his combat experiences.  Although the 
United States’ involvement in World War II is rarely thought of through the framework 
of colonialism, Silko’s treatment of the war emphasizes the connections between Tayo’s 
status as a Native American and the particular traumas of his military service.  As Alan 
Wald has argued, Silko’s depiction of Tayo’s trauma suggests not only that “similar 
mechanisms of racism and economic exploitation are involved in all wars waged by the 
United States,” but also that “American imperialism's crimes against people of color are 
not simply aberrations” (26).  Indeed, Tayo’s experiences of trauma—both the “political” 
trauma of shell-shock and the “personal” trauma of growing up an orphan—combine to 
reveal the pernicious and pervasive effects of Native Americans’ status as an internally 
colonized minority.  By placing the personal, embodied effects of Tayo’s trauma, such as 
his nightmares, nausea, and uncontrollable crying, at the center of her text, Silko 
emphasizes the devastating consequences of Native Americans’ oppression and 
marginalization by white America and suggests the urgency with which these injustices 
must be addressed. 
At the start of Silko’s novel, Tayo is wracked by nightmares and incapacitated by 
nausea, left alone to care for his family’s isolated sheep camp on the Laguna reservation.  
Through the novel’s fragmentary narration, we gradually learn of Tayo’s past as his mind 
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moves freely between his present life on the reservation and his memories of childhood 
and the war.  The illegitimate child of an anonymous father whose ethnicity remains 
unknown, Tayo is given to his aunt to raise, and remembers very little about his mother, 
who dies while he is still young.  His cousin, Rocky, whom his aunt clearly favors, is a 
star football player who aspires to lead the assimilated life that is valorized at school.  
The two young men enlist together, and when Rocky is killed in combat, Tayo feels 
responsible for his death, as well as for that of his beloved uncle Josiah, who dies while 
they are away at war.  Back home again at Laguna, Tayo struggles with alcohol abuse, 
like many of the other veterans, but after he seeks help from the Native healer Betonie, 
his perspective changes.  As Betonie explains, the evils of the modern age, including the 
arrival of whites in America and the invention of the atom bomb, are the result of Native 
witchery, which it is Tayo’s mission to resist.  Following Betonie’s advice, Tayo searches 
for and recovers Josiah’s stolen cattle, and during his search he meets and begins a 
romantic relationship with Ts’eh, an embodiment of a sacred figure in Laguna 
mythology, who joins him at the sheep camp and teaches him about traditional forms of 
healing.7  Tayo is forced to hide from the authorities when his longtime adversary Emo 
spreads rumors that he is crazy, and by choosing not to retaliate when Emo tortures and 
kills his friend Harley, Tayo frustrates the destroyers’ bloodthirsty purpose.  At the close 
of the novel, Tayo no longer suffers from survivor’s guilt and traumatic flashbacks, and 
he is beginning the process of becoming a Native healer. 
                                                
7 Although Ts’eh’s identity remains ambiguous, she has strong connections to both 
Thought-Woman, who appears at the novel’s opening, and the mythic figure of Yellow 
Woman.  For a thorough account of Yellow Woman’s significance in Silko’s fiction, 
including Ceremony, see Elizabeth Hoffman Nelson and Malcolm A. Nelson, “Shifting 
Patterns, Changing Stories: Leslie Marmon Silko’s Yellow Women.” 
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Tayo’s intrusive memories, which encompass both bittersweet memories of 
childhood and violent echoes of combat, seem to reflect two distinct sources of trauma: 
growing up as an orphan, and serving in World War II.  For Tayo, however, “[h]ome life, 
and the battles waged there, are indistinguishable from the battle he has fought as a 
combatant overseas,” and the trauma of his personal experiences of marginalization and 
loss reflects the political structures of U.S. militarism and imperialism (Rand 24).  As a 
member of an internally colonized minority, Tayo identifies with the Japanese soldiers he 
is fighting, who are also framed by U.S. wartime discourse as nationally and ethnically 
other.  The connection that Tayo sees between himself and the Japanese—a connection 
structured by the operation of U.S. imperialism—expresses itself in a profoundly 
personal way when he becomes convinced that his beloved uncle Josiah is one of the men 
before his firing squad: 
Tayo stood there, stiff with nausea, while they fired at the soldiers, and he 
watched his uncle fall, and he knew it was Josiah; and even after Rocky 
started shaking him by the shoulders and telling him to stop crying, it was 
still Josiah lying there. (8)   
Importantly, although Tayo’s fellow soldiers dismiss his vision of Josiah as 
“hallucinations” brought on by “battle fatigue,” the Native healer Betonie validates the 
personal connection Tayo feels with the Japanese soldiers (8).  “It isn’t surprising you 
saw him with them.  You saw who they were.  Thirty thousand years ago they were not 
strangers” (124).  In a similar moment, at the train depot after Tayo’s release from the 
veterans hospital, his traumatic memory transforms a young Japanese-American boy in 
an army hat into his cousin Rocky.  The image of the boy blurs the distinctions between 
Japanese soldiers, Japanese-American civilians, and Tayo’s own Native American 
family, and sends Tayo into a fit of terrified crying and vomiting.  As the novel suggests, 
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there is a germ of truth in Tayo’s traumatic visions of Josiah and Rocky, which reveal the 
similar forms of marginalization and state-sponsored violence inflicted on those, such as 
the Japanese-Americans and Native Americans, who are defined as outsiders.  In Tayo’s 
mind, military service makes him responsible for the deaths of both his uncle and his 
cousin, and the guilt he feels about these deaths suggests his profound ambivalence, as a 
Native American, about his role in the U.S. military.  
Tayo’s mixed-race identity is also a source of trauma that is shaped by and 
reflective of imperial power.  As the child of a Laguna mother and an unknown father, 
Tayo’s “half-breed” identity is a constant reminder to his family and community of his 
mother’s shameful past.  Tayo is consciously excluded by his aunt, who raises him, and 
carefully distanced from her own son, Rocky, in a tacit arrangement that only the three of 
them acknowledge.  As Silko makes clear, the shame that Tayo feels about his mother’s 
past, which is shared by Auntie and by the community at large, reflects the alienating 
effects of an intrusive white culture.  Unlike “the oldest times, when the people had 
shared a single clan name” and “had known, with the simple certainty of the world they 
saw, how everything should be,” Tayo and his family live in a world where everything 
has become “entangled with European names” (68).  Tayo’s mother, Laura, is a victim of 
this cultural double bind, ashamed of both her own culture and her transgressions of its 
norms, and the community is defeated by their sorrow and confusion at “losing her” and 
also “losing part of themselves” (68).  For Tayo, the loss of his mother and the isolation 
he feels in his aunt’s family give rise to a profoundly personal trauma that reflects Native 
Americans’ status as an internally colonized minority and white America’s devaluation of 
Native culture.  
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Silko’s narration weaves this account of Tayo’s childhood and his mother’s past 
together with two other important events—Tayo’s and Rocky’s enlistment, and a bar 
fight in which Tayo almost kills Emo—which situate Tayo’s childhood trauma in a 
broader political context.  At Rocky’s suggestion, Tayo and Rocky enlist together as 
brothers; as a soldier, Tayo gains a brother only to lose him.  Tayo’s status as an 
unwanted and unwelcome member of the family only heightens his survivor’s guilt, 
which makes him feel as though Rocky, the favored child, should still be alive and “[i]t 
was him, Tayo, who had died, but somehow there had been a mistake with the corpses, 
and somehow his was still unburied” (28).  Tayo’s relationship with Rocky and his own 
mixed-race identity are also at the heart of his conflict with Emo.  At the time the fight 
begins, Emo is bragging about torturing Japanese soldiers and toying with a bag of 
human teeth.  As his anger at Emo mounts, Tayo recalls the image of the Japanese-
American boy at the depot, in which the Japanese soldier’s face and Rocky’s childhood 
face are merged.  For Tayo, who sees through the logic of war that authorizes violence 
against “enemies,” Emo’s pride is little more than murderous bloodlust.  When he 
accuses Emo of being a killer, Emo’s retort, “[y]ou love Japs the way your mother loved 
to screw white men,” finally pushes Tayo to violence (63).  Emo’s remark equates 
Laura’s cultural and sexual betrayal with Tayo’s betrayal of his country at war: both 
mother and son are accused of loving the enemy, an accusation which maps the violence 
of war onto the terrain of intimate relations. 
Emo, like many of the other veterans, acts out the political trauma of his status as 
a second-class citizen in his sexual relationships.  In uniform, the Native American 
veterans experienced a temporary reprieve from the racism of mainstream American 
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society, and for the first time enjoyed the sexual attentions of white women.  After the 
war, the veterans’ stories about dancing with blondes and going to bed with redheads 
feature prominently in their drunken reminiscences, and sex with white women stands in 
for all of the forms of privilege they experienced during the war.  Emo makes this 
equation between white privilege and white women explicit: “They took our land, they 
took everything!  So let’s get our hands on white women!” (55)  The Native American 
women the veterans sleep with, like the young Towac woman Helen Jean, are treated as 
little more than poor substitutes for the white women the veterans remember.  One man 
comes on to Helen Jean by telling her about a blond prostitute he slept with in California, 
and when she does not leave the bar with him, he makes her perceived inferiority clear: 
“You bitch!  You think you’re better than a white woman?” (165)  Having failed to get 
work as a secretary, Helen Jean is too ashamed of herself to write home, and although she 
survives as a de facto prostitute, she clings to the last vestiges of respectability that set 
her apart from the other Indian women she sees in Gallup: the curled hair and penciled 
eyebrows that reflect internalized standards of white beauty. Helen Jean’s inability to 
escape the life she is living, as well as the veterans’ disdain for her, reflect the racism of 
white society; like Tayo’s guilt and shame, they reveal the trauma of empire at work in 
the realm of the personal and the intimate. 
Trauma in The God of Small Things 
The God of Small Things, although set in a very different context than Silko’s 
novel, also relies on trauma to emphasize the profound effects of national and imperial 
power on the personal and intimate lives of its characters.  For some critics, most notably 
Aijaz Ahmad, the novel’s concern with the intimate appears to marginalize the political 
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as a lens through which the novel’s events can be contextualized and interpreted.8   As 
Ahmad suggests, the novel’s emphasis on the erotic, in particular, “dismisses the actually 
constituted field of politics as either irrelevant or a zone of bad faith” (104).  Ahmad is 
right to note that intimacy and the erotic feature prominently in Roy’s depictions of a 
variety of political projects, including resistance to the legacies of British colonialism and 
struggles for legal and social equality.  He fails to recognize, however, that by focusing 
her novel on the personal, Roy actually raises the stakes of these projects by 
demonstrating their profound personal, as well as political, significance.  By suggesting 
that her characters’ problems stem from the breaking of “the Love Laws”—a phrase 
which itself represents the intersection of the intimate and the juridical—Roy points to 
the personal as a stage on which politicized forms of violence can be both carried out 
and, perhaps, resisted (33).   
The God of Small Things is narrated cyclically, alternating between an account of 
the events that unfold for the novel’s protagonists, the twins Estha and Rahel, in 
December 1969, and their consequences, more than twenty years later, when brother and 
sister are reunited as adults.  The 1969 storyline begins with the arrival of the twins’ 
cousin Sophie Mol, the daughter of their uncle Chacko and his estranged British wife 
Margaret Kochamma.  During Margaret Kochamma’s and Sophie Mol’s visit, the twins’ 
mother, Ammu, begins an affair with Velutha, an Untouchable carpenter, that sets off a 
                                                
8 Ahmad’s review of The God of Small Things in the weekly Indian newsmagazine 
Frontline is frequently cited and rebutted by subsequent critics of Roy’s novel, in part, I 
suspect, because his overt and strongly worded critique stands out among many other 
more positive responses.  Although I disagree with him on many points, in particular the 
fairness and “realism” of Roy’s representation of communism, Ahmad offers a thorough 
and engaging analysis of the novel and raises a number of valid questions about Roy’s 
treatment of sexuality and intimacy. 
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chain reaction of tragic events.  In the chaos that follows the discovery of the affair, the 
three children decide to run away, and Sophie Mol drowns when their canoe capsizes.  
Unknowingly, Velutha and the twins take refuge in the same abandoned house, and the 
twins witness Velutha’s brutal beating at the hands of the police who come to arrest him 
on trumped-up kidnapping charges.  When it becomes clear that Velutha is fatally 
injured, the twins’ great-aunt, Baby Kochamma, who filed the initial false report, coerces 
the twins into identifying Velutha as their kidnapper.  In the aftermath of these events, 
Estha is “Returned” to his father; Ammu, forced to leave her family’s home, is separated 
from both her children, becomes impoverished and ill, and eventually dies.  Estha and 
Rahel are forever changed, haunted by their own complicity in Sophie Mol’s death and 
Velutha’s murder, and grieving the loss of their mother and each other.  As adults, the 
twins lead hollow lives, and Estha’s muteness, like Rahel’s vacant eyes, serves as a 
continuing testimony to the personal damage that can be done by the social and political 
forces of “an era imprinting itself on those who lived in it” (293).   
Throughout the novel, Roy relies on her characters’ personal, affective experience 
to frame political currents and historical events and imbue them with significance.  Set in 
the fictional town of Ayemenem, in the Indian state of Kerala, the novel’s events are 
informed by the region’s long history of Syrian Christianity, as well as by the more recent 
flourishing of communist politics there, and throughout the novel Roy reminds readers of 
the personal implications of this political movement.  Three characters represent the face 
of Communism in Ayemenem: Chacko, who avows his commitment to revolution while 
underpaying his own workers; Velutha, the Untouchable carpenter and card-carrying 
Party member; and Comrade Pillai, the ambitious local Party functionary.  For these 
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characters, Roy makes clear, being a Communist often has as much to do with the 
domestic and sexual dimensions of their daily lives as with their abstract political ideals.  
For Chacko, “play[ing] Comrade! Comrade!” provides a pretense for showering 
attentions on the most attractive of the female factory workers and a means of satisfying 
his “Men’s Needs” (63, 160).  Although Velutha’s political commitments are certainly 
more genuine than Chacko’s, the novel consistently directs our attention to the personal 
significance of his political activism, as well: his playful insistence to Rahel that it was 
his imaginary “Long-lost Twin brother” Urumban whom she saw in the Communist rally, 
and his rejection of the “smug, ordered world” that is, as Brinda Bose points out, part of 
the sexual and emotional connection he shares with Ammu (Roy 169, 167; Bose 63-4).9   
Comrade Pillai, Ayemenem’s most prominent Communist, is a politically savvy 
man eyeing a potential seat in the Legislative Assembly and a “professional omeletteer” 
who is not afraid of breaking a few eggs (224).  Despite his role in local public life, 
however, Comrade Pillai is most frequently depicted within the confines of his own 
domestic space.  The scene in which Chacko and Comrade Pillai first discuss Velutha’s 
involvement with Party politics is filled with detailed descriptions of the size, condition, 
and contents of Pillai’s house, which he instinctively understands give him a political 
advantage: 
Comrade Pillai knew that his straitened circumstances (his small, hot 
house, his grunting mother, his obvious proximity to the toiling masses) 
gave him a power over Chacko that in those revolutionary times no 
                                                
9 I agree with Bose that Ahmad’s treatment of the relationship between Ammu and 
Velutha is inappropriately dismissive; although Ahmad rightly points out that their 
relationship is primarily sexual in nature, his assertion that this fact “reduces the human 
complexity of the characters that [Roy] herself has created” is an overstatement (105). 
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amount of Oxford education could match.  He held his poverty like a gun 
to Chacko’s head. (261) 
As this description makes clear, the condition of Pillai’s home is an essential element of 
his political power.  Rather that existing outside the realm of politics, Pillai’s and 
Chacko’s private, domestic spaces become the basis on which political claims can be 
advanced. 
 Indeed, one of central and emblematic metaphors in Roy’s novel, the History 
House, emphasizes the way in which the legacies of British colonialism are experienced 
within the realm of the domestic.  The History House exemplifies the novel’s 
representation of history as, in the words of Anuradha Dingwaney Needham, “a 
dominating, oppressive force that saturates virtually all social and cultural space, 
including familial, intimate, and affective relationships” (372).  The phrase is coined by 
Chacko, who explains to the twins that their family’s entrenched Anglophilia leaves them 
“[p]ointed in the wrong direction, trapped outside of their own history” like people 
viewing a house from the outside (51).  As Chacko describes it, history is like “an old 
house at night.  With all the lamps lit.  And ancestors whispering inside” (51).  The 
notion of the History House is emblematic of the novel’s approach to history, which it 
renders concrete and meaningful—much as Chacko’s metaphor does—through the 
familiar details of the domestic and the personal.  For the twins, this explanation hits 
home immediately.  They know a house like the one Chacko describes, the abandoned 
estate of Kari Saipu, a Englishman “gone native,” located across the river from their 
home (51).  Kari Saipu’s house, the twins’ History House, has a sordid past: it was left 
vacant after its owner committed suicide when the young Indian boy who was his lover 
was taken away from him and sent to school.  The novel’s brief description of Kari 
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Saipu’s underage lover raises the specter of a sexual trauma that is shaped by and 
reflective of the operation of imperial power.  By connecting the House of Chacko’s 
metaphor—the structures of colonialism that alienate the colonized from their own past—
with Kari Saipu’s estate, the novel exposes the currents of sexual desire that colonialism 
shaped.   
 The Anglophilia that Chacko describes in his account of the History House, a 
manifestation of India’s colonial past, is essential to and inseparable from the family’s 
often fraught personal relationships.  Pappachi, the twins’ cruel and abusive grandfather, 
is, in Ammu’s words, “an incurable British CCP,” or “shit-wiper” (50).  Deceased prior 
to the main events of the novel, Pappachi is remembered through a Western-style portrait, 
in which he is nattily dressed in an equestrian outfit, wearing an expression of barely 
concealed cruelty, and holding the ivory-handled riding crop that he used to beat the 
adolescent Ammu.  Although they are never explicitly linked, Pappachi’s position in the 
imperial bureaucracy as an Imperial Entomologist and his role as a domestic tyrant 
consistently go hand in hand in Roy’s descriptions. 
 The intimate lives of both of Pappachi’s children, Ammu and Chacko, are 
similarly marked by the legacies of British colonialism.  Ammu’s marriage to her 
abusive, alcoholic husband disintegrates after he proposes that she become the concubine 
of his British supervisor, and when she returns home, Pappachi rejects her story because 
he refuses to believe that “an Englishman, any Englishman, would covet another man’s 
wife” (42).  Chacko, a Rhodes scholar who takes great pride in his time spent at Oxford, 
is attracted to his white, British ex-wife’s freckles and continues to adore her after their 
divorce in part because he sees himself as so unworthy of her.  And the twins, yearning 
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for a father figure after Ammu’s divorce, measure themselves heartbreakingly against the 
“clean white children” in the film The Sound of Music (100).  Staging an imaginary 
dialogue with Baron von Trapp, the twins find that, unlike their British cousin, they 
repeatedly fail to meet the Baron’s requirements.  The twins’ sense of rejection, like 
Ammu’s “Unsafe Edge” and Chacko’s heartbreak, are forms of trauma that reflect the 
powerful effects of imperial legacies within the realm of the personal (44).  
 Velutha’s beating is perhaps the most striking instance of a shockingly personal 
form of violence that highlights the embodied, human cost of abstractions such as 
“human history” and “power’s fear of powerlessness” (Roy 292-3).  Having discovered 
Velutha sleeping in the History House, the policemen beat him systematically and with 
detachment: 
 Unlike the tradition of rampaging religious mobs or conquering armies 
running riot, that morning in the Heart of Darkness the posse of Touchable 
policemen acted with economy, not frenzy.  Efficiency, not anarchy.  
Responsibility, not hysteria.  They didn’t tear out his hair or burn him 
alive.  They didn’t hack off his genitals and stuff them in his mouth.  They 
didn’t rape him.  Or behead him. 
 After all, they were not battling an epidemic.  They were merely 
inoculating a community against an outbreak. (293) 
 
Throughout Velutha’s beating, the policemen’s actions are described as impersonal and 
almost mechanistic, motivated not by personal hatred, but by an abstract sense of 
obligation to protect a certain circumscribed community from a perceived threat.  They 
are ready to take him away when the discovery of Velutha’s fingernails, which he had 
allowed the twins to paint days before, shatters the policemen’s façade of detachment: 
One of them held them up and waved the fingers coquettishly at the 
others.  They laughed.  “What’s this?” in a high falsetto.  “AC-DC?”  One 
of them flicked at his penis with a stick.  “Come on, show us your special 
secret.  Show us how big it gets when you blow it up.” (294)   
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After these taunts, one of the policemen crushes Velutha’s penis with his boot.  This act 
of sexual violence belies the impersonal detachment that the novel earlier attributed to the 
policemen’s violence.  Unlike the other crimes of which Velutha is already presumed 
guilty—including rape and kidnapping—the specter of homosexuality raised by 
Velutha’s painted nails seems a personal affront to the policemen, whose 
hypermasculinity Roy darkly parodies by describing them as mincing “[h]airy fairies 
with lethal wands” (290).  The policemen’s single act of sexual violence, the culmination 
of an otherwise “wholly impersonal” affair, invalidates the claim that personal and 
political forms of violence can be separated from one another (292).  For all their 
supposed detachment, the policemen’s cruelty is an inherently personal violation, and the 
gratuitousness of their final assault on a fatally wounded man reveals the shocking 
personal cost of preserving the novel’s social order.  
 In Velutha’s beating, which is the novel’s climax, all of the political currents and 
personal motives that Roy has traced throughout the novel converge.  Mammachi’s 
ingrained prejudice against Untouchables raises the stakes of Velutha’s transgression, and 
her tolerance of Chacko’s dalliances fuels her disgust at Ammu for “defil[ing] 
generations of breeding” (244).  A recent Communist march stokes Baby Kochamma’s 
anger, fear, and humiliation, which she projects onto Velutha in her false police report 
charging him with rape and kidnapping.  The death of Sophie Mol, a “clean, white” 
British child, makes the alleged kidnapping all the more shocking to the authorities, who 
react accordingly.  Velutha is brutally beaten in the History House, the place where he 
and Ammu conducted their affair, and where the twins stashed food and toys, preparing a 
home-away-from-home.  Acting as “history’s henchmen,” the police beat Velutha with 
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brutal efficiency, and his ruined body is the product of “an era imprinting itself on those 
who lived in it” (292, 293).  Finally, as Velutha lies dying in the police station, Baby 
Kochamma uses the twins’ love for their mother and each other to coerce the false 
identification that corroborates her report and justifies “the Death in Custody of a 
technically innocent man” (298).  This event, in which the personal—intimacy, 
domesticity, sexuality—converges with the political—class, caste, gender, empire—lies 
at the heart of the novel’s trauma.  
 In both Ceremony and The God of Small Things, trauma reveals the individual, 
human cost of political structures like racism, gender and caste oppression, and 
imperialism.  But, in much the same way that Stoler and others suggest, by revealing the 
personal dimensions of political oppression, these novels also allow their readers to 
recognize the personal as a site of resistance.  Significantly, in both texts, sexual 
encounters become central acts of defiance.  Tayo’s relationship with Ts’eh is essential to 
his process of healing, and the affection and intimacy they share stands in sharp 
contradistinction to the other sexual relationships we see in the novel, especially those of 
the other veterans.  As Tayo combats the witchery in the novel’s climactic scene, he 
draws strength and insight from his relationship with Ts’eh, who teaches him how to 
reconnect with traditional ways of life and practices of worship.  In The God of Small 
Things, Ammu’s affair with Velutha represents the consummate transgression of gender 
and caste restrictions, and their sexual attraction to one another is credited with the power 
to leave history “wrong-footed” (167).  Likewise, the incestuous sex between Estha and 
Rahel, although described as a moment of shared sadness, reunites the twins and 
counteracts, to a degree, the trauma that has left them alone in life and alienated from one 
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another.  In both novels, but especially in The God of Small Things, the power of such 
intimate relationships to challenge forms of imperial violence is certainly circumscribed; 
nevertheless, these relationships exemplify the forms of resistance that can be imagined 
only when the personal dimensions of political power are recognized. 
The Global Circulation of Traumatic Narrative 
 Both Silko and Roy rely on depictions of trauma to bring home the personal 
dimensions of state and imperial violence to their readers, but placing trauma at the 
center of their fictions serves another purpose as well.  More than simply describing 
trauma, Ceremony and The God of Small Things reproduce it through formal strategies 
such as fragmentation and repetition that create a reading experience not unlike the 
experience of traumatic memory.  Like witnesses to a survivor’s traumatic account, we as 
readers become responsible for constructing a linear narrative of the past from the 
disjointed one with which we are confronted.  This strategy for eliciting readerly 
engagement is particularly powerful for authors like Silko and Roy, whose fictions are 
written at least in part with “outside” audiences in mind—non-indigenous readers in 
Silko’s case, and international readers in Roy’s.  Indeed, both Ceremony and The God of 
Small Things can fairly be considered within the framework of world literature, 
understood along the lines that David Damrosch suggests, as a body of “literary works 
that circulate beyond their culture of origin” (4).  Damrosch rightly qualifies this 
definition, emphasizing that such texts must not only reach but also be taken up by other 
readerships in order to be considered global in any meaningful sense.  Reflecting this 
concern with the reactions of “actual readers,” both Ceremony and The God of Small 
Things elicit powerful forms of engagement and obligation from their readers by placing 
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them in the position of the witness.  Readers who might distance themselves from the 
places, events, and communities that these novels describe are drawn in to them, and as a 
result they experience the consequences of imperial violence with a newfound 
immediacy.  Significantly, although Ceremony and The God of Small Things both rely on 
the language of trauma to interpellate their readers, they employ the sense of connection 
they elicit to very different ends.  Whereas Ceremony invites its readers to identify with 
Tayo and share in the healing ceremony that the novel itself performs, The God of Small 
Things cautions us against embracing comforting narratives and makes us responsible for 
preserving an accurate record the past we have just witnessed. 
The nature of trauma, which places narrative at the center of the process of 
healing, suggests consonances between the work of the witness or therapist and the work 
of the reader of fiction.10  Indeed, the reconstructive work involved in creating an account 
of the traumatic past can lend such accounts a distinctly literary quality.  Through a 
certain lens, the primary difference between narratives that reproduce trauma and 
narratives that heal it can be seen as a difference in form: the language of trauma is 
disjointed, interruptive, and repetitive, whereas a healing narrative is linear and integral; 
the intrusions of trauma are experienced in the present tense, whereas a healing narrative 
                                                
10 This comparison requires a degree of caution.  I want to make clear that I am 
suspicious of any easy equation between real experiences of suffering and the psychic 
wounds they leave, on the one hand, and the literary strategies used to convey the pain of 
fictional characters and elicit emotional responses from readers, on the other.  
Nevertheless, I recognize the power of trauma as a framework for understanding the 
events and effects of literary works like the ones I consider in this chapter.  Inasmuch as 
authors like Silko and Roy foreground the experience of trauma in their fictional texts, it 
is important to consider the stakes and consequences of narrating the past in the terms 
that trauma provides. 
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confines those events to the past.11  Extending these comparisons further, it is possible to 
see novels like Ceremony and The God of Small Things as analogs for the narratives of 
trauma survivors: both are fragmented narratives, and both require the reconstructive, 
often imaginative work of a reader or listener to assemble a complete, linear account of 
key events.  
Likening literary texts to the narratives of trauma survivors in this way raises 
important questions about the listener’s or witness’s identification with the survivor, 
which his or her narrative of the past might invite or enable.  In clinical settings, the 
presence of a witness is central to the process of reconstructing a healing narrative of 
traumatic events, for the witness’s willingness to listen is what allows the victim to 
reconstruct a story of his or her experience.  Although the attentive listening of a witness 
may allow the trauma sufferer to narrate traumatic events and begin to integrate them into 
his or her life story, it also risks blurring the boundaries between survivor and witness.  
Speaking from the perspective of a therapist, Judith Herman asserts: “Trauma is 
contagious.  In the role of witness to disaster or atrocity, the therapist at times is 
emotionally overwhelmed.  She experiences, to a lesser degree, the same terror, rage, and 
despair as the patient” (140).  Herman goes on to offer several examples in which the 
survivor’s traumatic narrative seems to take possession of the therapist, who begins to 
experience the same intrusive images or feelings of powerlessness suffered by the patient.  
In a literary rather than a clinical context, the idea that a traumatic narrative has the 
                                                
11 Echoing this comparison between healing narratives and artistic representations of the 
past, Judith Herman offers an evocative description of the traumatic narrative as “a series 




power to interpellate and impose itself on a witness is both compelling and potentially 
troubling. 
For example, the ongoing controversy surrounding Silko’s use of Native 
American cultural forms and messages typifies the problems that can arise from drawing 
readers too completely or indiscriminately into the world of the text’s traumatic narrative.  
For some, such as Paula Gunn Allen, the myths and stories Silko draws on carry sacred 
content, and Silko’s willingness to share those stories indiscriminately with non-Native 
audiences marks her as a cultural outsider.  Allen is critical of Silko’s choice to include a 
“clan story” in her novel, remarking that “she must have been told what I was, that we 
don’t tell these things outside” (88). For others, like James Ruppert, the “mediational” 
quality of Silko’s narrative, which combines Native and non-Native ideologies, is the 
source of the novel’s power to “restructure how each audience [Native and non-Native] 
values truth, reality, and knowledge” (176, 178).  The particular power that Ruppert 
identifies in Ceremony—to engage and transform its readers—is a quality frequently 
attributed to Native American writing as a genre.  This special mode of address, which 
Susan Berry Brill de Ramírez has termed “conversive,” places the reader in an “active 
role that transcends the more bounded role of the textual reader” in a process that 
“transforms all involved” (13).  What such a theory of Native textuality does not 
explicitly address, however, are the means by which readers—especially readers 
unfamiliar with Native cultural forms and traditions—are brought into conversation with 
these potentially transformative texts, and made to take up the “responsibilities” that 
come along with their reading position (Brill de Ramírez 13).   
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The question of Ceremony’s address to and interpellation of non-Native readers is 
an important one, since as Allan Chavkin points out, more than half a million copies of 
the novel have been sold since 1977, and by the early 2000s it had become “one of the 
most frequently taught contemporary novels in higher education” (4).  For white 
American readers, who might be tempted to see the traumas that Silko describes, such as 
the self-destructive alcoholism of Native American veterans, as abstract social ills, distant 
from and irrelevant to themselves, the language of trauma lays the groundwork for a 
meaningful engagement with the novel.  Indeed, Ceremony not only invites the 
engagement of its white readers, but also allows them to occupy a comfortable place in 
relation to the story of trauma and recovery it narrates.  By allowing its readers to align 
themselves with Tayo as fellow victims of the pernicious effects of witchery, Ceremony 
shatters the perceived distance of its white readers and effectively interpellates them into 
the Native epistemology it espouses. 
 Throughout much of Ceremony, the novel’s narrative style reproduces the 
repetitions and disjunctions of traumatic memory.  Scenes from Tayo’s present, at the 
sheep camp, alternate with vivid depictions of the Pacific jungles where he saw combat, 
childhood memories of time spent with Rocky and Josiah, and accounts of Tayo’s 
experiences in the veterans hospital and at home with Auntie after his return from the 
war.  These scenes interrupt the narration of present events as completely and as 
forcefully as the memories themselves intrude on Tayo’s consciousness; just as Tayo is 
incapacitated by these involuntary flashbacks, it takes almost fifty pages for Silko to 
narrate Tayo’s journey from the sheep camp to the bar, so densely are these pages filled 
with detailed depictions of scenes from his past.  Information that is essential to 
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understanding Tayo’s story, such as Rocky’s death or his mother’s past, emerges slowly, 
and readers are often presented with key phrases or images before their significance is 
revealed. This fragmented, non-linear narration places the reader in a position analogous 
to the witness of a trauma survivor’s account, who struggles to construct a narrative from 
the survivor’s disjointed, uncomprehended memories.   
This traumatic style of narration, which is particularly prevalent towards the 
beginning of the novel, gradually becomes more linear and grounded in the present as the 
novel progresses and Tayo begins to heal.  After Tayo’s visit to Betonie, the quest to 
recover Josiah’s stolen cattle and defeat the witchery provides structure, sequence, and 
meaning to his previously shattered life, and the novel’s narration reflects this shift, 
progressing in a more linear way as Tayo travels to the mountain, returns with the cattle, 
and evades capture by Emo and government officials.  In this latter section of the novel, 
Tayo’s memories inform rather than interrupt his decisions and actions in the present, as 
when, during his search for the cattle, he remembers the lessons learned from childhood 
hunting trips with Rocky and Josiah.  For the reader, too, this section provides a sense of 
calm and relief.  After the struggle of reconstructing Tayo’s story in the novel’s early 
pages, we are now able to follow a clear and purposeful sequence of events—indeed, the 
familiar plot of a quest or adventure—to its clear and logical conclusion.  If, in the 
novel’s earlier sections, we experienced vicariously the intrusions of the traumatic past, 
by its end we share the relief of finally incorporating those memories into a 
comprehensible narrative.  Like Tayo, we see “the pattern, the way all the stories fit 
together—the old stories, the war stories, their stories—to become the story that was still 
being told” (246).  Reflecting Native American understandings of healing as a communal 
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process rather than an individual one, the conclusion of Silko’s narrative artfully draws 
readers into the community that is being healed by her story and requires them to leave 
behind the notion of the individualistic Western hero plot. 
This idea—that readers, through their identification with Tayo, share in the 
healing that he undergoes—gives rise to one of the most pervasive and contentious 
claims about Ceremony.  According to this line of reasoning, Silko’s novel does not 
merely describe the ceremony that Tayo carries out, but rather enacts a ceremony in 
which we as readers participate. Carol Mitchell’s account of the novel as ceremony is 
exemplary: 
While one novel alone cannot revive or replace the traditions and 
ceremonies of a people, Silko's novel is itself a curing ceremony. It 
weaves the old stories and traditions into the contemporary story of Tayo 
in a way that helps to make the old ways understandable and relevant to 
the contemporary situation. Not only is Tayo cured by the old stories and 
changing ceremonies, but the form of the novel may bring a new 
storytelling tradition into the Indian tradition that will help to cure some of 
the hopelessness and despair of the contemporary Indian who is caught 
between two ways of life. (28) 
Mitchell’s assertion—that Ceremony’s healing power extends beyond the world of the 
novel’s fictional narrative to include those among its readers who might be suffering as 
Tayo is—echoes comments made by Silko herself.  Reflecting on the process of writing 
the novel, Silko describes experiencing the same journey of healing and recovery that her 
protagonist does.  “[W]hen I started Ceremony, I was as sick as Tayo was.  I was having 
nausea and all kinds of weird symptoms and stuff and then as he starts to get better, of 
course, I was starting, so there is this parallel.”  She explains, “[t]hat is why it is called 
Ceremony, because I know that I could not have made it if I had not been writing 
Ceremony for those two years” (qtd. in Cohen 258).   
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Not only does Silko herself identify with Tayo and share his healing journey, but 
the structure of the novel suggests and invites a similar identification from its readers.  
Even those critical of Silko’s approach, such as Jana Sequoya-Magdaleno, agree that she 
intends to interpellate her readers in this way.12  In the prologue, which frames the novel, 
the figure of Ts’its’tsi’nako, or Thought-Woman, introduces a direct relationship between 
thought and reality, since “whatever she thinks about / appears” (1).  When the narrator, 
speaking in the first person, declares “I’m telling you the story / she is thinking,” 
Ts’its’tsi’nako’s power to make stories into reality is attributed to the entire novel.  As 
Robert Bell, among others, has suggested, the story of Ts’its’tsi’nako can be seen as part 
of a curative ritual with the power to affect the world through its very repetition (24).  
Thus, by incorporating Tayo’s story (the story which the first-person narrator is telling 
us) into the ritual telling of Ts’its’tsi’nako’s story, the prologue suggests that Silko’s 
novel might also possess the power to heal those who read it. 
 By encouraging its readers to identify with Tayo, Ceremony also encourages us to 
embrace the concept of witchery’s pervasive and pernicious influence on the modern 
world, since it is by accepting Betonie’s alternate history that Tayo is able to begin the 
process of healing.  According to Betonie, the violence and cruelty of the modern world, 
including the arrival of whites in America, the genocide of Native Americans, and the 
carnage of modern war, can be attributed to the work of Native witches, the destroyers.  
He reassures Tayo that although whites might seem to be the cause of Indians’ suffering, 
                                                
12 Sequoya-Magdaleno’s critique of Ceremony, which accords with those made by Paula 
Gunn Allen and others, centers on the way that the hybrid nature of the novel’s prologue 
invites its readers to take part in both Laguna and Western reading practices, which she 
argues are mutually exclusive.  The very fact of Sequoya-Magdaleno’s concern with this 
question, however, points to the power of Ceremony’s interpellation of its readers. 
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“white people are only tools that the witchery manipulates; and I tell you, we can deal 
with white people, with their machines and their beliefs.  We can because we invented 
white people; it was Indian witchery that made white people in the first place” (132).  For 
readers of the novel, Betonie’s account of history is tantalizing, for it reframes the history 
of European colonization, and Native communities’ consequent displacement and 
disenfranchisement, in terms that make Native Americans agents rather than victims.  If 
Native witches are the cause of the destruction that Tayo and Betonie witness in the 
world around them, then they and others like them also have the power to stop that 
destruction and frustrate the witchery’s plans.   
The logic of Betonie’s alternate history is not only compelling, it is central to 
understanding the novel’s climax, the contest between Tayo and Emo.  This scene in 
particular reveals the process by which, as Teuton has argued, “Silko carefully inserts 
tribal experience so that mainstream readers must rely on these supernatural experiences 
to understand the text and to value their universal appeal to overturn destructive 
worldviews” (141).  Given both the means and the motive to confront and kill Emo, Tayo 
remains hidden and watches passively while Emo tortures and kills his friend Harley.  In 
the terms of the conventional Western hero plot, Tayo’s choice would be seen as 
cowardly, for he has failed to show loyalty by protecting his friend.  In the context of 
Silko’s novel, however, this scene is read as a triumph, because by resisting the trap set 
for him by Emo and refusing to meet violence with violence, Tayo ruins the destroyers’ 
evil ritual.  Thus, in order to read this scene as the climax of the plot and the culmination 
of Tayo’s personal development, we must accept the alternate history of the witchery that 
justifies Tayo’s actions as heroic rather than cowardly.  In order for the novel to conclude 
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in the way we have been prepared to expect, with the satisfying experience of Tayo’s 
success, we must accept the notion of the witchery and embrace the struggle to defeat it 
as the novel’s central dynamic. 
 By locating Betonie’s alternative history of European colonization at the center of 
Ceremony, Silko seems to echo Cathy Caruth’s notion of trauma as the source of “a 
history that is no longer transparently representational” (Unclaimed Experience 11).  In 
seeking to understand and narrate his trauma, Tayo creates an account of the past that, 
while it may not meet strict standards for empirical documentation, has an enormous 
power to heal.  Moreover, by suggesting that the ills and injuries of witchery in Silko’s 
novel are global in scope and afflict all people in this post-atomic age, the novel frames 
both Native and non-Native readers as in need of the healing ceremony it carries out.  By 
identifying with Tayo and accepting the version of history that guides him from illness to 
healing, we also accept, at least implicitly, the epistemology that the novel espouses, one 
in which time is continuous and the world is both unified and profoundly interdependent.  
As James Ruppert suggests, in the absence of more overt “activist discourse” in 
Ceremony, this epistemological claim, which he describes as “subversive in the best 
sense,” is the source of the novel’s politics (177).  Through the language of trauma, 
Ceremony challenges all of its readers, both Native and non-Native, to embrace a 
narrative of history, that, while not “factual” in the empirical sense, contains another form 
of truth. 
 Like Ceremony, The God of Small Things relies on the language of trauma to 
engage its readers, especially those who could be considered cultural “outsiders.” As an 
Indian novel written in English, The God of Small Things targets a very particular 
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audience, which includes both international Anglophone readers and upper-class Indian 
readers, who would have received an English-medium education.13  As one indication of 
its appeal to an international readership, Roy’s novel sparked bidding wars among 
publishers competing for distribution rights in a wide range of Western countries (Swami 
100).  Like Silko, Roy uses the language of trauma to convey the immediacy and urgency 
of her twin protagonists’ experience to socially and geographically distant readers.  By 
filtering the novel’s key events through the childlike perspective of Estha and Rahel, Roy 
ensures that her readers share the children’s horror at events that, in the broader context 
of world affairs, might seem insignificant.  But like the therapist who risks adopting the 
survivor’s sense of powerlessness, readers of The God of Small Things are cautioned 
against aligning themselves too thoroughly with the novel’s victims.  Rather than 
including the reader in the process of healing, The God of Small Things enforces a critical 
distance and makes its readers responsible for reconstructing the factual, linear narrative 
of the past that the novel itself cannot provide.   
 Just as a trauma sufferer cannot grasp the significance of the events which intrude 
into his or her consciousness, the disjointed, repetitive quality of traumatic narratives 
reproduced in The God of Small Things presents its readers with descriptions that, 
although central to the novel’s purpose, cannot at first be comprehended or placed.  
Phrases like “the sourmetal smell” of steel bus rails or the scent of “old roses on a 
                                                
13 The complicated questions surrounding the role of the English language in Indian 
literature and education are beyond the scope of this project.  Priya Joshi offers a 
compelling account of the relationship between the British novels imported to India in 
service of a broader colonial project, and the English-language novels written 




breeze” appear and recur many times before readers are able to recognize them as the 
twins’ sensory impressions of Velutha’s brutal beating (31, 8).  Key events, too, are 
narrated out of sequence: in the first chapter, we witness Sophie Mol’s funeral without 
knowing the cause of her death, and we learn of Estha being “Returned” before learning 
of the events which lead him to be separated from his mother and sister (12).  As in 
Ceremony, the reader of The God of Small Things becomes, in effect, a witness to the 
novel’s traumatic narrative.  Crucially, however, The God of Small Things cautions us to 
resist the kind of readerly identification that Ceremony invites.  Instead, by maintaining 
its fragmented, non-linear style until its close, Roy’s novel makes its readers wholly 
responsible for reconstructing the unified narrative of the past that its traumatized 
protagonists can never entirely achieve.  Unlike Ceremony, whose readers are invited to 
participate in the novel’s revision of history, The God of Small Things holds its readers 
accountable for constructing an accurate account of the past from the fragmentary 
evidence that the novel provides. 
 At several points, Roy’s novel seems to caution its readers about the kind of 
“participatory or emulative relation” to the past that historian Dominick LaCapra warns 
may inhibit our ability to think critically about history (187).  As adults, Estha and Rahel 
continue to suffer from the trauma they experienced as children: Estha has chosen to stop 
speaking, and Rahel, whose distant, vacant eyes offend her husband during their 
lovemaking, is left empty from all that she has lost.  Despite their evident pain, however, 
the novel denies them the opportunity to “purchase, for a fee, some cheap brand of 
exorcism from a counselor with a fancy degree, who would sit them down and say, in one 
of many ways, “You’re not the Sinners.  You’re the Sinned Against.  You were only 
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children.  You had no control.  You are the victims, not the perpetrators” (182).  As the 
novel’s narrator makes clear,  
[i]t would have helped if they could have made that crossing.  If only they 
could have worn, even temporarily, the tragic hood of victimhood.  Then 
they would have been able to put a face on it, and conjure up fury at what 
had happened.  Or seek redress.  And eventually, perhaps, exorcise the 
memories that haunted them. 
 But this anger wasn’t available to them . . . .  Esthappen and Rahel 
both knew that there were several perpetrators (besides themselves) that 
day.  But only one victim. (182) 
 
This passage is an explicit rejection of the sort of revisionary narratives that allow trauma 
sufferers to “exorcise the memories that haun[t] them.”  Although such narratives might 
provide comfort, the novel reminds us, they also risk effacing one’s responsibility for the 
events of the past.  Estha and Rahel cannot accept an account of the past in which they 
are merely innocent victims, for they know that such a narrative belies their complicity in 
Velutha’s death.  Indeed, through the twins’ resistance to claiming a victimhood which, 
to their minds, they have not deserved, Roy challenges our own desire as readers to 
identify with the suffering of her characters.  Although we may be moved by the novel’s 
many traumas, Roy’s text reminds us that we must nevertheless be scrupulous in our 
accounting of the events of the past and attribute victimhood only where it is merited. 
 The novel’s depiction of the History House, Kari Saipu’s abandoned estate, 
provides an even more scathing critique of revisionary narratives of the past.  The site of 
the novel’s traumas, the location where all of the personal and political interests in the 
novel converge in Velutha’s fatal beating, is transformed years later into “Heritage,” a 
tourist resort.  At Heritage, the resort owners create “[t]oy Histories for rich tourists to 
play in” by relocating the ancestral homes of local families and positioning them around 
Kari Saipu’s home “in attitudes of deference” that reflect an idealized colonial past (120).  
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The truncated kathakali performances which take place there, timed to cater to the 
“imported attention spans” of the tourists, make a mockery of the epic stories of India’s 
past that the full dances narrate (220).  The resort owners, like readers of Roy’s novel, 
weave together a narrative of history from different fragments in ways that suit their 
needs.  As Roy makes blisteringly clear, however, these accounts of history are appealing 
precisely because they efface the tourists’ complicity in colonialism and class and caste 
oppression, much as the hotel itself seeks to conceal the poverty that surrounds it and the 
dangerous pollution of the river that borders it, unappealing facts for which its patrons 
share some responsibility.  By overlaying the present-day activities of the resort with 
traces of the events that took place there years before, like Rahel’s abandoned 
wristwatch, the novel once again makes its readers responsible for filling the gaps in 
history and cautions us against constructing self-serving and inaccurate accounts of the 
past. 
Taken together, Ceremony and The God of Small Things offer important insights 
into the nature and consequences of fictional representation of the traumatic past. Silko’s 
approach to trauma privileges revision as the source of transformation and the basis for 
connections across difference.  By inviting us to identify with its protagonist and embrace 
the healing narrative that he adopts, Ceremony opens the past for revision in the present.  
Rather than being the victims of European colonization, displacement, and racism, the 
traumatic effects of which are well documented in the novel, Native Americans like Tayo 
and Betonie become agents in their own history, and Native epistemology becomes the 
basis for bringing Native and non-Native readers together in the novel’s healing 
ceremony.  By contrast, Roy’s novel encourages suspicion of revisionary narratives, and 
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the structure of The God of Small Things demands an accurate rather than imaginative 
reconstruction of the novel’s events.  Our responsibility, as readers of the novel, is to 
construct a record of history and its victims without falling prey to the temptation to 
identify with them.  It is only by maintaining this uncompromising record, the novel 
suggests, that we can fulfill our obligation to those who suffer from history’s traumas.  
Crucially, for both Silko and Roy, trauma gives rise to responsibility and obligation on 
the part of the witness; we see this play out within the narrative frame of each text, but 
we also see it enacted in the relation each author structures between text and reader.  As 
readers of Ceremony, we are entrusted with the task of changing the way we see the 
world.  As readers of God of Small Things, we are made responsible for reconstructing 
the story of history’s victims, who have been prevented from telling it themselves. 
Responsible Reading and the Traumatic Past 
Both Ceremony and The God of Small Things make their readers responsible for 
constructing an account of the past, but whereas Ceremony invites its readers to share in 
the process of revising and reimagining the past, The God of Small Things entrusts us 
with the obligation to preserve an accurate record of it.  Especially when the past in 
question is one of imperial domination, this distinction has real ethical and political 
stakes.  Reading these two novels together forces us to ask: Is it empowering to revise a 
history marked by violence and oppression, or does doing so blunt forms of political 
engagement based on an accurate accounting of past wrongs?  For some trauma theorists, 
such as Cathy Caruth, the power of trauma lies in the opportunities for revision that it 
creates.  Echoing Ceremony’s emphasis on identification and connection, Caruth sees 
trauma as a means of interrogating the boundaries that separate the known from the 
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unknown and bringing people together across difference.  For others, such as Dominick 
LaCapra, trauma’s silences and omissions call instead for a scrupulously factual record of 
the past.  Like The God of Small Things, which cautions its readers against identifying 
too easily with its victims, LaCapra asserts that it is essential for those who have not been 
traumatized to maintain their critical distance and account for the events of the past in 
ways that survivors themselves might be unable to do.  The debate between these two 
theorists, which hinges on the question of how to narrate the traumatic past in an ethically 
responsible way, suggests what might be at stake in the different ways that Ceremony and 
The God of Small Things engage their readers. 
According to Cathy Caruth, trauma challenges us to embrace the revisionary 
quality of survivors’ narratives and to reevaluate the definition of truthfulness that we 
apply to such accounts of the past.  As she has argued, the act of listening to a survivor’s 
narrative “calls for different ways of thinking about what it means to understand and what 
kinds of truth we are looking for” (“Preface” viii).  Caruth focuses her analysis on what 
she considers to be trauma’s central and most compelling paradox: that the memory that 
returns to haunt the trauma sufferer is, by definition, one that he or she cannot know or 
understand.  In Caruth’s terms, then, “trauma opens up and challenges us to a new kind of 
listening, the witnessing, precisely, of impossibility” (“Trauma” 10).  Caruth’s insistence 
on the “impossibility” of traumatic memory does not simply acknowledge that the 
narratives of trauma sufferers may diverge from historical fact.  It goes further, claiming 
that traumatic narratives, by their very nature, cannot offer knowledge about the past, but 
exist instead in a different register of truthfulness, in which the truth of a survivor’s 
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testimony lies in its “departure” from, rather than its fidelity to, the original event 
(“Trauma” 10). 
Caruth’s understanding of traumatic memory, which emphasizes the 
unknowability of the traumatic event or experience, has important implications for the 
relationship between survivor and witness.  By emphasizing the impossibility of  
traumatic narrative, Caruth seems to suggest that it is not only uncomprehended by the 
trauma sufferer, but also more fundamentally incomprehensible, in its unrevised form, by 
both victim and witness alike.  Thus, the witness must be willing to receive the survivor’s 
testimony even if he or she is, at first, unable to know or understand the content of what 
will be transmitted through that testimony.  For Caruth, this inability to know or 
understand calls into question both the volition and the autonomy of the witness.  “[O]ne 
challenge of this listening is that it may no longer be simply a choice: to be able to listen 
to the impossible, that is, is also to have been chosen by it, before the possibility of 
mastering it with knowledge.  This is its danger—the danger, as some have put it, of 
trauma’s ‘contagion’ ” (“Trauma” 10).  Caruth is describing the same “contagious” 
quality of trauma that Herman identifies, but rather than framing it, like Herman, as a risk 
faced by therapists and other witnesses, Caruth sees it as the source of “trauma’s address 
beyond itself,” to which she attributes the power to counteract both individual and 
cultural isolation (“Trauma” 11).  Much like Ceremony, which relies on the notion of a 
shared trauma to create connections between Native and non-Native characters and 
readers, Caruth suggests that trauma has the potential to bridge barriers of cultural 
difference.  As she argues, all people can potentially be drawn together by the common 
experience of confronting the unknown within themselves.  Indeed, she suggests that 
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“[i]n a catastrophic age, . . . trauma itself may provide the very link between cultures: not 
as simple understanding of the pasts of others but rather, within the traumas of 
contemporary history, as our ability to listen through the departures we have all taken 
from ourselves” (“Trauma” 11). 
If for Caruth the unknowability of trauma provides an opportunity to interrogate 
assumptions about the transparent referentiality of historical narratives, for Dominick 
LaCapra the devastating effects of trauma on survivors only emphasize the necessity of 
creating and preserving a faithful record of the past.  Unlike Caruth, who sees 
identification as the source of trauma’s transformative power, LaCapra stresses the 
danger of blurring the lines between survivor and witness.  Although he affirms a view of 
historical inquiry “wherein knowledge involves not only the processing of information 
but also affect, empathy, and questions of value,” LaCapra nevertheless forcefully 
distinguishes the “empathic unsettlement” one might experience when studying the 
traumatic past from the “appropriation of [survivors’] experience”  (35, 41).  Unlike 
survivors, for whom the act of daily survival—and the creation a narrative of the past that 
facilitates it—might be an admirable accomplishment, those who did not directly 
experience atrocities have a different obligation to the past.  On this question LaCapra is 
emphatic: 
If we who have not been severely traumatized by experiences involving 
massive losses go to the extreme of identifying (however spectrally or 
theoretically) with the victim and survivor, our horizon may unjustifiably 
become that of the survivor, if not the victim, at least as we imagine her or 
him to be. . . . But something different may be required of someone who 
has not lived through extreme events and been severely traumatized, 
however much we may insist on the significance, value, and effects of 
empathy with the victim and survivor or the notion that certain 
“unclaimed” experiences cannot be possessed.  Indeed, working through 
problems for one born later is itself distinctive and closely linked to 
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ethical, social, and political demands and responsibilities that relative 
good fortune (of course, markedly different for those in different life 
situations and subject positions) should call forth and enable one to 
recognize and to take up. (211-12) 
For LaCapra, the distinction between survivor and witness is essential and self-evident, 
and his claims about history are addressed primarily to the latter, who he argues cannot 
rightly claim, as Roy would put it, “to wear the tragic hood of victimhood” (182).  As he 
makes clear, an inappropriate identification with survivors of trauma risks absolving 
witnesses of their obligation to account for the events of the past, an obligation to which 
he attaches both ethical and political stakes. 
 As works of fiction, Ceremony and The God of Small Things amplify the debate 
that Caruth and LaCapra stage, for as I have suggested, they not only allow for the 
possibility of identification, as a trauma survivor’s testimony might, but they invite it by 
reproducing the experience of trauma in their narration.  Read individually, each novel 
seems to expose itself to critique.  Ceremony does indeed efface the responsibility that 
some of its readers might share for the dispossession of Native Americans.  By 
suggesting that Native Americans themselves are the authors of the ills that beset them, 
the novel creates a reading position for its non-Native readers—particularly the white 
readers who remain overrepresented in the many university classrooms where Ceremony 
is read—that seems a bit too comfortable and convenient.  No longer responsible for the 
individual and structural violences that have harmed Native communities, white readers 
who identify with Tayo join the ranks of the aggrieved and become entitled to the healing 
that the novel envisions.  By contrast, The God of Small Things is almost too concerned 
with distinguishing victim from perpetrator.  For readers who have been invited to see the 
world through Estha’s and Rahel’s eyes, their continued suffering seems a high price to 
 
 95 
pay, even granting their complicity in Velutha’s death.  And the certainty with which the 
novel separates “sinned against” from “sinning” belies the complexity of the world it 
describes, in which various forms of privilege and oppression cross-cut one another.  
Read together, however, Ceremony and The God of Small Things suggest an 
approach to narrating the traumatic past that balances identification and accountability in 
the context of a global readership.  The traumatic narration of Ceremony makes Tayo’s 
suffering our own, drawing us into a story that might otherwise seem distant to many of 
its readers.  Like a ghost, whose appearance reminds us that what is strange can also be 
uncannily familiar, Ceremony refuses to be read through the framework of 
multiculturalism as “a story about somebody else.”  The power of Silko’s novel is 
precisely that it makes Tayo’s story our story, and in doing so makes us, its readers, 
responsible for the past we share with its protagonist.  The God of Small Things’ more 
guarded approach, however, stands as a necessary corrective to the sweeping 
inclusiveness of Ceremony’s address to its readers.  Although, to an extent, Roy’s novel 
also draws its readers in, having done so it cautions them repeatedly against the dangers 
of embracing strategic, selective accounts of history.  Like the tourists—presumably both 
Indian and international—who visit the reinvented History House for pleasure and 
entertainment, we risk dodging our responsibility for both the past and the present when 
we create revised narratives of history through our engagement with a work of fiction.  
But a warning like the one Roy offers is meaningless if readers have not first come to see 
themselves as connected to and implicated in the trauma she narrates.  Without the 
experience of identification and recognition that a text like Ceremony offers its readers, 
Roy’s insistence on a rigorous accounting of the past risks falling on deaf ears.  Together, 
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however, Ceremony and The God of Small Things suggest a model of reading that, by 
balancing connection and distance, challenges us to assume responsibility for the 
traumatic past. 
 When read together, these two novels elicit complementary forms of engagement 
and obligation from their readers, and in doing so, begin to envision a practice of global 
reading that both recognizes the interconnections that define world literature and remains 
mindful of the structures of power that mark its production and circulation.  If, 
individually, Ceremony and The God of Small Things make visible the hidden or 
unacknowledged operations of empire, their consonances reveal the interrelationships 
between temporally and geographically distinct imperial projects.  Despite the very 
different contexts from which these two novels are drawn, one cannot help but be struck, 
at times, by their uncanny similarity to one another.  It seems more than coincidental that 
both novels center around poignant depictions of orphaned children, evoking a common 
sense of loss that lies at the root of the traumatic experiences they describe.  That both 
Silko and Roy turn to traumatic narrative to engage their readers suggests similarities, 
too, in the ways that both authors’ work is circulated and consumed by a global audience.  
Both Ceremony and The God of Small Things consciously work to position readers who 
are cultural outsiders, offering them both connections and cautions.  Reading these novels 
together, however, transforms us all into outsiders, for a reader who feels at home in one 
text will almost certainly feel distant from the other.  If we practice the model of reading 
that these two novels provide, we become personally connected to characters and events, 
however distant from our own experiences they may be, in the way that Ceremony 
encourages us to do.  But we also proceed with caution, as The God of Small Things 
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advocates, being careful not to indulge in comforting narratives that blunt our ethical and 
political obligations to the past and its victims.  As the texts themselves reveal, by 





Invisible Victims, Visible Absences: Imagining Disappearance for an International 
Audience 
Disappearance is a form of political violence that attempts to erase an individual 
from the social and political worlds he or she inhabited, leaving behind a ghostly 
remainder that stubbornly eludes representation.  Nevertheless, as human rights advocates 
are at pains to point out, the disappeared are not specters but real individuals, and the 
victims of disappearance have not “simply vanished,” despite the effectiveness of their 
official erasure (Amnesty International 84).  Like the genres of nonfiction writing that are 
mobilized in support of humanitarian causes, fictional accounts of disappearance are 
faced with the imperative of making victims visible and recognizable, in order to both 
intercede on their behalf and bring the perpetrators of systematic violence to account.  
But precisely because it is not expected or required to be strictly “factual,” fiction plays a 
special role in representing and transmitting the stories of the disappeared.  The 
disappeared themselves rarely reappear to inform the world of the atrocities they 
suffered, but fictional representations allow the disappeared to be brought to life as 
recognizable, empathetic individuals.  And because the imaginative work of the writer of 
fiction readily spans geographic distance, fictional narratives that depict and advocate for 
the disappeared can be both created and circulated abroad, beyond the reach of official 
censorship.  These fictions, which reflect both the circumstances of their frequently 
distant production and the desires and investments of the international audiences for 
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whom they are produced, challenge the silencing and uncertainty that disappearance 
creates.  But they are also marked by their own limitations: the forms of privilege they 
fail to recognize and the victims who elude their representational frames. 
The two texts I consider in this chapter, the 1982 film Missing and Michael 
Ondaatje’s novel Anil’s Ghost, are representations of the disappeared that are profoundly 
shaped by these conditions of production and circulation.  Both were created at a remove 
from the violent conflicts they depict: Missing was produced in the United States under 
the auspices of Hollywood, directed by the noted international filmmaker Costa-Gavras, 
and released almost a decade after the 1973 Chilean coup during which it is set.  
Ondaatje, a quintessentially diasporic writer living in Canada, visited his native Sri Lanka 
to research Anil’s Ghost, but wrote, published, and circulated his novel at a remove from 
that country’s protracted civil war.  Spanning geographical and cultural distance, these 
two texts rely on the conventions of realism to render their depictions of the disappeared 
both compelling and authoritative to their readers.  Although these texts are able in some 
ways to counter the silencing and erasure that disappearance imposes, recreating the 
disappeared as empathetic, three-dimensional characters, their failures to do so are 
ultimately more illuminating than their successes.  Despite their strategic acts of 
imagination, both Missing and Anil’s Ghost are marked by silences, the haunting 
presence of victims who cannot be recovered by distant authors or produced as characters 
for international readers.  Ultimately, these texts—and the ghostly figures that lurk at 




The Epistemic Violence of Disappearance 
For several reasons, disappearance is unique in the grim repertoire of human 
rights abuses that, due to a growing culture and discourse of human rights activism, has 
become increasingly visible in recent decades.  The human rights organization Amnesty 
International defines the disappeared as “people who have been taken into custody by 
agents of the state, yet whose whereabouts and fate are concealed, and whose custody is 
denied” (84).  Victims of disappearance are often arrested without notice and detained in 
secret facilities; if they are killed, their deaths are concealed, and their remains are often 
disposed of anonymously.  The fate of the disappeared is, in this way, fundamentally 
different from that of recognized combatants or accused criminals who are officially 
detained and placed on trial; although their treatment at the hands of the state may also be 
unjust, those victims receive a form of official and public recognition.  The disappeared, 
by contrast, simply become invisible, unacknowledged by the government and 
inaccessible to their families and the public. 
Although the term “disappearance” evocatively describes the effects of secret, 
extrajudicial detention, it is also somewhat misleading, for it implies that victims have 
simply ceased to exist, effacing the agency of perpetrators and reifying the erasure they 
attempt to impose.  As Alice Nelson explains, speaking about Chile in particular, “[f]rom 
the moment of their disappearance, missing people were relegated to a perverse limbo in 
which the state not only denied their deaths, but also attempted to negate their lives by 
claiming that the disappeared never existed” (A. A. Nelson 50, italics in original).  
Human rights groups such as Amnesty International are careful to make this point clear: 
Amnesty International puts the term [disappearance] in quotation marks to 
emphasize that the victim has in reality not simply vanished.  The victim’s 
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whereabouts and fate, concealed from the outside world, are known by 
someone.  Someone decided what would happen to the victim; someone 
decided to conceal it.  Someone is responsible. (84)  
 The authors of this report sound an important note of caution: that the term 
“disappearance” risks euphemizing the real suffering of a particular person in custody, as 
well as the agency of those responsible for detaining that person.  It is notable, however, 
that despite challenging the erasure of disappearance, this statement focuses primarily on 
the perpetrators, rather than on the victim.  Although the culpability of the perpetrators is 
reasserted, the agency and affective experience of the disappeared person remains 
stubbornly absent, even in an intervention as pointed as this one.  This omission points to 
the particular challenge posed by disappearance: it not only makes it difficult to locate 
and protect victims, but also threatens to place them beyond the reach of representation.   
 The silencing of the disappeared themselves is often almost total; held in secret 
prisons, the disappeared are rarely able to communicate with the outside world, and many 
never “reappear” to tell their story.  Moreover, the systematic regimes of torture that 
frequently accompany disappearance make it extremely difficult for those who do survive 
to speak publicly about their experiences.  Although a consideration of the extensive 
body of scholarship concerning the phenomenology of pain is beyond the scope of this 
project, the seminal insights of Elaine Scarry point to the congruent and complementary 
effects of erasure and dehumanization that disappearance and torture together produce.1   
                                                
1 As Scarry suggests, physical pain both undermines the linguistic powers of the person 
experiencing it and creates uncertainty in the person to whom it is reported (4).  Thus, the 
disappeared person who becomes a victim of torture is subject to a double erasure: 
removed from public view and denied recognition as a bearer of rights through the act of 
extrajudicial detention, and removed again, by the experience of inexpressible pain, from 
participation in the public discourse. 
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To the extent that the disappeared are unable to represent themselves as victims, it 
falls to others to reclaim their identities and reinscribe them in the public discourse.  As 
Nelson explains, “Even without a body to serve as physical proof of their existence, . . . 
missing people did continue to exist through the ways in which other people 
reconstructed them discursively, by telling stories that bore witness to those individuals’ 
lives within a community” (50).  Needless to say, however, the state that perpetrates 
disappearances also endeavors to disrupt and suppress these powerful and resistant acts of 
representation.  “In order to disappear a person completely, then, the State’s task involved 
an extended battle to silence such community-based narratives” (A. A. Nelson 50).  Thus, 
in addition to secret detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing, disappearance also 
involves a broader process of silencing intended to prevent the family and community of 
the disappeared from reclaiming them discursively. 
 Paradoxically, public display is often central to the coercive power of 
disappearance and the silencing it imposes on the broader population.  Rather than 
concealing the fact that people are being disappeared, perpetrators make abductions 
highly visible as a threat to discipline onlookers and render them complicit.2  Thus, 
despite the fact that disappearance is often a matter of common knowledge, the climate of 
fear it produces prevents it from being acknowledged or condemned, giving rise to an 
enforced, collective blindness that Diana Taylor has termed “percepticide” (10).  
Although her subject is Argentina’s so-called “Dirty War,” which differed in important 
ways from both the Chilean and Sri Lankan conflicts considered here, Taylor’s insights 
                                                
2 Indeed, as James Dawes points out, the fact that onlookers are present may motivate and 
shape, rather than restrain, acts of violence, which take on the quality of public 
performances (169).   
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into the representational strategies involved in disappearance are illuminating.  As she 
points out, “[t]he military violence could have been relatively invisible, as the term 
disappearance suggests.  The fact that it wasn’t indicates that the population as a whole 
was the intended target, positioned by means of the spectacle.  People had to deny what 
they saw and, by turning away, collude with the violence around them” (123).  In a 
climate like the one Taylor describes, representing the disappeared becomes difficult, if 
not impossible, in the public sphere.  This coerced, public silencing contributes to the 
spectral quality that victims of disappearance assume: although they exist, their bodies 
(living or dead) are inaccessible, and although their loss is grieved by their family and 
community, it cannot be acknowledged or narrated. 
This dynamic of silencing and erasure is exemplified by a scene recounted in 
Ondaatje’s novel, in which a man is abducted by rebel fighters in full view of the public 
and carried away by his captors on a bicycle.  Sarath, who witnessed the scene, 
remembers it in vivid detail:  
“. . . It would have been easier if they had all walked.  But this felt in an 
odd way ceremonial.  Perhaps a bike was a form of status for them and 
they wanted to use it.  Why transport a blindfolded victim on a bicycle?  It 
made all life seem precarious.  . . . They cycled off at the far end of the 
street, beyond the market buildings, they turned and disappeared.  Of 
course the reason they did it that way was so none of us would forget it.” 
“What did you do?” 
“Nothing.” (154-5) 
As Sarath’s account suggests, the highly visible, memorable way in which this unknown 
man was disappeared goes hand-in-hand with Sarath’s inaction and the guilt he feels as a 
result of it.  He feels uncomfortably included in the “us” for whom the scene was staged, 
and his retelling echoes and almost reifies the logic of the man’s captors: “I don’t know 
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what he had done.  Maybe he had betrayed them, maybe he had killed someone, or 
disobeyed an order, or not agreed quickly enough.  In those days the justice of death 
came in at any level” (154).  Distanced from the man being abducted, Sarath concedes 
that any of the offenses the man might have committed would be punishable by death.  
Although Sarath certainly does not condone the man’s disappearance, he accepts it as 
normal in the context of the war and is forced to acknowledge the position of complicity 
into which his act of passive witnessing has placed him. 
 Because of its simultaneous reliance on erasure and public display, disappearance 
takes on a spectral quality that distinguishes it from other forms of violence.  Indeed, as 
Avery Gordon suggests, haunting may be the only framework through which we can 
adequately comprehend disappearance.  She explains: “[a] disappearance is real only 
when it is apparitional because the ghost or the apparition is the principal form by which 
something lost or invisible or seemingly not there makes itself known or apparent to us” 
(63).  Gordon’s description certainly evokes the condition of living in a society where 
disappearance is occurring, in which it is both an unacknowledged reality and a constant 
threat.  But it also points, more broadly, to the problems of representation that 
disappearance engenders, both within and beyond the zone of conflict.  On the one hand, 
those who attempt to represent the disappeared see it as an ethical imperative, for as 
Nelson reminds us, “those narratives explicitly reaffirmed the existence of the absent 
person and resisted the social fragmentation that the regime sought to impose” (50).  But 
however urgent such narratives are, they are profoundly constrained by the forms of 
imposed silencing that they attempt to counteract.  There are limits to what can be 
known, or even imagined, about the disappeared, and there are also limits to the contexts 
 
 105 
in which narratives of disappearance can be produced and circulated.  Gordon’s account 
of disappearance as haunting points to this central paradox: representing the disappeared 
becomes essential and urgent precisely to the degree that it also becomes impossible. 
Fiction and Disappearance 
 Under a regime of terror, simply narrating the lives and experiences of the 
disappeared constitutes an urgent and dangerous form of resistance.  Those within the 
zone of conflict often go to heroic lengths to represent the disappeared, using methods 
and media that range from graffiti to unauthorized theater performances to the 
photographs of their missing children displayed by the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in 
Argentina.  But given the risk of producing resistant representations at home, narratives 
of disappearance are often created abroad, intended to circulate among an international, 
rather than domestic, audience.  Located beyond the reach of official censorship and 
coerced silence, authors writing at a distance from a conflict have much more freedom in 
representing it.  And by distributing their narratives broadly, these authors hope to make 
disappearance visible to people who have not directly experienced it and who, free from 
the fear that controls those in the conflict zone, might be better able to respond and 
intervene.   
Although he certainly recognizes their limitations, James Dawes argues for the 
importance of the forms of storytelling that communicate human rights abuses to 
international audiences.  “One of the most important premises of contemporary human 
rights work is that effective dissemination of information can change the world. . . . 
Individuals can be inspired to donate time and money; governments, particularly those 
dependent on foreign aid, can be pressured into altering their behavior” (9).  To the extent 
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that such narratives are effective, in Dawes’s terms, they are often strategic, consciously 
or unconsciously informed by the circuits they will travel.  As Kay Schaffer and Sidonie 
Smith remind us, narratives of human rights abuses are inherently shaped by the contexts 
of their production, circulation, and reception, and the representations of disappearance in 
Missing and Anil’s Ghost are no exception.3  Schaffer and Smith invite us to consider 
how “modes of circulation impact upon the expectations of the teller, the structure of the 
story, and the mode of address to different kinds of audiences,” as well as the ways in 
which “contexts of reception direct and contain the ethical call of stories and their appeals 
for redress” (6).  Although there are important differences in the patterns of production, 
circulation, and consumption that define Missing and Anil’s Ghost, both were created at a 
remove from the conflicts they depict, and with international—and arguably Western—
audiences in mind.  Shaped by these similar conditions, these two texts rely on parallel 
strategies to traverse the distance between their creators, their readers, and the conflicts 
they depict.  
 Released in 1982, Missing tells the story of Charles Horman, an American 
expatriate who disappeared during the early days of Chile’s 1973 coup.  The film is 
fictional but “based on a true story,” conforming closely with a nonfictional account 
written by Thomas Hauser, which was not widely read at the time of its initial publication 
in 1978.  Although Costa-Gavras, a Greek director based in France, was well known for 
his previous independently produced political films, Missing was produced in Hollywood 
by Universal Pictures for a popular audience, with prominent American actors Jack 
                                                
3 Although Schaffer and Smith focus on autobiographical narrative, the questions they 
pose are equally thought-provoking in the context of other forms of representation, both 
nonfictional and fictional. 
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Lemmon and Sissy Spacek in starring roles.  Although it depicts the events of 1973, 
Missing also reflects its own context, including the conflicts taking place elsewhere in 
Latin America at the time of the film’s release.  As Costa-Gavras explained, 
Universal would have liked to put at the beginning of the film, “Chile, 
September 1973.”  By saying that, though, it becomes a local problem, and 
it also becomes a historical thing—far away, ten years ago, who 
remembers that?  But I think these things are still happening.  It could be 
Argentina, it could be El Salvador.  People are disappearing all over the 
world. (qtd. in Crowdus and Rubenstein 32)  
Costa-Gavras’s statement reflects a particular conception about the interests and concerns 
of the film’s potential viewers, one which certainly informed its distribution and 
promotion in the U.S. 
 Anil’s Ghost is Michael Ondaatje’s third novel, and its circulation and 
consumption reflect both Ondaatje’s reputation as an author and the context of his 
previous work.  Ondaatje was born to Dutch parents in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), but 
received his secondary education in England and eventually settled in Canada, where he 
established himself as a well-respected poet and writer of fiction.  The visibility and 
success of Ondaatje’s previous novel, The English Patient, which won the Booker Prize 
and was adapted into a popular Hollywood film, ensured a broad, international interest in 
and circulation of Anil’s Ghost.  If the war-torn setting and fragmentary, imagistic 
narration of The English Patient formed part of the context of reception for Anil’s Ghost, 
so too did the ongoing war in Sri Lanka and an evolving discourse of international human 
rights.  Published in 2000, in the wake of the so-called “decade of human rights,” Anil’s 
Ghost explicitly positions itself in relation to a popular narrative of disappearance that 
traces its genealogy from the Latin American revolutions of the 1970s and ’80s to more 
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recent conflicts in Africa and Southeast Asia (Schaffer and Smith 1).4  Well received by 
readers in England, Canada, and the U.S., the novel is frequently read as human rights 
fiction, an established and recognized genre by the time of its publication. 
In comparing a work of literary fiction with a Hollywood feature film, it is 
essential to recognize the differences in medium and form that distinguish their 
approaches to constructing narratives of disappearance.  Reflecting on scholarly 
responses to film adaptations, Brian McFarlane cautions literary scholars in particular, 
whose training “equips us to read complexity and subtlety in novels,” to be attentive to 
the comparable but formally distinct ways in which films make meaning (5).  McFarlane 
argues that for a critic to be ignorant of “the ways in which the three large classes of film 
narration—mise-en-scène, editing, and soundtrack, in their various subcategories—put 
before us the narrative events” of the film “is to be ignorant of how a film creates 
meaning in those large areas which pervade a text vertically, as distinct from the 
horizontal causally linked chain of events” that make up a film’s plot (7).  Recognizing 
the distinct means through which novels and films undertake the process of narration, 
however, we can nevertheless identify similar narrative modes that traverse these two 
media.  Both Missing and Anil’s Ghost are forms of human rights fiction that tell stories 
about the disappeared, and both strive to be both realistic and emotionally engaging to 
their audiences, although they use different formal mechanisms to do so. 
                                                
4 Anil’s Ghost begins with a brief scene depicting Anil at work excavating a clandestine 
burial site in Guatemala.  Not directly related to the novel’s main plot, this scene serves 
in part, as Qadri Ismail has suggested, to situate Anil’s forensic work in the context of a 
broader narrative of disappearance as a global phenomenon (28). 
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 Despite their distinct contexts and media, Missing and Anil’s Ghost both rely on 
the strategies of fictional narrative in general, and literary realism, in particular, to reach 
their intended audiences.  Because the aim of disappearance is to deny the very existence 
of its victims, fictional narrative is particularly effective at overcoming this attempted 
erasure.  In fact, this is fiction’s strong suit: whereas nonfictional representations such as 
human rights reports are constrained by limited access to information about the 
disappeared, fictional narratives are free to fill the gaps and silences of disappearance 
through the imaginative work of their creators.  Unlike nonfictional accounts, which 
cultivate a “rational, objective, non-emotive voice,” in order to establish their “authority 
to speak,” fictional narratives are able to engage the empathy of their audiences through 
rich, detailed, three-dimensional characterizations of the disappeared that bring them to 
life for readers and viewers (Dudai 251).  While fictional narrative may be able to 
imaginatively overcome a lack of factual evidence, however, it is hardly exempt from the 
expectation of truthfulness—some sense that although the particular lives and 
experiences it represents are imagined, they are nevertheless accurate reflections of a 
broader truth.  This is particularly the case for human rights fiction, which seeks to 
promote awareness of and intervention in real, ongoing conflicts, and which must 
therefore depict those conflicts without the perception of exaggeration or bias.  Both 
Missing and Anil’s Ghost rely on the conventions of literary realism in this way to 
establish the accuracy and reliability of their representations.  
As a narrative device, realism responds to the paradoxical situation in which those 
seeking to represent disappearance frequently find themselves: the imperative to create a 
fictionalized account that audiences will nevertheless receive as accurate, authentic, and 
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truthful.  As Ian Watt has notably characterized it, literary realism is concerned with “the 
production of what purports to be an authentic account of the actual experiences of 
individuals” (27).  In providing such an account, realism places primary importance on 
depictions of interiority, creating characters who are recognizable to readers as distinct 
and three-dimensional individuals.5  Thus, it is through the seeming truthfulness of their 
characters—the extent to which the depiction of those characters’ interiorities is 
recognizable and thus credible to their audiences—that works of fiction like Missing and 
Anil’s Ghost establish their authoritativeness in representing the disappeared.  Literary 
realism is certainly not the only means of narrating disappearance; indeed, a significant 
number of fictional accounts address disappearance through abstraction, fragmentation, 
or metaphor, and do so to great effect.6  But the realist style embraced by works like 
Missing and Anil’s Ghost reflects a canny appraisal, whether conscious or unconscious, 
of the desires and preferences of their viewers and readers. 
As works that present accounts of human rights abuses in the Third World to an 
international audience, Missing and Anil’s Ghost enter into contexts already marked by 
multiple regimes of political, cultural, and economic power.  Perhaps the most prominent 
of these is the cultural prestige and economic buying power of Western literary markets, 
which privileges the position of Western, metropolitan readers among these texts’ 
                                                
5 Formal strategies such as linear plots, reliable narration, and Hollywood continuity 
editing all contribute to this effect of a character-centered realism.  For the purposes of 
this argument, I am more concerned with the consequences of this realism than the 
particular strategies used to achieve it. 
6 Avery Gordon’s reading of Luisa Valenzuela’s novel Como en la guerra / He Who 
Searches, a novel Gordon describes as “allegorical, fragmented, narratively incoherent, 
and difficult to comprehend in any straightforward way that would easily answer the 
questions all readers ask,” is exemplary (67). 
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“international” audiences.  Thus, although Anil’s Ghost was published and circulated 
broadly, its primary market was in the West.  Missing’s international circulation, though 
different from that of Ondaatje’s novel, reflects the economic power of the American film 
industry.  As a Hollywood film, Missing’s primary audience was American moviegoers, 
but it has been screened in more than ten countries and garnered several international 
awards.  The predominance of Western, metropolitan readers and viewers among the 
international audiences to which Missing and Anil’s Ghost address themselves is typical, 
especially for human rights literature, and therefore profoundly influences the ways in 
which these texts choose to represent disappearance. 
While it is always problematic to generalize about readers and their 
preconceptions, it is nevertheless important to recognize that the creators of works of 
fiction inevitably make their own assumptions about their readers, especially when they 
seek to inspire real-world political, legal, or humanitarian action. It is therefore worth 
considering several of the dominant frameworks through which the global circulation of 
human rights fiction can be understood.  In The Postcolonial Exotic, Graham Huggan 
offers a convincing if pessimistic account of the fetishizing imperialist frameworks 
through which Third World literature is consumed in the West.  As his title suggests, 
Huggan argues that, under the conditions of postcoloniality, Third World literatures and 
cultures circulate in a global marketplace that values them as “exotic.”  Exoticness, he 
reminds us, is not an inherent quality of a particular cultural object, but rather the result 
of the way that object is consumed, “a  particular mode of aesthetic perception—one 
which renders people, objects[,] and places strange even as it domesticates them” 
(Huggan 13).  Certainly, we see evidence of this familiar optic in the ways that Missing 
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and Anil’s Ghost represent the people, culture, and landscape of Chile and Sri Lanka, 
respectively.  But the fetishizing gaze that Huggan describes also informs, more 
specifically, the treatment of disappearance in these texts. 
For the Western readers Huggan describes, hungry for the exotic, disappearance 
becomes otherness writ large, since official silencing intensifies the inscrutability usually 
attributed to Third World nations and their inhabitants, and in an attempt to capture the 
attention and concern of distant readers, the literary realism of texts like Missing and 
Anil’s Ghost frequently traffics in the very fetishisms that Huggan critiques.  On the one 
hand, these representations of disappearance cater to readers’ desire to know, to possess 
the masterful gaze of the colonial observer, by providing the aesthetic effect of 
omniscient, mimetic access to characters’ interiorities.  These texts not only recover the 
missing through credible, empathetic characterizations, but also probe the depths of their 
inner lives, providing unfettered access to the “reality” of disappearance.  At the same 
time, however, they also seem to obey the traditional limits of fiction: their stories of the 
disappeared, though realistic, are consumed and appreciated as something apart from the 
world their readers occupy.  Thus, texts like Missing and Anil’s Ghost expose their 
audiences to disappearance as something that happens elsewhere, that Westerners should 
be concerned about but will never need to fear.  By indulging the imperialist gaze, these 
representations of the disappeared succeed in achieving visibility in the eyes of the West, 
but also, to varying degrees, transform the disappeared into the traditionally passive 
objects of that gaze: looked upon, but unable to look back. 
Certainly, there is some truth to this appraisal of how literary realism functions in 
texts like Missing and Anil’s Ghost.  But it is also possible to understand these texts as 
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engaging in a more dialogic, if nevertheless strategic exchange with their Western 
audiences.  For although realism can serve, on the one hand, to reify the imperialist gaze 
of its most powerful audiences, it can also serve, on the other, as the terrain on which 
claims to status and rights are themselves negotiated.  As Joseph Slaughter argues, the 
novel, and in particular the coming-of-age story or bildungsroman, is closely allied with 
the project of international human rights.  Emphasizing the parallels between a literary 
genre and a legal regime both predicated on what the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights terms “the free and full development of the human personality,” Slaughter 
points to the postcolonial bildungsroman as a privileged site where the conferral of 
personhood, and its attendant rights, can be imagined (qtd. in Slaughter 4).  The novel, 
like human rights law itself, is therefore a site where human rights are not merely 
depicted or defended, but actively produced.  Thus, while Western readers’ desire to 
consume otherness in the familiar form of the bildungsroman privileges that form “to the 
likely exclusion of alternative generic forms and constructions of human rights,” the 
bildungsroman in turn extends the reach of international human rights law “by projecting 
the social and cultural conditions out of which human rights might be recognized as 
commonsensical” (Slaughter 33, 29). 
Although the subtleties of Slaughter’s analysis of the bildungsroman form in 
particular lie beyond the scope of this analysis, his framing of human rights law and 
human rights literature as “mutually enabling fictions” points toward a more reciprocal 
relationship between those engaged in contests over human rights and the Western 
readers for whom their stories are narrated (4).  Following Slaughter’s model, 
representing the disappeared as people and bearers of rights contributes to the realization 
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of a broader international order in which those rights can be recognized, and the 
strategies of realism deployed by texts like Missing and Anil’s Ghost are ideally suited to 
that task.  Much like stories of self-realization from the Third World that arrive in “the 
familiar national dress” of the bildungsroman, literary realism is a genre with which 
Western readers are familiar and comfortable (Slaughter 33).  Realism’s central concern 
with individual experience, and with relaying the stories of “particular people in 
particular circumstances,” predisposes it to the task of establishing the personhood of the 
disappeared (Watt 15).  And the privileged concern with interiority that characterizes 
literary realism helps create the bonds of empathy that are so often the basis or the 
inspiration for real-world action and intervention.7 
 Both Huggan’s critique of the West’s voracious consumption of the postcolonial 
exotic, and Slaughter’s vision of literary personhood as inseparably if not 
unproblematically linked with the logic of international human rights, inform an 
understanding of how representations of disappearance such as Missing and Anil’s Ghost 
are produced, circulated, and received.  Together, the arguments put forward by both 
Huggan and Slaughter reflect the work and the negotiations these texts undertake through 
their use of realism.  By bringing the disappeared to life in a direct, seemingly 
unmediated way for their readers, these texts bridge the gaps—both geographic and 
ideological—that might otherwise leave international audiences unaware of and 
                                                
7 A great deal has been written, in both theoretical and practical contexts, regarding the 
relationship between empathy and humanitarianism (see, for instance, Nussbaum and 
Rorty).  While it is important to acknowledge the critiques leveled against empathy as, at 
best, a flawed mechanism for attaining political and social justice, it is also appropriate to 
recognize its ongoing centrality to the consciousness-raising work that much human 
rights fiction undertakes.  
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unconcerned about the anonymous, impersonal victims of oppressive regimes.  
Moreover, by representing the disappeared as people—recognizably rights-bearing 
individuals—these fictions may begin to contribute to their legal recognition and 
protection.  But by doing so through the frameworks most available and legible to their 
creators and their readers, texts like Missing and Anil’s Ghost reproduce a particular set 
of values and blind spots.  By relying on realism to reconstruct the stories of the 
disappeared, these texts challenge certain erasures but inevitably create others. 
Realist Narrative: Bringing the Disappeared to Life  
 Both Missing and Anil’s Ghost use the conventions of realism effectively to elicit 
the engagement of the distant, predominantly Western audiences for whom they are 
written.  Both texts center around the creation of empathetic, three-dimensional 
characters whose inner experiences become the means by which the conflict itself is 
depicted and interpreted.  The credibility of these characterizations therefore becomes the 
basis for broader claims of legitimacy and truthfulness in representing the conflicts 
themselves.  This strategy is surprisingly effective at circumventing the climate of silence 
and denial that surrounds disappearance, for it shifts the burden of proof away from the 
forms of factual information that can be suppressed through censorship and coercion, and 
toward the kinds of fictionalized interiority that novelists and filmmakers are experts at 
constructing.   
Produced as a Hollywood film targeting a broad American audience, Missing 
faced the challenge of humanizing the victims of a regime that had received both covert 
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support and overt recognition from the U.S. government.8  Set against the backdrop of a 
violent military takeover in which thousands of lives were lost, the film focuses intently 
and exclusively on just one victim, Charlie Horman, an American writer and journalist 
who was disappeared by the Chilean military.  On its surface, the film traces the efforts of 
Charlie’s widow, Beth, and his father, Ed, to construct an account of Charlie’s 
disappearance, find proof of his death, and grieve his loss.  Throughout, however, the 
film’s central concern is not Charlie’s whereabouts but his character, the question of what 
kind of man Charlie was.  So too, the events of Ed’s and Beth’s search, which drive the 
film’s plot, are ultimately less important than their struggle to make sense of Charlie’s 
loss.  Thus, although Missing depicts people, places, and events that are based on fact, its 
moral weight derives from the fictionalized characters it creates within the framework of 
that factual narrative. 
 The film’s very first scene, which plays during the opening credits, perfectly 
illustrates its perspective, framing its depiction of the Chilean coup through a focus on 
the character of Charlie.  As the title fades, we see a man, Charlie, through the partially 
open window of a car.  He is intently watching the scene in front of him, which is visible 
to the audience as a distant, distorted reflection in the glass of the car window.  As 
Charlie and the audience watch, a group of children plays soccer in an open plaza or 
square.  The tense, ominous music that plays during this scene at first seems incongruous, 
                                                
8 The United States’ involvement in the 1973 coup, which overthrew Chile’s 
democratically elected Socialist president Salvador Allende and installed a military junta 
led by General Augusto Pinochet, was still hotly debated at the time of Missing’s release.  
Subsequently, the nature and degree of that involvement, which included a range of 
covert actions to destabilize the Allende government and provide resources to its 
opponents, has become a matter of scholarly consensus corroborated by the ongoing 
release of formerly classified documents. 
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overwhelming the diegetic sounds of the children’s game and foreshadowing the arrival 
of a truck full of heavily armed soldiers.  Our focus shifts momentarily, first to the 
smiling face of Charlie’s friend Terry, who is also watching the game, then briefly to the 
children themselves, as we see the military truck approach.  But as the soldiers climb 
down from the truck and the children disperse, we once again watch the scene unfold 
through the reflection in the car window, literally projected onto Charlie in the position of 
the observer.  More than simply an inventive shot, the perspective in this scene is 
emblematic of that which the film will employ: our focus is closely trained on Charlie, 
whom we are invited to read through his reaction to the scene unfolding in front of him.  
It is only as a consequence of our concern with Charlie and his character that we witness 
the events of the coup itself.   
 In contrast to nonfictional representations, in which the disappeared are often 
reduced to shadowy, anonymous figures or empty statistics, Charlie is highly visible—
almost hyper-visible—in the film’s early scenes. These scenes, which take place before 
Charlie’s disappearance, play a crucial role in establishing him as an empathetic character 
and an admirable man: we watch him worry about and then lovingly comfort his wife, 
carefully and courageously navigate an encounter with the police, and idealistically 
attempt to intervene on behalf of a stranger who is seized by security forces.  The film’s 
ability to represent Charlie with the authority of the present tense is unique to fiction, 
since nonfictional representations of the disappeared are inevitably retrospective.  And 
although the character of “Charlie” is built on the imaginative work of the film’s 
screenwriters and the actor who plays the role, the mimetic conventions of Hollywood 
film dovetail with audience expectations to lend these scenes immediacy and apparent 
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truthfulness.  As viewers, we feel that we know Charlie personally and, based on that 
knowledge, can recognize and resist his attempted erasure.  In contrast to the ambiguity 
and uncertainty that disappearance usually produces, viewers of Missing are placed in the 
empowering position of knowing the “truth” about Charlie in the face of the competing 
narratives that will be put forward in the wake of his disappearance. 
 Indeed, although Missing might be expected to ground its authority on its basis in 
fact, the film’s own self-framing highlights its status as fiction.  The film’s prologue 
exemplifies this framing: rather than stating solely that it “is based on a true story,” 
Missing’s prologue gives equal emphasis to its fictionalization: “[s]ome of the names 
have been changed to protect the innocent and also to protect the film.”  From a practical 
standpoint, this emphasis on the film’s status as fiction did serve to “protect” it, as the 
prologue suggests: Costa-Gavras and Universal Pictures successfully defended 
themselves against several libel suits filed by the consular officials whom the film 
portrayed in a negative light.9  But beyond these legal battles, Missing’s status as fiction 
also allowed it to defend itself effectively in the court of public opinion during the 
controversy that surrounded its release.  The film’s suggestion that the U.S. government 
was complicit in Horman’s death elicited significant criticism, including an official 
statement from the U.S. State Department contesting the film’s claims.10  But even when 
the facts on which it is based are disputed, the emotional appeal contained in the film 
                                                
9 For a comprehensive account of the libel suits that followed the film’s release, see John 
J. Michalczyk, “Costa-Gavras’ Missing: A Legal and Political Battlefield.” 
10 In the published statement, the State Department explains that it “regrets the sad death 
of Charles Horman as well as the efforts by some to read into it possible involvement by 
the United States Government and its officials, which the record indicates is wholly 
unwarranted” (qtd. in Crowdus and Rubenstein 38). 
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remains effective, as even Flora Lewis, one of its harshest critics, was forced to 
acknowledge.  That Missing is, in Lewis’s words, “cinematically convincing” allowed it 
to generate a degree of public interest and debate about the Chilean coup that neither the 
Hormans’ complaint nor Hauser’s book were able to elicit (1).   
Like Missing, Anil’s Ghost also relies on representations of interiority to both 
engage its readers and establish its truthfulness.  Set during the late 1980s or early 1990s, 
during one of the most intensely violent periods in Sri Lanka’s protracted civil war, 
Michael Ondaatje’s novel revolves around efforts to identify a particular victim of that 
conflict.11  Initially, the novel presents its readers with a mystery: Anil, a Sri Lanka-born 
forensic pathologist representing an international human rights organization, and Sarath, 
the government archaeologist with whom she is paired, discover a contemporary skeleton 
in an ancient burial site.  Knowing that the skeleton’s location in a controlled 
archaeological site strongly implicates the government, they undertake to identify the 
victim, whom they nickname “Sailor,” and to document his disappearance.  As the novel 
progresses, however, its focus shifts from Anil’s efforts to identify Sailor through 
forensic science to the individuals that surround her, each of whom has found a way to 
cope with the forms of loss that define their experience of war.  By the end of the novel, 
Anil’s effort to find truth in “bones and sediment” has faded to the background, and the 
                                                
11 The complex, bloody conflict in Sri Lanka pitted the country’s majority Sinhala 
government against both Tamil separatists in the north and armed militants in the south.  
During an intense period of fighting between 1987 and 1990, Amnesty International 
estimates that tens of thousands of people were victims of disappearance or extrajudicial 
killing (28).  In 2009, the Sri Lankan government declared victory over the Tamil 
separatists, but as of this writing, wartime emergency laws remain in place and the 




novel’s shifting temporality and roving, omniscient narration present readers instead with 
a collage of what Sarath describes as “character and nuance and mood” (259). 
Anil, enamored with both the methods of forensic science and its underlying 
empiricism, focalizes the first section of Ondaatje’s novel, which elaborates her 
background and traces her efforts to discover the identity of the skeleton she has found.  
To identify an anonymous victim like Sailor, Anil seeks to uncover “the permanent 
truths” documented in his remains, “same for Colombo as for Troy” (64).  Indeed, she 
successfully identifies Sailor based on the “markers of occupation” on his bones, which 
reveal his past labor as both a toddy tapper and a miner, and which in turn allow her and 
Sarath to discover his village, his name—Ruwan Kumara—and the circumstances of his 
disappearance (177).  Despite her commitment to forensics, however, even Anil doubts 
the effectiveness of using documentary evidence to combat disappearance and political 
violence.  In an episode that foreshadows events later in the novel, Anil recalls her 
organization’s prior expulsion from the Congo, their evidence confiscated by the 
government whom their findings offended.  As she investigates Sailor’s disappearance, 
Anil remains acutely aware of the limits of such work: “in all the turbulent history of the 
island’s recent civil wars, in all the token police investigations, not one murder charge 
had been made during the troubles” (176).  
Sailor’s identification resolves the mystery around which Anil’s Ghost initially 
centered and marks an important shift in both the novel’s focus and its narrative frame.  
As Sailor recedes from view, the novel directs our attention to a cast of characters that 
Ondaatje has introduced in the preceding pages: Sarath and his brother Gamini, a 
physician; Palipana, the aging scholar; and Ananda, a local artisan whom Anil and Sarath 
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hire to create a facial reconstruction of Sailor.  Amid the chaos of war, these characters 
take refuge within themselves, and Ondaatje narrates their inner lives and past 
experiences to the reader in engaging and lyrical detail.  Moving away from the logic of 
empiricism and the framework of international law on which it initially seems to center, 
the novel privileges the inner life of the individual over the public terrain of science and 
law as the site where survival, justice, and healing are enacted.  And even more than 
Missing, Anil’s Ghost valorizes the ways of reading in which the text itself invites us to 
participate.  Ondaatje’s characters—readers, artists, or historians—embrace the figurative 
and the interpretive to makes sense of the violence around them.  These characters seek 
truth in the aesthetic, rather than the factual, modeling the very practices of reading and 
knowing that the novel makes available to its readers: practices that circumvent the forms 
of silencing that disappearance imposes.  
In Anil’s Ghost, Ondaatje relies on the strategies of fiction to render the 
disappeared familiar and empathetic, rather than distant and abstract.  For although the 
novel begins with Anil’s efforts to identify an anonymous victim, Sailor, it ends with the 
identification of a much more familiar victim: Sarath.  In a surprising twist at the novel’s 
close, Sarath is tortured and killed for helping Anil escape the country with evidence of 
Sailor’s murder, and his body is discovered by his brother, Gamini, among the 
anonymous corpses of political prisoners whose injuries he reviews and documents.  
Unlike those dead prisoners, however, Sarath has been constructed as a three-dimensional 
character; by the time of his death, readers know a great deal about his values, principles, 
and motivations, as well as the formative events and relationships in his personal life.  
And unlike the majority of the disappeared, his body is quickly identified by his own 
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brother, whose medical insights remove much of the uncertainty about Sarath’s final 
hours of life.  Not only does disappearance fail to remove Sarath from the realm of 
representation, it renders him even more intimately knowable both to Gamini and to 
readers. 
Even with his brother’s face concealed, Gamini immediately recognizes Sarath in 
his weekly stack of photographs.  After locating his brother’s body in the morgue, 
Gamini carefully dresses its wounds, as if by treating Sarath as he would a living patient, 
he can bring him back to life.  For Gamini, this final act begins “a permanent 
conversation with Sarath,” acknowledging the resentments that distanced the two 
brothers and narrating both their past differences and their present reconciliation (288).  
In contrast to the many anonymous victims whose wounds Gamini reviews, the 
“innocent” marks of Sarath’s childhood injuries make him instantly legible as an 
individual and recall vivid memories of their shared past: “[t]he gash of scar on the side 
of your elbow you got crashing a bike on the Kandy Hill.  This scar I gave you hitting 
you with a cricket stump” (287).  Rather than posing a series of unanswerable questions, 
Sarath’s body provides proof of his essential nature, as confirmed by his torturer’s cruel 
instincts.  “It was the face they went for in some cases.  They could in their hideous skills 
sniff out vanity.  But they had not touched Sarath’s face” (290).  As a member of the 
disappeared, Sarath is not rendered invisible, but rather becomes even more legible in 
death than he was in life.  
The conventions of realist fiction allow Ondaatje to represent the disappeared 
more legibly than real life usually allows, but throughout the novel, he also argues for 
fiction as the best—and at times the only—means of survival and resistance in a conflict 
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zone.  The character of Palipana, Sarath’s disgraced and reclusive mentor, epitomizes the 
practices of nonliteral interpretation that the novel advocates.  Palipana was trained as an 
archaeologist, but his preferred description of himself as an “epigraphist” suggests a more 
oblique, less literal relationship between the ancient writings he studies and the meaning 
he finds in them (78).  Although Palipana’s object of study is the ancient past, Ondaatje 
clearly relates the “political tides and royal eddies of the island in the sixth century” to 
the political violence in contemporary Sri Lanka (81).  As Palipana’s own eyesight fades, 
the “illegal story” he finds recorded in interlinear inscriptions is, like representations of 
the disappeared, “how one hid or wrote the truth when it was necessary to lie” (105). 
Ondaatje suggests that, despite Palipana’s disgrace within the academic community, 
which rejects his interpretations as fabricated, his definition of truth and practice of 
reading are the right ones for the times.  His traumatized, orphaned niece, who rightly 
distrusts the pretense of safety and veneer of normalcy at the government orphanage 
where she is initially taken, comes into her own under Palipana’s care and tutelage.  
Much like the shifting, elusive truth that Palipana seeks, the phrase she chisels into the 
rock at the edge of a lake to commemorate him after his death “appears and disappears” 
with the light and the level of the water (107).  A privileged, almost sacred figure in the 
novel, Palipana is emblematic of the imaginative, aesthetic work of recovering the truth 
of a life from the silence of official history. 
Ananda also responds to disappearance through creative acts of representation 
rather than factual reconstruction.  Ananda’s wife, Sirissa, is, like Sailor, a victim of the 
war, and her disappearance prompts him to abandon his work as a ceremonial painter of 
Buddhist statues and take up grueling and dangerous work in the gem mines. Anil and 
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Sarath hire him to reconstruct a likeness of Sailor’s face that they can use to identify him, 
and for Ananda, the project becomes a way of challenging the uncertainty and erasure 
that disappearance produces.  Like other fictional representations of the disappeared, and 
like the novel itself, Ananda’s reconstruction dispels the uncertainty of the hypothetical, 
“how someone possibly looked,” and relies on imagination to recreate an unknown 
victim as “a specific person” (184).  The face Ananda creates is not, however, a likeness 
of Sailor, but rather a representation of “what he wants of the dead” that displays “a calm 
Ananda had known in his wife, [and] a peacefulness he wanted for any victim” (184, 
187).  Through his sculpture, Ananda embraces fiction as a way of providing himself, and 
other survivors, with solace and certainty in the wake of disappearance. 
The healing power of fictional representation is fully on display in the novel’s 
final scene, which depicts Ananda at work on the restoration of a destroyed statue of the 
Buddha—rather than Anil’s return to the West with her forensic evidence, which remains 
unnarrated.  Ananda’s work as a ceremonial eye-painter, like his reconstruction of Sailor, 
brings the dead to life, for painting eyes on the statue transforms it from an inert object 
into a sacred one.  But this work also takes place, of necessity, in the absence of complete 
knowledge: although the artificer “brings to life sight and truth and presence” by painting 
the eyes, “he must never look at the eyes directly.  He can only see the gaze in the 
mirror” (99).  This indirect, refracted vision is also emblematic of the work of aesthetic 
representation in a conflict zone.  Ananda’s work to repair the broken statue is clearly an 
act of healing on several levels.  Not only does the destroyed figure, sutured together by 
the work of the artist, stand in for an equally ravaged national culture, but the process of 
repairing it provides an opportunity for Ananda to acknowledge and remember the 
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disappeared: at one point, Ananda, wearing a shirt given to him by Sarath, and standing 
atop the statue during the act of painting the eyes, sees soaring birds, with their hearts 
“beating exhausted and fast,” that remind him of “the way Sirissa had died in the story he 
invented for her in the vacuum of her disappearance” (307).  By choosing Ananda’s 
imaginative act of representation to end the novel, Ondaatje argues for the power of 
fiction to create meaning and provide comfort in the wake of violence and loss. 
Invisibilities and Selective Vision 
 Both Anil’s Ghost and Missing use the techniques of fictional narrative to great 
effect in countering the silencing effects of disappearance: rather than relying solely on 
the limited factual information that is available to them, these texts imaginatively fill the 
gaps and silences in narratives of disappearance in ways that make them engaging and 
authoritative for an international readership.  The very nature of this strategy, however, 
requires these narratives to reproduce both the perspectives and the blind spots of their 
creators and viewers.  When gaps in factual accounts are filled by the imaginative work 
of authors who are distanced, often by necessity, from the conflicts they depict, the 
resulting narrative is constrained not by the conditions of disappearance, but by the limits 
of its author’s own imagination.  Thus, Ondaatje represents the Sri Lankan conflict 
through the eyes of characters who, like him, are readers and interpreters of the world 
around them, and who share his concern with elusive, abstract questions of beauty and 
truth.  But if fictional narratives inevitably reproduce, to some degree, the perspectives of 
their creators, they also reflect the expectations and interpretive frameworks their readers 
bring to them.  To the extent that Missing consciously tries to represent the disappeared in 
ways that will be recognizable and familiar to its U.S. audiences, the film reproduces the 
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limits of its viewers’ imaginations by focusing almost exclusively on U.S. victims of 
Chile’s coup.  Thus, as a direct consequence of their success in creating narratives of 
disappearance that can circulate among broad, international audiences, texts like Anil’s 
Ghost and Missing reproduce a form of differential vision that renders only certain kinds 
of victims visible. 
 Throughout Anil’s Ghost, Ondaatje consistently privileges aesthetic questions 
over questions of material survival or political power.  Notably, none of Ondaatje’s 
central characters take sides in Sri Lanka’s divisive civil war, nor do the forms of healing 
he envisions—creating a sculpture or a story, “study[ing] history as if it were a body”— 
respond to the material or political conditions at the root of the conflict (193).  This 
apolitical approach to the conflict has drawn criticism from various reviewers and critics.  
In his review for The Nation, Tom LeClair accuses Ondaatje of “turn[ing] away from 
politics to personal lives,” and Qadri Ismail dismisses the novel as “not much more than 
the typically flippant gesture towards Sri Lanka often produced by the West” (LeClair 32; 
Ismail 28).  Ondaatje’s turn toward interiority and away from politics, however, can be 
seen, somewhat more charitably, as a strategy for engaging with his predominantly 
Western readership.  As Manav Ratti points out, Ondaatje’s privileging of the private and 
the personal forges connections between the novel’s Sri Lankan characters and its 
Western readers by demonstrating that “ ‘they’ are just like ‘us’ ” (138).  Nevertheless, 
the interiorities that the novel imagines for its characters share marked similarities that 
point to the formative effect of Ondaatje’s own experience and perspective. 
 For example, although Anil’s Ghost imagines characters from a variety of 
professions and backgrounds, all of them seem to see the world through the eyes of an 
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artist, philosopher, or writer.  Sarath, the archaeologist, can “read a bucket of soil as if it 
were a complex historical novel,” and would “give his life” for the efficiency of line in a 
cave painting he once discovered (151, 157).  Despite his manual labor in the mines, 
Ananda is, at heart, an “artificer” who comes to recognize his true calling by the novel’s 
close (304).  Palipana, who has “reconstructed eras simply by looking at runes,” passes 
on to his niece the lesson that carvings in “stone and rock could hold one person’s loss 
and another’s beauty forever” (104).  And Gamini remembers his formative experience as 
a young doctor at a remote base hospital through the lens of the novels that were read in 
the doctors’ lounge.  Even Anil, the consummate empiricist, at times demonstrates an 
incongruous love of literature and figurative language that seems a reflection of 
Ondaatje’s own inescapable perspective.  In a particularly striking moment, Anil turns to 
the comfort of quotations from her favorite books to make sense of her experiences of the 
war.  The books she turns to, however, are classics of European fiction, The Man in the 
Iron Mask and Les Miserables.  Uncharacteristically for someone whose search for truth 
is guided by quotations like “the bone of choice would be the femur,” Anil praises one of 
these novels as “so thick with human nature she wished it to accompany her into the 
afterlife” (140, 54).  This short scene, I would argue, represents a break in Anil’s 
character that points to the limits of Ondaatje’s ability to imagine a character whose 
experiences and values are, in this respect, so different from his own. 
To the extent that the inner lives of characters such as Sarath and Anil are shaped 
and colored by Ondaatje’s own interests and predispositions, the character who seems 
most central to the novel’s work of recovery, Ruwan Kumara, is rendered entirely 
inscrutable within the novel’s privileged frame.  Anil’s forensic work provides the few 
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biographical details about Ruwan Kumara that allow his body to be identified: his death 
was recent, and he was not killed in the cave where his body was found, but elsewhere.  
He was buried temporarily in a swampy area, somewhere where there were fireflies.  He 
did vigorous, physical labor before breaking his leg, and afterward took up work in the 
plumbago mines.  When Anil and Sarath finally discover his identity by going from 
village to village, they learn the date and a few sparse details of Ruwan Kumara’s 
abduction, when he was singled out by a masked informant.  But we know nothing of 
Ruwan Kumara’s thoughts or experiences.  Unlike almost all the other characters, both 
major and minor, the novel provides no insight into Ruwan Kumara as an individual.  
Indeed, after all her efforts, Anil is forced to acknowledge that “they still knew nothing 
about the world Sailor had come from” (176).  When he shifts our attention from Ruwan 
Kumara to Sarath in the novel’s final pages, Ondaatje effectively forwards one of the 
novel’s central aims: rendering the victims of the Sri Lankan conflict visible and 
empathetic for an international audience.  But in doing so, he also reproduces the 
limitations of his own and his readers’ imaginative frameworks, which place Ruwan 
Kumara, an uneducated peasant, beyond the reach of representation.  
Moreover, despite the novel’s commitment to the aesthetic and the imaginative, 
Ondaatje’s highly visible practices of research and citation throughout the novel 
explicitly acknowledge the limitations of his own perspective.  Although he was born in 
Sri Lanka, the majority of Ondaatje’s adult life has been spent in the West, and, like Anil, 
he must certainly have encountered a very different country on his return than the one he 
remembers from his childhood.  In his acknowledgments, Ondaatje documents the 
extensive factual research he conducted while writing the novel, listing interviews as well 
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as a wide range of print sources including reference books, atlases, scholarly articles, 
memoirs, and Amnesty International reports.  In several cases, quotations from these 
texts are integrated directly into the novel itself.  Thus, despite its overt privileging of 
imaginative, interpretive, fictionalizing forms of representation, Anil’s Ghost 
simultaneously foregrounds its own reliance on precisely the kinds of factual information 
it claims to transcend. 
Indeed, at several points, Anil’s Ghost offers an explicit critique of the very 
position that the novel itself occupies.  When Sarath points out to Anil, in the novel’s 
early pages, “[y]ou know, I’d believe your arguments more if you lived here,” the same 
could be said of an expatriate author like Ondaatje.  Sarath urges Anil to “understand the 
archaeological surround of a fact.  Or you’ll be like one of those journalists who file 
reports about flies and scabs while staying at the Galle Face Hotel.  That false empathy 
and blame” (44).  The accusation of false empathy is particularly cutting in the context of 
a novel such as Ondaatje’s, the success of which hinges on its ability to elicit readers’ 
empathy.  So is another, similar comment later in the novel, where Gamini reflects 
sarcastically on the West’s view of his country: 
“American movies, English books—remember how they all end?” Gamini 
asked that night.  “The American or the Englishman gets on a plane and 
leaves.  That’s it.  The camera leaves with him.  He looks out the window 
at Mombasa or Vietnam or Jakarta, someplace now he can look at through 
the clouds.  The tired hero.  A couple of words to the girl beside him.  
He’s going home.  So the war, to all purposes, is over.  That’s enough 
reality for the West.  It’s probably the history of the last two hundred years 
of Western political writing.  Go home.  Write a book.  Hit the circuit.” 
(285-6) 
Gamini’s critique of this familiar, distanced viewing position rings true, and Ondaatje’s 
own prominence on the Western literary “circuit” cannot help but inflect it with a self-
referential quality.  By raising questions about authority and responsibility of authors 
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writing at a distance, Ondaatje foregrounds the limitations of his own perspective even as 
he relies on it to respond to the conflict he depicts and to overcome the silencing to which 
he would otherwise be subjected. 
In much the same way, Missing’s concern with rendering victims of the Chilean 
coup legible to primarily U.S. audiences reproduces—and at times foregrounds—its own 
form of selective vision.  Charlie’s identity as a U.S. citizen is central to the film’s 
representation of him, as well as to its concern with him as a victim.  Certainly, the film’s 
choice to focus on an American is a reflection of its intended U.S. audience and their 
presumed sympathies.  But it also places Charlie Horman’s identity as an American at the 
center of the film’s project of reconstruction: Charlie becomes an individual who can be 
differentiated from the anonymous mass of “radicals” and “subversives” imprisoned by 
the regime to the extent that he can be represented as a good, upstanding, and therefore 
implicitly rights-bearing U.S. citizen. 
Much of Missing functions as an extended debate over Charlie Horman’s 
character, and by extension his legibility as a victim.  At the start of the film, Ed voices a 
series of negative opinions about Charlie that would limit our sympathy and concern for 
him: according to his father, Charlie is irresponsible and lazy, a dissolute liberal who has 
done something stupid and gotten himself in trouble in a foreign country.  Ed’s 
recriminations echo the veiled accusations of the senator whom Ed visits on Charlie’s 
behalf, as well as the other government officials depicted in the film, who suggest that 
Charlie was a radical and an agitator who deserved his fate.  It is up to Beth to provide a 
counter-narrative of Charlie as an idealist, a childlike dreamer, and a man of principle.  
Defending their decision to move to Chile, Beth describes herself and her husband as 
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“two normal, slightly confused people trying to be connected to the whole damn rotten 
enchilada.”  By presenting herself and her husband as idealistic, sincere young people 
seeking meaning in their lives, Beth refutes the suggestion that their behavior was 
somehow “un-American,” recasting them as engaged in a quintessentially American 
search for self-realization.  Although Beth’s impassioned defense of Charlie’s lifestyle 
and values helps frame him as a sympathetic character, it leaves unchallenged the conceit 
that radicals, whether of U.S. or of Chilean citizenship, might not qualify as victims. 
This implicit distinction between “good” American citizens and leftist political 
agitators is reinforced by the film’s treatment of another disappeared expatriate, Frank 
Teruggi.  The character of Teruggi, like many others in the film, is based on a real 
individual of the same name, although some aspects of Teruggi’s character, including his 
close relationship with Charlie, are fictionalized.  In the film, Teruggi represents the 
committed leftist, a staunch supporter of Chile’s socialist experiment, who stands in 
contrast to Charlie, who is described at several points in the film as a “political 
neophyte.”  Teruggi’s disappearance is one of the other “cases” that the consulate is 
pursuing, but the film suggests that the American officials are even less concerned with 
his fate than they are with Charlie’s.  Indeed, these officials’ own statements 
unintentionally reveal their tacit belief that leftist “radicals” like Teruggi are not true 
Americans entitled to the intervention and protection of the consulate.12  Sketching an 
outlandish scenario in which Charlie staged his own kidnapping, they suggest he might 
                                                
12 Although the American consulate is certainly not presented in a flattering light in 
Missing, the possibility that it was openly hostile to certain groups of émigrés is only 




have done so to tarnish the reputation of the regime by “mak[ing] it look like they’re 
arresting Americans.”  Beth is quick to point out their oversight: “They are arresting 
Americans, or don’t David Holloway and Frank Teruggi count!”  Certainly, the film 
intends to suggest that Americans like Teruggi do count, but its overwhelming 
investment in representing Charlie as a legitimate and sympathetic victim undermines 
that intention.  By emphasizing both Charlie’s and Ed’s political disengagement and 
naïveté, the film itself reproduces the exclusionary logic it attributes to the Consul, which 
excludes leftists and radical Americans from the category of true citizens. 
Thus, by rendering Charlie hyper-visible as a victim, Missing in effect produces a 
kind of differential vision which over-writes the more complex and ambiguous 
contestations over citizenship, rights, and national identity with a more straightforward 
rubric: Charlie or not-Charlie.  The film is structured around the search for the truth about 
Charlie, and it invites its viewers to align themselves with Ed and Beth, average people 
caught in an unimaginable circumstance.  But the film also offers us another viewing 
position at a slight remove from Ed and Beth, one which throws the selective nature of 
their concern into sharp relief.  Repeatedly, the camera follows the Hormans, often with a 
tight focus on their faces, as they scan countless anonymous victims in search of Charlie.  
They wander through rows of beds containing nameless patients in a basement hospital 
ward.  Then, upping the visual and representational ante, they walk through a morgue, in 
which room after room is filled with piles of identified, and later, unidentified bodies.  By 
this point in the film, the Hormans’ optimism has faded; there is little likelihood that they 
will find Charlie, and these scenes of searching seem almost overdetermined.   
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The scenes where Ed and Beth search for Charlie represent the film’s most 
sustained engagement with the widespread violence that followed in the wake of the 
coup, and they are one of the few instances where Chilean victims are visible onscreen.  
But in room after room of bodies, the only victim that can be humanized and rendered 
visible by the film is Charlie.  Even when Beth discovers and identifies Frank Teruggi’s 
body in the morgue, the film’s particular selective vision is only temporarily disrupted.  
After a brief close-up of Teruggi’s body, which is marked by bullet wounds, the camera 
returns to the multitude of anonymous, unidentifiable bodies that surround them, then 
pans upwards to show the silhouettes of still more bodies, limbs askew, visible on the 
other side of a translucent glass roof.  All these bodies must be viewed, the shot suggests, 
before the Hormans will be convinced that Charlie’s body, the one that matters, is not 
among them.  This is the perspective made available through a viewing position 
identified with Ed and Beth, and one which the film arguably privileges.  But these 
scenes also reveal another disappearance: the invisibility of the many Chilean victims of 
the coup that the film’s tight focus on Charlie reduces to the status of scenery.  There are 
notably few Chilean characters in Missing, and even fewer civilians.  The one Chilean 
radical to whom we are introduced early in the film is revealed to have been in hiding and 
returns safely—in reality a highly unlikely scenario.  Just as Charlie’s status as an 
individual and a victim, at least as it is produced by the film, cannot quite include Frank 
Teruggi, it even more definitively cannot be extended to individual Chileans who were 
disappeared. 
The film’s selective vision is most poignantly revealed in the scene in which Ed 
and Beth Horman finally get permission to search for Charlie in the National Stadium, an 
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improvised prison camp where the military regime detained, tortured, and murdered 
hundreds and perhaps thousands of Chilean civilians in the early days of the coup.  In the 
years that have followed, the National Stadium has become an iconic representation of 
the atrocities perpetrated by the Pinochet regime.  Thus, for viewers who have even the 
barest knowledge of the historical events on which the film is based, or for those attentive 
to the ominous references to the stadium throughout the preceding portion of the film, the 
stadium is a site already marked by violence.  When Ed and Beth emerge from a dark 
tunnel onto the sunny playing field, the image revealed to viewers is shocking: as the 
camera pans across the stands, we see they are full of people, all prisoners, whose ragged 
appearance and improvised shelters suggest they have been in captivity for some time.  
Over the loudspeaker, Beth and Ed identify themselves and address Charlie by name.  
Standing on the playing field, they search futilely for him among the crowds in the 
stands.  As in previous scenes, Ed’s and Beth’s evident despair makes an emotional 
impact on viewers.  But even as we sympathize with them, the scene impresses on us a 
sense of disproportion which its visual frame reinforces: Ed and Beth occupy the 
foreground, and their out-sized grief dominates the center of the frame, while the 
suffering of the prisoners behind them is depicted in the aggregate and in miniature.  
Amid thousands of prisoners, only Ed, Beth, and the absent Charlie are legible as 
individuals. 
The disproportion that marks this scene does not go unacknowledged by the film 
itself.  The privileged status that Ed and Beth enjoy in the stadium is emphasized by the 
Chilean colonel’s introduction of them, which is notably the only Spanish dialogue in the 
film that is subtitled.  The colonel orders the prisoners to pay attention, then explains, 
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“We’re going to permit this American who is looking for his son to speak here.  Keep 
quiet [and pay attention].”13  As this introduction emphasizes, Ed Horman’s ability to 
speak in the stadium is entirely contingent on his status as a U.S. citizen, a fact which is 
not lost on at least one of the prisoners.  In response to Ed’s appeal, a man who appears to 
be about Charlie’s age, and with a similar hairstyle, rushes forward, and Ed initially 
mistakes this prisoner for his son.  Leaning on the chain-link fence that separates the 
stands from the field, this man addresses the Hormans sarcastically in accented English.  
“My father cannot come here.  But how about some ice cream with my dinner, Coronel 
Espinoza?”  The prisoner’s statement highlights the exceptional nature of Ed Horman’s 
position relative to the many Chilean families desperate for knowledge of loved ones 
detained in the stadium and elsewhere.  And by usurping the discursive space reserved 
for Charlie to make his own impossible demands, this man also highlights the 
Hormans’—and the film’s—selective vision.  In order to become visible as an individual 
and legible as a victim, this man must claim the position of privilege reserved for Charlie, 
but in doing so he once again becomes invisible, for the optic of the film quickly reduces 
him to Charlie’s uncanny double.  Moreover, by this point in the film, viewers recognize 
that this man’s attempt to make himself visible will likely cost him his life.  
In this scene, Missing foregrounds the limitations of its own perspective, 
reminding viewers of the injustice of a differential vision in which Charlie, always the 
                                                
13 The final words of this address to the prisoners are not subtitled, and the translation is 
mine.  The fact that subtitles are used so sparingly throughout the film, and that the prison 
guard’s announcement is only partially translated, suggests to me the significance of what 
otherwise might seem to be simple exposition.  In particular, foregrounding the Horman’s 
status as Americans through the subtitles contributes to the film’s self-awareness in this 
moment, and its brief recognition of its own selective view. 
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object of our search, renders others invisible.  The prisoner’s outburst in the stadium is 
hardly necessary to the film’s plot; indeed, as the Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman has 
pointed out, “the scene is touching but implausible” given the disciplinary power of the 
detention center (796).  Its inclusion points to an unwillingness on the part of the film to 
leave its viewers’ privileged perspective unquestioned.  It challenges us to ask, as 
Dorfman does, “What about him?  What about the son whose father could not go to the 
stadium to search for him?” (796)  Within the framework of the film, which is carefully 
crafted to appeal to its primarily U.S. audiences, a viewing position identified with Ed 
and Beth may indeed marshal empathetic engagement from viewers that may translate 
into action or activism.  But that engagement becomes all the more powerful when it can 
be extended beyond Charlie onto the many other victims at the film’s margins, whose 
recovery, even through fiction, is far more tenuous. 
The Power of Haunting Presences 
 At first glance, the silences that mark both Anil’s Ghost and Missing might seem 
to detract from the work of recovery and consciousness-raising that these two texts, and 
others like them, set out to do.  But to take these silences at face value, as simple 
omissions, is to underestimate the productive power of haunting as a response to the 
paradoxical demands of disappearance.  As Avery Gordon argues, “in order to understand 
and to transform state power, to fight even the most coercive, threatening, militarized, 
and violent state, the story must be told in the mode of haunting. . . .  Why must the story 
be told this way?  Because the story, which is very much alive, is happening in and 
through haunting” (131).  Inasmuch as haunting is the mechanism of disappearance, 
Gordon suggests, it is also the best means of fighting it.  Indeed, through the ghostly 
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figures that haunt them—Ruwan Kumara and the irreverent prisoner—Anil’s Ghost and 
Missing envision forms of resistance that move beyond the powerful but limited frame of 
the realism they employ.  These figures trade the familiarity of legible, empathetic 
characterizations for a relationship with readers that is less certain, but also potentially 
transformative.  By occupying the ambiguous space of haunting—neither present nor 
absent, neither known nor unknowable—the ghosts of the disappeared ensure that we 
remain accountable to them.   
Like ghosts, who refuse to be contained or forgotten, the disappeared pose an 
immediate, present, and ongoing challenge to oppressive regimes.  Argentina’s Madres 
de la Plaza de Mayo are one group who have recognized the power of that challenge, 
resisting official efforts to declare their children dead and rallying around the call of 
“aparición con vida” [bring them back alive].14  As several of the mothers themselves 
acknowledge, they hold little hope that their children are alive, years after their 
disappearance, but accepting their death or claiming their remains would seem to close 
the matter of their disappearance, which for the mothers is far from resolved (Taylor 
189).  Through their demands for aparición con vida, the mothers continue to challenge 
the government for information and accountability, and to demand justice and public 
reckoning in the present.  The mothers’ strategy points to the very uncertainty of 
disappearance as a powerful source of resistance: as long as victims’ fates remain 
                                                
14 The Madres are certainly not the only group that has used public protest and 
consciousness-raising to resist disappearance, but they are certainly among the most 
visible, and their call for “aparición con vida” exemplifies the resistant power to which 
the contradictory condition of disappearance can give rise. 
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unknown, they demand a reckoning that has not yet taken place, leaving open the 
possibility that justice might be carried out at some point in the future.  
The haunting quality of disappearance not only resists efforts to confine it to the 
past, but also defies the geographic and political boundaries that make disappearance 
something that happens elsewhere.  After the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 
2001, the coup which took place on that same date in 1973 has begun to be referred to as 
“Chile’s 9/11.”  On its surface, this comparison simply points to these two events as 
similarly tragic and formative moments in their respective national histories.  But it also 
evokes a more profound comparison between the U.S. and Chile that haunts a film like 
Missing, which insists so repeatedly and so forcefully on their differences.  Before the 
coup, many Chileans thought of themselves with pride as members of a stable and long-
standing democracy; after the coup, official discourse framed the suspension of 
democratic rights and freedoms as a necessary defense against internal agitators and 
external enemies.  This history casts a long shadow over recent U.S. policy in defense of 
the “homeland,” including so-called “aggressive interrogation techniques,” and the 
detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay without the right of habeas corpus or other 
protections of the U.S. civilian legal system.  Haunted by the victims disappearance, the 
logic that would distinguish U.S. human rights abuses from those that have taken place 
elsewhere becomes tenuous indeed. 
Finally, by challenging the boundaries and conceits of the realist texts that contain 
them, the haunting figures at the center of Missing and Anil’s Ghost also resist practices 
of reading that would confine them safely away from the worlds of their audiences.  
Missing places us, as viewers, in the position of Ed and Beth in the stadium, where the 
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irreverent prisoner literally calls us to account.  His outburst foregrounds the privileged 
viewing position occupied by the film’s viewers, especially its U.S. audience.  The 
inscrutable Ruwan Kumara presents a more subtle challenge to the vantage point of 
Ondaatje’s readers, who have come to expect the seemingly unmediated access that 
omniscient narration provides, and the tidy closure that novels, in particular mysteries, 
rely on.  The spectral quality of these characters destabilizes the authority of the author’s 
or filmmaker’s gaze by revealing the limitations of the work of recovery that fiction can 
carry out.  It also challenges, moreover, the complacency with which readers distant from 
zones of conflict might consume representations of the disappeared, exposing the forms 
of privilege that allow some people to read about what others must live.  Although works 
of fiction like Missing and Anil’s Ghost set out to render the disappeared visible, it is 
through their depictions of what remains invisible that they have the potential to form the 





Dystopian Presents, Haunting Futures 
Neither Ayi Kwei Armah’s 1968 novel The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, a 
depiction of life in newly independent Ghana, nor Don DeLillo’s Falling Man, set in 
post-9/11 New York City and published in 2007, offer particularly appealing visions of 
the social worlds their authors occupy.  In Armah’s Ghana, the social life of the nation 
has become dominated by an ethos of unchecked consumption, financed by graft and 
corruption, that prevents the emergence of a more hopeful and productive vision for the 
nation’s future.  In DeLillo’s novel, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 signal the end of 
America’s role as an economic and cultural superpower, but in doing so reveal the 
emptiness and meaninglessness of the late capitalist society whose decline they 
inaugurate.  Not surprisingly, these novels’ grim visions of the present and the future 
have elicited strong negative reactions from many of their readers.  It is a mistake, 
however, to believe that Beautyful Ones and Falling Man are entirely nihilistic or 
defeatist, as readers and critics have often assumed.  By interpreting these two novels 
through the framework of dystopian literature, we are able to appreciate the extent to 
which their bleak outlooks function as a form of social critique.  Relying on the 
conventions of the dystopian form, their extremely negative visions create critical 
distance for readers and expose the flawed nature of the social realities they depict.  
Indeed, the more extreme and alienating that vision, the more effectively it forms the 
ground for critique—and ultimately for change. 
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Thinking of Beautyful Ones and Falling Man as dystopian texts recasts our 
understanding of the nature of these novels’ productive political and social engagements,   
shifting critical attention away from the content of their depictions and toward their 
narrative form and structure.  Both Armah and DeLillo reveal the oppressive nature of 
societies grounded in capitalist consumption and commodity fetishism, which transform 
meaningful labor and sustaining family ties into empty market relations.  For both 
authors, however, this commitment to laying bare the oppressive mechanisms of their 
present social realities is at cross-purposes to the work of imagining genuine alternatives 
to those realities.  Writing during historical moments in which imagining otherwise 
seems both urgently necessary and impossibly compromised, both Armah and DeLillo 
create texts that transfer that responsibility onto their future readers through their cyclical 
structure and ambiguous, open-ended narrative.  By resisting simplistic forms of 
optimism, these texts refuse to take up the flawed rhetorics that are available to them and 
remain committed to carrying out clear-eyed social critique.  But by leaving their 
representations of societies in crisis open to reinterpretation and rereading, the novels 
allow for the possibility that the future might offer hopeful visions that are impossible in 
the present.  These texts—and our readings of them—are haunted by the futures that they 
themselves cannot presage; as readers, we are invited to step into the ghostly reading 
positions they map out, and to question whether we can generate the kinds of genuinely 
different vision they call for.  By eliciting such ongoing forms of engagement, these texts 
embrace haunting as a practice of reading for the future. 
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The Unpleasant Present 
 Armah’s representation of postindependence Ghana in The Beautyful Ones Are 
Not Yet Born is unrelentingly bleak.  The novel’s protagonist, referred to throughout 
simply as “the man,” has abandoned the intellectual ambitions of his youth and resigned 
himself to a job at the Railroad Administration, which he finds thankless and stultifyingly 
dull.  Barely able to support his family on his government paycheck, the man is 
surrounded by flagrant and unabashed corruption, which he rejects on principle despite 
his desire to provide a better life for his wife and children.  The man’s refusal to 
participate in dishonest dealings isolates him from society, which he perceives as having 
embraced corruption wholeheartedly in pursuit of “the gleam” of modern amenities and 
European imports.  Although the man rejects the dishonest practices required to attain the 
gleam, he grudgingly acknowledges its appeal, especially in contrast to the poverty that is 
its alternative.  The novel begins during “Passion Week,” the week before payday, when 
the man and all those around him have barely enough money for necessities like food and 
bus fare (1).  “How much hard work,” the man skeptically wonders, “before a month’s 
pay would last till the end of the month?” (95) 
In a world where corruption, rather than hard work, is the only route to success, 
others see the man’s honesty not as integrity, but as foolishness or cowardice.  His wife, 
Oyo, is particularly dismayed by the man’s refusal to participate in what he describes as 
“the national game,” and ridicules him for lacking the courage to provide her with the 
lifestyle she desires (55).  As Oyo explains, “[e]verybody is swimming towards what he 
wants.  Who wants to remain on the beach asking the wind ‘How . . . How . . . How?’ ” 
(44).  The example of Joe Koomson, the man’s former classmate, only sharpens Oyo’s 
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disappointment in her husband.  Now a government minister, Koomson is living the life 
of  the “gleam,” enjoying privileges formerly reserved for the class of exploitative white 
colonizers.  Koomson’s life is filled with luxuries that can only be obtained through 
corruption and public theft: a chauffeured car; a spacious house in the exclusive, largely 
white Upper Residential Area; imported goods like liquor, perfume, a German radio set, a 
wig for his wife, and beautiful clothes and toys for his daughter.  Although Oyo knows 
that the Koomsons’ lifestyle is financed by dishonesty, she is unapologetic in her desire 
for it: “It is nice.  It is clean, the life Estella [Koomson] is getting” (44).  And although 
the man insists that “some of that kind of cleanness has more rottenness in it than the 
slime at the bottom of a garbage dump,” he admits to himself that he wishes he could 
provide his own family with the advantages that Koomson’s family enjoys (44). 
For the children.  Supposing Deede also could have beautiful clothes with 
their beauty crossing the seas from thousands of miles away, and 
supposing Adoley could have a machine to ride around on, to occupy her 
attention while she was growing up, what would they know about ways 
that were rotten in the days of disappeared parents?  What would they 
care?  What, indeed, would anybody care? (145) 
Unwilling to compromise his integrity but forced to recognize its cost to him and his 
loved ones, the man is constantly beset by guilt, doubt, and loneliness. 
The unrelenting pessimism of Beautyful Ones manifests itself in the novel’s 
pervasive imagery of filth and decay, applied equally to the supposedly “clean” lifestyle 
of the gleam and to the daily struggles of the masses.1  As the novel’s first chapters trace 
the man’s daily routine, everything he sees or touches is unclean and contaminated, from 
                                                
1 In a convincing reading of Armah’s novel, John Lutz uses the framework of Marxist 
commodity fetishism to illuminate “the implicit connection between the ‘clean life’ lived 
within the gleam and the miserable, abject one lived among mountains of waste and 
excrement,” both of which are the products of “a monolithic system of commodity 
production and exchange” (103-4). 
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the “rotten . . . stench” of paper money, to the waste receptacle “covered over thickly 
with the juice of every imaginable kind of waste matter,” to the grime and stench of 
public showers and latrines.  Even the seemingly innocent banister in the Railroad 
Administration building—its wood decaying beneath layers of polish, and contaminated 
by the traffic of many hands—elicits his revulsion and despair.  The man is no less 
revolted by his own domestic space than by these public ones: the family’s shared latrine, 
the shower thickly coated with mysterious slime, and the red floor polish, “tired and 
menstrual,” which does nothing to rejuvenate the worn surfaces to which it is applied 
(118).  The imagery of filth, rot, and waste in Beautyful Ones is certainly not 
symbolically or ideologically neutral; indeed, in Armah’s text, “shit has a political 
vocation” (Esty 32).  On the most fundamental level, these depictions contribute to our 
sense of the utter degradation of the man’s environment and the daily assaults to which 
his values—including cleanliness and purity—are subjected. 
Falling Man offers a similarly grim view of both the present and the future in the 
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City.  DeLillo’s novel steers 
clear of depicting the acts of heroism and solidarity that 9/11 inspired, focusing instead 
on the ordinary, banal, and even unsavory reactions of flawed and fallible characters.  
The novel’s protagonist, Keith Neudecker, escapes the Twin Towers, where several of his 
friends perish, but contrary to our expectations, Keith is more antihero than hero.  At the 
time of the 9/11 attacks, Keith is estranged from his wife, Lianne, and their young son, 
Justin, and although the couple reunites after Keith’s escape, their family life remains 
strained and distant throughout the novel.  Indeed, none of DeLillo’s characters rise to the 
challenge articulated by the character of Martin, a cosmopolitan art dealer and the 
 
 145 
longtime lover of Lianne’s mother, Nina Bartos.  In the days immediately following the 
attacks, Martin urges Lianne to respond rationally and productively: “[t]here’s the event, 
there’s the individual.  Measure it.  Let it teach you something.  See it.  Make yourself 
equal to it” (42).   
Despite Martin’s advice, neither Lianne nor her mother reacts in the way Martin 
suggests.  Indeed, Nina’s unwillingness to see the events of 9/11 through the political and 
economic frameworks that Martin puts forward introduces conflict into their long and 
loving relationship, and eventually leads to their separation. Lianne’s initial response to 
9/11, like Nina’s, is dominated by anger and incomprehension.  Watching the news 
footage of the planes, Lianne remains unable to make sense of what she sees.  In the 
weeks and months following 9/11, she isolates herself from her friends, and even incites a 
physical confrontation with a neighbor who plays Middle Eastern music that is audible in 
the halls.  By the end of the novel, Lianne has turned even further inward.  Her volunteer 
work with a support group for Alzheimer’s patients concludes and is replaced only by a 
private, neurotic concern with her own mental state, and although she begins attending 
church regularly, her religious experience is a profoundly solitary one. 
Keith and Lianne reunite after 9/11, but their recommitment to one another takes 
the form of a dazed surrender rather than a conscious change.  Although they agree that 
in “[t]imes like these, the family is necessary,” the family they are able to construct 
together is little more than “people sharing the air” (214).  Even as he recommits to his 
family, Keith begins an affair with a fellow survivor, Florence Givens, whose briefcase 
he unknowingly carried with him as he fled the towers.  Although their relationship, with 
“its point of origin in smoke and fire,” seems initially to offer the possibility of healing 
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and catharsis, it quickly assumes the banal form of an ordinary infidelity (161). “[S]he 
would say what someone always says.  ‘Do you have to leave?’  He would stand naked 
by the bed.  ‘I’ll always have to leave’ ” (137).  Keith eventually ends his relationship 
with Florence but remains an unreliable presence at home, traveling for days at a time to 
attend poker tournaments, where he plays semiprofessionally.  In stark contrast to his 
former regular game with a gathering of friends, the tournaments are held in generic, 
anonymous casinos and offer Keith a world devoid of emotional significance, where his 
choices are pared down to the simplest principles of cause and effect.  Keith’s alienation 
and purposelessness characterize the novel’s worldview: rather than presenting us with 
characters who are made stronger and more self-aware by the harrowing events of 9/11, 
or a community that draws together under duress, Falling Man depicts bare human 
survival and responses to tragedy that are anything but heroic. 
The Politics of Pessimism 
The grim visions that characterize both Beautyful Ones and Falling Man have 
elicited forceful negative reactions from many of their readers.  Leonard Kibera, for 
instance, disparages Armah’s novel for literary shortcomings such as its one-dimensional 
characters and lack of “development and significant plot,” but is even more troubled by 
what he sees as Armah’s “contempt for Africa” (71).  Although Kibera maintains that he 
does not expect “moral reassurance as we grovel in the muck, nor an indication of hope 
contrived in desperation,” he is nevertheless dissatisfied with the novel’s lack of a 
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hopeful vision (71).2  Disappointed readers of DeLillo’s novel offered similar critiques.  
The seeming prescience of much of DeLillo’s previous fiction, which was both ambitious 
in scope and marked by cutting social critique, led to his embrace by many as a 
privileged interpreter of the events of 9/11, capable of addressing such a momentus 
subject without aestheticizing or romanticizing it.  On the release of Falling Man, 
however, DeLillo was widely criticized for failing to provide his readers with an account 
of the events that offered solace, enlightenment, or transcendence.  To Maureen Corrigan, 
reviewing the novel for National Public Radio, Falling Man is nothing more than “a 
series of gestures, some contorted, some striking, but all of them infuriatingly empty.” 
And prominent New York Times reviewer Michiko Kakutani was disappointed by 
DeLillo’s choice not to center his novel on a more admirable and selfless survivor, 
instead of Keith, whom she dismisses as “a self-absorbed man, who came through the fire 
and ash of that day and decided to spend his foreseeable future playing stupid card games 
in the Nevada desert” (2). 
Critical accounts of the novels such as these are, in essence, factually correct: 
Armah is contemptuous of the Ghanaian society that surrounds him, and DeLillo does 
choose to focus on the banality and emptiness of 9/11, rather than on the acts of heroism 
it inspired.  But in an important sense, such critiques reveal more about the expectations 
of the novels’ readers than about the texts themselves.  These novels elicit a surprising 
degree of emotion from readers like Kibera, Corrigan, and Kakutani, who are not merely 
disappointed by the novels’ formal or aesthetic shortcomings, but seem emotionally and 
                                                
2 Fellow Ghanaian writer Ama Ata Aidoo has been another prominent critic of Beautyful 
Ones, and her own short story collection, No Sweetness Here, published in 1970, can be 
read as a response to it. 
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even morally affronted by their pessimism.  Underlying these reactions, I would suggest, 
is an implicit sense that authors like Armah and DeLillo, who take moments of acute 
social crisis as their subjects and settings, assume a certain political and social 
responsibility in their representations.  Corrigan’s complaint about DeLillo’s “failure to 
deepen our understanding of September 11th” is particularly revealing: for many readers, 
it is not enough to merely represent 9/11; rather, it must be framed in a way that allows 
us to make the events themselves meaningful within a larger social narrative.  And 
Kibera’s dismay at Armah’s “disaffection with the men and women of Ghana” seems to 
reflect his own frustrated search for a more hopeful vision of decolonization in Armah’s 
text (70).  The fact that authors like Armah and DeLillo, writing in and about moments of 
crisis, do not provide redeeming narratives of transcendence or visions of social 
transformation is interpreted by many readers as a betrayal of some greater social 
responsibility.  
Rather than dismissing the pessimism of Beautyful Ones and Falling Man as 
reactionary or defeatist, considering these novels through the lens of dystopian literature 
allows us to understand their political and social engagements in slightly different terms.  
Although they differ in important ways from the most familiar literary dystopias, which 
are set in distant lands or imagined futures and frequently rely on the conventions of 
science fiction, both Beautyful Ones and Falling Man “offer a detailed and pessimistic 
presentation of the very worst of social alternatives,” which Tom Moylan describes as the 
defining attribute of dystopian fiction (147).  In the context of dystopian literature, a 
genre dedicated to exposing the flaws of a given set of social conditions, the extremely 
negative visions in Beautyful Ones and Falling Man enable, rather than detract from, a 
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political critique.  Indeed, the very bleakness and pessimism that readers such as Kibera, 
Corrigan, and Kakutani find so objectionable becomes the means through which these 
texts historicize oppressive conditions that might otherwise be taken for granted, thus 
prompting critical evaluations and opening the way for social change. 
As M. Keith Booker has argued, “[t]he principal technique of dystopian fiction is 
defamiliarization: by focusing their critiques of society on spatially or temporally distant 
settings, dystopian fictions provide fresh perspectives on problematic social and political 
practices that might be otherwise taken for granted or considered natural and inevitable” 
(19).  Significantly, both Beautyful Ones and Falling Man are not set in imagined worlds, 
but rather depict the present or recently past social realities occupied by their authors.  
DeLillo, himself a resident of New York City, began his novel shortly after the 9/11 
attacks and published it in 2007, while memories of those events remained fresh in many 
minds.  And although several decades have now passed since the 1966 coup which forms 
the backdrop for Armah’s novel and the context for its writing, the structural challenges 
and social ills it depicts—powermongering, political instability, concentration of wealth, 
and “underdevelopment”—persist in Ghana and elsewhere.3  Instead of creating an 
alternate reality, however, Armah and DeLillo lay the groundwork for a meaningful 
critique by cultivating detachment and even disgust with the present.  Thus the alienation 
                                                
3 As Neil Lazarus reminds us, “[i]ndependence seems to have brought neither peace nor 
prosperity to Africa.  Instead, it has paradoxically borne witness to stagnation, elitism, 
and class domination, and to the intensifying structural dependence—economic, political, 
cultural, and ideological—of Africa upon the imperial Western powers” (3).  The failed 
promise of postindependence social transformation in Africa provides the context for 
Armah’s novel and others of the period, as well as for our reading of these texts today.  
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that many readers experience when confronted with these novels is in fact instrumental to 
their functioning as social critiques. 
 For Armah, pervasive and graphic scatological imagery becomes a powerful 
mechanism for defamiliarizing quotidian realities and pervasive ideologies.  Many critics 
have attended to the symbolic import of Armah’s depictions of shit and the many other 
bodily “juices” that are central to the novel’s figurative vocabulary (Armah 40).  On a 
symbolic level, Armah’s scatological imagery evokes both the moral corruption that 
defines postindependence Ghanaian society, and the material processes of 
“[i]rresponsible consumerism and embezzlement [that] lead directly to undisposed-of 
filth and waste” (Wright 30).  Moreover, as Joshua Esty points out, in Beautyful Ones, 
“Armah uses excremental language to perform an extended Freudian unmasking or 
desublimation: he re-odorizes money, converting it into shit and forcing readers to see 
wealth as polished waste” (33).  Although Esty regards Armah’s novel through the 
generic lens of satire, the disillusionment conveyed through Armah’s “excremental 
vision” also lends itself to the purposes of dystopian literature (35).  Through the effect of 
abjection, Armah’s vivid descriptions of waste and filth cause his readers instinctively to 
draw back from the object, individual, or ideology with which it is associated.  For 
instance, in describing the wigs of human hair, much desired by aspiring, upwardly 
mobile women like Oyo, as “scraped from [a] decayed white woman’s corpse,” the novel 
carries out an act of defamiliarization that opens the familiar commodity, and its 
reification of colonial values, to critique (89).  This strategy is crucial for Armah’s novel, 
since it reveals how the man’s comparatively comfortable, middle-class life, which might 
seem enviable at first glance, is contaminated by the internalized racism and avaricious 
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consumerism of the society that surrounds him.4 
The distancing effects of DeLillo’s narrative are much more subtle, but no less 
significant.  Falling Man invites us to see New York City in the wake of 9/11 through the 
eyes of a survivor, for whom familiar landscapes are radically transformed and detached 
from any sense of their former significance.  The novel’s first pages describe ground zero 
as, “not a street anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and near night” (3).  
In light of the towers’ collapse, the ordinary scenery of the city, formerly unremarkable, 
seems strange and nonsensical: a “Breakfast Specials” sign is impossibly incongruous, 
and joggers are stopped in their tracks, their activity rendered wildly inappropriate by the 
gravity of the scene they witness (3).  Reminiscent of the stunted reactions of trauma 
survivors, this sense that the familiar world has suddenly become incomprehensible is a 
hallmark of 9/11 discourse, especially in the weeks and months that followed the attacks.  
But in DeLillo’s novel, this experience of dislocation is pervasive.  The detachment of the 
9/11 survivors is echoed, for example, by the Alzheimer’s patients with whom Lianne 
conducts her “storyline sessions” (125).  For these men and women, nothing about the 
world around them can be taken for granted, as “things fall away, streets, names, all sense 
of direction and location, every fixed grid of memory” (156).  This sense of dislocation is 
also a hallmark of DeLillo’s own prose, which posits the emptiness of his characters and 
their actions as the defining condition of an American modernity in which “individuality 
                                                
4 Esty’s reading of the role of excrement in Beautyful Ones foregrounds the self-reproach 
that scatological imagery encodes, pointing to the complicity of intellectuals such as the 
novel’s protagonist—and its author—in the flawed social system they critique. 
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is rubbed out, willpower attenuated, and language barely functional” (Versluys 20).5   For 
DeLillo, as for Armah, defamiliarization creates an effect similar to that of the alternate 
realities that are characteristic of dystopian texts, and both authors, by distancing their 
readers from the social realities that surround them, achieve the “cognitive estrangement” 
that gives rise to both reflection and critique (Suvin 255).6 
The Possibilities of “Utopian Pessimism” 
Despite their bleakness, dystopian texts are not necessarily fatalistic in their 
outlook, and scholars of the genre are careful to distinguish the varying degrees to which 
particular texts either open up or close down possibilities for imagining alternatives to the 
oppressive social conditions they depict.  The responses that dystopian texts elicit from 
their readers are central to determining their ideological orientation.  (Indeed, a concern 
with the kinds of imaginative practices these texts inspire in their readers is implicit in the 
genre, which is defined by the critical evaluation of alternative realities it invites.)  
Discussing the varying degrees of optimism generated by utopian and dystopian texts 
quickly creates a terminological morass, but I will conform here with the relatively 
intuitive terms on which Tom Moylan ultimately settles.  As he suggests, the bleakness of 
the imagined world in dystopian texts makes them, by definition, pessimistic.  But in 
depicting a flawed society, dystopian texts may also envision the possibility that 
oppressive social conditions might be transformed or transcended.  For Moylan, the 
                                                
5 For a more inclusive treatment of DeLillo’s engagement with contemporary American 
culture and society, see Mark Osteen, American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo’s 
Dialogue with Culture. 
6 Darko Suvin’s foundational definition of science fiction also describes the effect sought 
by dystopian literature written in other genres, which “estranges the author’s and reader’s 
own empirical environment” in service of an alternative vision (255). 
 
 153 
viability of the challenge that a dystopian novel imagines, to a great extent, determines 
the political significance of its pessimism.  Thus, dystopias which prompt critical 
reflection on the depicted social conditions and inspire hope for a different and better 
alternative display “utopian pessimism” (Moylan 154).  By contrast, to describe those 
dystopias which offer no alternative to the bleak reality they depict, Moylan coins the 
term “anti-utopian pessimism” (154). 
 On the level of plot, neither Beautyful Ones nor Falling Man imagines the 
possibility of a successful challenge to the current, flawed reality; indeed, both texts 
actively cast doubt on such a possibility. In Beautyful Ones, the coup which deposes the 
corrupt former revolutionary leader Kwame Nkrumah, and which structures the novel’s 
climax, holds little promise of real or meaningful change.  The man stays at his desk 
when his coworkers go out, opportunistically, to join demonstrations in support of the 
new government, and he notes that, although the words of the crowd’s songs about 
Nkrumah have changed from praise to condemnation, the songs themselves remain the 
same.  Nevertheless, the coup does cause one small but important change: Koomson, 
formerly the embodiment of everything the man had failed to achieve, is forced to flee 
fearing for his life.  No longer a representative of the gleam, Koomson is abjected by his 
fear, which produces noxious bodily odors, and he must escape from the man’s house, 
where he has taken refuge, by squeezing through the narrow opening of the latrine.  The 
man helps Koomson escape to safety, and Oyo, terrified and revolted by the spectacle of 
Koomson’s fall, expresses for the first time her gratitude that her husband “never became 
like him” (165).  Although he recognizes that the world has changed completely for 
individuals like Koomson, the man foresees no real change for Ghana or for himself: “for 
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the nation itself there would only be a change of embezzlers and a change of the hunters 
and the hunted” (162).  And reflecting on the family and the daily life to which he will 
always return, the man is filled not with optimism but with “the never-ending knowledge 
that this aching emptiness would be all that the remainder of his own life could offer 
him” (183). 
 DeLillo, too, offers very little in the way of optimism, depicting the Neudecker 
family, years after the attacks, as locked into a pattern of gradual and inevitable decline.    
Keith and Lianne “sink into [their] little lives,” much as Keith had predicted.  By the 
novel’s close, they have become defined by the actions they compulsively repeat—
counting by threes or going to church, playing cards or doing rehabilitative wrist 
exercises—actions which seem to grow more and more meaningless with every 
repetition.  Keith’s compulsion to correct misspellings of his last name on incoming mail, 
crossing out the “new” in “Neudecker,” is emblematic of the novel’s vision of the future, 
marked by empty habits that foreclose the possibility of genuine change.  Nina’s 
estrangement from Martin and her eventual death also cast doubt on the possibility of the 
kind of personal, ideological transformation that Martin advocated in the novel’s early 
pages.  When Martin and Lianne meet for the last time, after Nina’s memorial service, he 
has abandoned his earlier hope that Americans might rise to the challenge of seeing 
themselves and their place in the world differently after 9/11. 
 On the level of plot, then, neither Beautyful Ones nor Falling Man offers much 
opportunity to imagine otherwise, but to dismiss these texts as anti-utopian is to 
underestimate the significance of the ideological work they inspire beyond the frame of 
their fictional narratives.  As Moylan suggests, it is frequently the formal and structural 
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openness of a dystopian text, rather than its plot, which allows for hopeful and utopian 
possibilities.  Thus, in contrast to conservative, anti-utopian texts, which “[tend] to favor 
a linear plot” in which all rebellions are crushed, those which offer “a possibility for 
change or identif[y] a site for an alternative position” allow readers to step outside of the 
dystopian world, critique its flaws, and imagine other, resistant possibilities (Moylan 156-
7).  Moreover, as Moylan acknowledges, even those texts which most stubbornly 
foreclose alternative visions and enforce an anti-utopian pessimism can inspire 
oppositional reading positions that give rise to utopian possibilities outside the frame of 
the texts itself.  Confronted with such closed, unrelentingly anti-utopian texts, “readers or 
audiences may well respond with a resistant and utopian attitude—perhaps finding in the 
very closure of a certain text a chilling view of the present that counterfactually produces 
hope rather than the capitulation the text itself invites” (Moylan 158).7  Thus, by shifting 
our critical focus from the pessimistic visions provided by works of fiction to the forms 
of resistance and critique they elicit in their readers, the scholarship of dystopia suggests 
a different way of thinking about the bleakness of the imagined worlds in Beautyful Ones 
and Falling Man. 
 Echoing Moylan’s concern with the ideological implications of dystopian texts’ 
structure and form, Fredric Jameson’s recent work on utopia directs our attention to the 
inevitable silences and imaginative failures of utopian literature.  Jameson notes the 
                                                
7 Moylan’s claim that even the most closed and conservative of dystopian fictions can 
inspire a resistant hopefulness in their readers is both appealing and problematic: while it 
allows critics to account for a wide range of readerly reactions and identify forms of 
resistant reading, it also threatens to undermine the formal analysis of dystopian fiction 
that Moylan has just offered by suggesting that the politics encoded in the text’s form 
may be entirely superseded by readers’ ideological orientation. 
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problematic nature of focusing on the content of utopian visions: inasmuch as utopian 
possibilities are genuinely new and different, they risk becoming “not merely 
unrealizable, but what is worse, unimaginable” to readers whose imaginations are shaped 
by their present political and social context (xv).  By corollary, dystopian literature faces 
the opposite challenge.  Profoundly invested in critiquing the political and social 
conditions in evidence around them, dystopian texts may be unable to transcend the 
context of that critique to convincingly evoke or depict a different and hopeful 
alternative.  Jameson, in response to this paradox, advocates a shift in critical focus from 
content to representation, a practice he calls “utopian formalism”: 
It is not only the social and historical raw materials of the Utopian 
construct which are of interest from this perspective; but also the 
representational relations established between them—such as closure, 
narrative[,] and exclusion or inversion.  Here as elsewhere in narrative 
analysis what is most revealing is not what is said, but what cannot be 
said, what does not register on the narrative apparatus. (xiii) 
The inevitable shortcomings of the utopian imagination form the basis of the 
politically informed critical practice which Jameson ultimately advocates.  If, as he 
suggests, in characteristically Marxist terms, “[o]n the social level, our imaginations are 
hostages to our own mode of production,” then “at best Utopia can serve the negative 
purpose of making us more aware of our mental and ideological imprisonment,” and 
“therefore the best Utopias are those that fail most comprehensively” (xiii).  Although 
utopian texts may fail to envision any genuinely different alternative to present social 
conditions, by making those oppressive conditions visible and allowing them to be 
historicized, these texts lay the groundwork for visions of the future that they themselves, 
by definition, may be unable to provide.  Thus, as Jameson suggests, “the most reliable 
political test [of a utopian text] lies not in any judgment on the individual work in 
 
 157 
question so much as in its capacity to generate new ones, Utopian visions that include 
those of the past and modify or correct them” (xv). 
Applying Jameson’s framework to both Beautyful Ones and Falling Man points 
us to a consideration of their form and structure as works of literature, rather than solely 
the content of the worlds they depict, as the source of their potential political 
engagement.  Although the novels themselves fail to provide hopeful visions of the 
future, they might invite or inspire readers to generate their own utopian visions, as 
Jameson suggests.  This understanding calls to mind the unrealized future promise of the 
“beautyful ones” in Armah’s novel.  Near the novel’s close, Armah’s protagonist reflects 
that 
[s]omeday in the long future a new life would maybe flower in the 
country, but when it came, it would not choose as its instruments the same 
people who had made a habit of killing new flowers.  The future goodness 
may come eventually, but before then where were the things in the present 
that would prepare the way for it? (159-160) 
The imagery of flowers in this passage clearly connects it with the inscription on the bus 
in the final scene, from which the novel takes its title: the image of a single flower 
surrounded by the words “THE BEAUTYFUL ONES ARE NOT YET BORN” (183).  Much as 
Jameson suggests, the man recognizes that “really new things” cannot emerge in the 
present, and turns instead to searching for “the things . . . that would prepare the way” for 
that as-yet unimaginable change.  Applying this model to a reading of the novels, we can 
imagine the possibility of “beautyful” future readers, who like Armah’s “Beautyful 
Ones,” might take these novels’ formal openness as the basis for utopian visions that 
exceed the novels’ present grasp—and perhaps ours as well.  Such readings would 
evaluate these novels and their utopian potential based on their capacity to generate 
hopeful visions of the future in the hands of these “beautyful” readers. 
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 Approaching Armah and DeLillo in this way, we would look not for vibrantly 
imagined alternatives to the social realities the novels depict, but rather for the terrain on 
which readers might begin to imagine those alternatives beyond the frame of the texts 
themselves.  In both novels, the conditions of market capitalism—and the hollow 
personal relationships that the capitalist system produces—are a defining aspect of the 
oppressive social realities they depict.  While Armah and DeLillo do not themselves offer 
alternatives to these dysfunctional systems, their failure to do so can be read as an 
invitation, especially in light of the iterative structure that defines their narrative arcs.  
Both Beautyful Ones and Falling Man deliver their readers, at the novel’s end, to a 
location very similar to their opening.  At the end of Armah’s novel, the man finds 
himself retracing, in reverse, the journey of his morning commute, and witnessing for the 
second time the casual corruption of a bus driver.  The repetition at the conclusion of 
Falling Man is even more pronounced, as Keith’s escape from the towers, which began 
the novel, is re-narrated.  By effectively beginning again, these novels carry out a 
repetition with a difference.  Not only do their final scenes differ in subtle but important 
ways from their earlier versions, but as readers, we approach these scenes having 
ourselves been transformed by the act of reading.  This circular structure offers an 
alternative to the hopelessness and stasis that has defined the novels, suggesting that 
change is possible and providing readers with the seeds of an alternate vision that extends 
forward from novel’s end. 
A Reading of Beautyful Ones 
In Beautyful Ones, Armah’s critique of Ghana’s ethos of consumption is 
unambiguous and unrelenting, but while there is little change in the flawed society the 
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novel depicts, its cyclical narrative offers the possibility that the man himself has changed 
in a subtle but important way.  For much of the novel, the man tries to hold himself aloof 
from the corruption and materialism he denounces.  In the Railroad Administration, he 
stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the not-so-subtle suggestions of the timber contractor 
who attempts to bribe him, and he avoids the contaminating contact with the banister as 
he ascends and descends the stairs.  At home and in public, the man also goes out of his 
way to distance himself from Oyo’s social posturing, complaining to the Koomsons about 
the high price of even unpretentious local beer, and bringing his wife abruptly down to 
earth during a rare taxi ride, when she flaunts “the few rich things that had ever happened 
to her” for the taxi driver’s approval (144).  Even as he struggles to separate himself from 
the corrupt world around him, the man recognizes the futility of such efforts, recalling a 
friend, Rama Krishna, a Ghanaian man who took that name in his search for spiritual 
purity.  Like our protagonist, Rama Krishna seeks to flee the world around him, which 
seems entirely contaminated by rot and decay, but his efforts to isolate himself prove 
pathetic and ineffectual.  “Near the end he had discovered the one way: he would not 
corrupt himself by touching any woman, but saved his semen to rejuvenate his brain by 
standing on his head a certain number of minutes every night and every dawn” (48).  
Despite his ascetic quest to keep his body and mind pure, Rama Krishna dies of 
consumption, his body having “undergone far more decay than any living body, however 
old and near death, can expect to see” (48-9). 
 The story of Rama Krishna points to the sexual, as well as financial, dimensions 
of the idealized purity that the man and others around him seek.  Throughout Armah’s 
novel, the normative gender roles that cast men as providers and women as consumers 
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forge a powerful link between the economic and sexual failings of men like the novel’s 
protagonist.  Indeed, it comes as little surprise that the man, who has no appetite for the 
national game of corruption and social climbing, has also lost his sexual appetite for his 
wife, and has no money to pay for the services of the prostitute who propositions him 
during Passion Week.  In his attempt to resist the prevailing social forces, the man feels 
burdened by Oyo’s hopes and aspirations, and yearns for the solitary life of a man like 
Teacher, who has “escaped the call of the loved ones” and is, in the man’s words, “the 
freest person I know” (55).  Teacher’s dark response, however, makes any vision of a 
happy life, either alone or with others, seem impossible: 
I know I am nothing and will never be anything without them, and when I 
most wish to stop being nothing, then the desire to run back to those I have 
fled comes back with unbearable strength.  Until I see again those loving 
arms outstretched, bringing me their gift of death.  Then I stop and turn 
around and come back here, living my half-life of loneliness. (56) 
For Teacher, as for the man, the expectations and desires of women—mothers, wives, 
and lovers—weigh most heavily.8  Despite his love for the woman Maanan, in her 
presence Teacher feels “accused by a silence that belonged to millions and ages of 
women all bearing the face and the form of Maanan, and needing no voice at all to tell 
me I had failed them” (72).  Unwilling or unable to live up to the expectations of their 
loved ones, both the man and Teacher find themselves trapped between the loneliness of 
a solitary life and the reproach of women whose desires they will inevitably fail to 
satisfy. 
                                                
8 In his provocative article, “Homoeroticism and the Failure of African Nationalism in 
Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautyful Ones,” Glen Retief identifies the powerful homoerotic 
undercurrents that are also at work in this scene.  Although Teacher succeeds in 
“mentor[ing] the man back to conventional, familial heterosexuality,” the scene 
nevertheless contains “a veritable plethora of signs pointing away from married, domestic 
heterosexuality in the direction of the homoerotic” (67). 
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 To justify his solitude and withdrawal from public life, Teacher cites the allegory 
of Plato’s cave: people imprisoned in the dark, who have never seen the sun, refuse to 
believe the account of one man among them who has escaped the cave and witnessed the 
brightness of daylight.  For Teacher, the parable captures the futility of struggling for 
change in postindependence Ghana, whose citizens are so seduced by the false values of 
consumer capitalism that they reject other visions for the nation’s future out-of-hand.  In 
his despair, Teacher concludes that “men were all free to do what they chose to do, and 
would laugh at the bringer of unwanted light if they knew what they needed was the 
dark” (79).  At the time this story is recounted, the man is saddened, but convinced by it.  
But Teacher’s interpretation of the allegory marginalizes one of its defining features: the 
conditions of imprisonment that cause the prisoners in Plato’s cave to reject the escapee’s 
visionary claim.  This is the aspect of the allegory that John Lutz emphasizes in his 
reading of the novel, which recasts Armah’s pessimism through an explicitly Marxist 
framework.  If, as Lutz suggests, “those imprisoned in the cave are understood primarily 
as prisoners of social desire who have been miseducated in a way that makes them 
incapable of recognizing what is in their own best interests,” the parable directs our 
attention to the fundamental changes that would need to occur before the prisoners could, 
literally, see the light.  Both the allegory, and Teacher’s deployment of it, neglect the 
question on which the man ultimately comes to focus: the conditions in the present that 
will prepare the way for future change. 
 The conclusion of Beautyful Ones is ambivalent at best.  As the novel makes 
clear, conditions are no different in the Ghana to which the man returns after his 
adventure with Koomson: desperate children still steal chips of stone from grave markers, 
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and officials still casually demand bribes.  But unlike Teacher, who is determined to hold 
himself aloof from that world, the man has chosen to engage with it.  He has risked his 
life to help Koomson, compromising his own principles to help the party man bribe his 
way to safety.  When the man encounters Maanan on the beach, he calls her by name in a 
gesture of recognition and hospitality, unlike Teacher, who cannot bring himself to speak 
to Maanan and acknowledge his failings and her suffering.  Although he dreads returning 
to “Oyo, [and] the eyes of the children after six o’clock,” the man nevertheless sets off 
toward home at the novel’s close (183).  After bribing the soldiers at a roadblock while 
the man looks on, the driver of the green bus with its hopeful inscription waves and 
smiles to the man as he drives off, hailing him much as the man hailed Maanan.  The 
man’s response to the driver’s gesture is ambiguous, and critics such as Robert Spencer 
have suggested that this interaction, in which the man is once again a distant watcher of 
the corruption around him, only confirms his aloofness and isolation.  But read alongside 
the earlier account of a bus journey with which the novel begins, this scene suggests an 
important shift in the man’s attitude and outlook.   
 In the earlier scene, the man is asleep as the bus driver counts his day’s take, and 
his refusal to partake in the driver’s offered reciprocity makes the man the target of the 
driver’s vitriol.  Although the man’s response is not narrated in the later scene, the bus 
driver’s friendly reaction suggests an important difference in how he has been perceived 
in his act of watching.  As Neil Lazarus suggests, “the bus-driver sees the watching ‘man’ 
not as a stern figure of conscience, calling him to account, nor—of course—as a partner 
in crime, but as one who understands” (78).  The subtle, indefinable change that the man 
has undergone over the course of the novel is not explicitly described in the text, but is 
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thus revealed though the cyclical narrative, which allows us to see this earlier scene 
repeated with a difference.  Armah’s text does not imagine any viable alternatives to the 
man’s bleak existence, and attempts by critics to name and identify alternatives often 
seem more definitive than the novel’s ending warrants.  But it does hold out the promise 
of a future that might differ from the present we have witnessed, a possibility embodied 
by the green bus.  The fact that the man is open to this promise is itself a form of hope in 
the context of a dystopian world in which “all that can be expected from the present is 
that it will not foreclose every single one of the future’s progressive options” (Lazarus 
73). 
A Reading of Falling Man   
Throughout Falling Man, DeLillo grapples with the fact that the “American way 
of life” under attack on 9/11 was defined by the oppressive conditions of late capitalism, 
conditions which he has frequently and thoroughly critiqued in his earlier fiction.  Much 
as the coup in Armah’s novel yields simply “a change in embezzlers,” 9/11 only 
superficially alters life for the Neudecker family, who remain isolated and adrift in the 
modern world they occupy.  Although Keith survives and the family is reunited, the novel 
suggests that the “normal” lives they try to recreate are defined by an empty, alienating 
consumer capitalism. Keith’s transformation from financier to professional poker player 
simply substitutes one form of empty, fetishistic financial dealing for another.  And 
throughout Falling Man, even the most basic activities are mechanized and dehumanized.  
To do laundry, Lianne must first “make selections on the control panel, set the dial on the 
other side of the panel and close the lid” in a laundry room with a “metallic chill that she 
felt in her teeth” (150).  At the bakery, she must “take a number from the dispenser on the 
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counter”; as she waits, she realizes that “[s]he hated this regimen of assigned numbers, 
strictly enforced, in a confined space, with nothing at the end of the process but a small 
white bow-tied box of pastry” (36).  In scenes such as these, DeLillo emphasizes the 
alienating effects of American late capitalism, social conditions that are revealed, but not 
meaningfully altered by the events of 9/11. 
The tense, distant relationships in DeLillo’s novel are also profoundly marked by 
the effects of capitalist alienation.  One of the most intimate moments that readers 
witness in the brief affair between Keith and Florence takes place at Macy’s, where 
Florence has come to purchase a mattress.  In this scene, the private space of the bedroom 
is transformed into the commercial space of the mattress department, and DeLillo 
fetishistically repeats brand names like “Beautyrest” and “Posturepedic” that evoke a 
corporatized and consumption-based domesticity.  As Florence tests her mattress, Keith 
surveys the room to see many other shoppers doing the same, including a couple, 
“middle-aged and purposeful, trying to determine whether one person’s tossing would 
disturb the other’s sleep” (132).  “[B]ouncing and rolling,” the men and women in the 
mattress department perform their sleep in public, eroding the significance of this private, 
intimate act (132).  In a similar moment, during the early stages of their reconciliation, 
Keith and Lianne make out in the back of a taxi, and Lianne thinks to herself, “it’s a 
movie, it’s a movie,” their real-life intimacy somehow stranger and less familiar than 
images on a screen (104).  Later, when Keith travels to poker tournaments, their intimate 
relations become even more mediated and mechanical: he and Lianne have phone sex, 
separated by several time zones, and she imagines him having “automated teller sex” 
with a call girl (233). 
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Through these representations of meaningless actions and hollow relationships, 
Falling Man calls into question any celebratory notion of the “American way of life” that 
Islamic fundamentalism has placed under attack.  Within the novel, it is Martin who gives 
voice to this critique, suggesting that America is defined by little more that its role as a 
global economic superpower.  If the September 11 attacks mark the end of that era of 
dominance, Martin contends, they only reveal the emptiness underlying America’s 
national identity.  “Soon the day is coming when nobody has to think about America 
except for the danger it brings.  It is losing the center.  It becomes the center of its own 
shit” (191).  Although Nina’s former colleagues, whom Martin is addressing, take 
umbrage at his statements, they do not contest his central claim that America has been 
defined by its role as an economic superpower.  “Ask yourself,” they challenge him,  
“[w]hat comes after America?” (192).  Martin’s response that “[t]here is an empty space 
where America used to be,” eerily echoes the logic of the terrorists DeLillo depicts (193). 
The character Hammad, the ingenuous young jihadi, asks a similar question of “Amir,” 
DeLillo’s representation of so-called “9/11 mastermind” Mohamed Atta: “What of the 
others, those who will die?”  Amir responds that “there are no others.  The others exist 
only to the degree that they fill the role we have designed for them,” an assertion which is 
uncomfortably similar to the logic that pervades DeLillo’s novel (176).  Hammad comes 
to accept this explanation, musing that “[t]hese people, what they hold so precious we see 
as empty space” (177).  Although they reflect profoundly different ideologies and 
motives, Martin’s and Hammad’s statements both suggest that, in an America so 




This nihilistic outlook is reflected in the first account of Keith’s escape from the 
Twin Towers, with which the novel begins.  Keith is alone as he emerges onto the street, 
surrounded by the swirling, meaningless debris of the corporate world: “the paper massed 
in the air, contracts, resumés blowing by, intact snatches of business, quick in the wind” 
(4).  Amid this debris, the image of a falling shirt stands out; in this scene, the shirt is 
empty, “lifted and drifting in the scant light and then falling again, down toward the 
river” (4).  The falling shirt takes on added significance in light of the many victims who 
fell or jumped from the towers’ higher floors, a fact which the novel’s title brings 
powerfully to mind.  In this first scene, however, the “falling man” is revealed to be little 
more than an empty shirt.  This scene seems to suggest that much of what was destroyed 
on 9/11—contracts and resumés, white shirts, and perhaps even Keith himself—was 
already empty long before the towers fell.   
By narrating Keith’s escape a second time, however, the novel creates an 
opportunity for readers to understand it in new terms.  As Keith and Lianne watch the 
news footage of the attacks, they model a similar transformation for the novel’s readers: 
“It still looks like an accident, the first one,” Keith reflects, watching the impact of the 
first plane.  “But only the first.  . . . The second plane, by the time the second plane 
appears, . . . we’re all a little older and wiser” (135).  Like Keith and Lianne, we are a 
little older and wiser by the time we arrive at the second account of Keith’s survival, 
which concludes the novel.  The two accounts are factually consistent, but the second 
version is longer and more complete, beginning with Keith inside his office, where he 
witnesses the death of his friend Rumsey, and then describing his long, slow descent of 
the stairs with the other survivors.  By this time, we have gleaned additional details from 
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the novel’s preceding pages that help us understand Keith’s experience differently, 
allowing us to construct a more hopeful interpretation of 9/11 than the novel itself 
explicitly provides.   
Through Keith’s fragmentary memories, we have come to know Rumsey, a 
nebbishy, balding man who is ruled by compulsions, about which he is unflinchingly 
honest with Keith. “The persistence of the man’s needs had a kind of crippled appeal.  It 
opened Keith to dimmer things, at odder angles, to something crouched and uncorrectable 
in people but also capable of stirring a warm feeling in him, a rare tinge of affinity” 
(123).  In the novel’s brief descriptions, the closeness of the friendship between Rumsey 
and Keith is powerfully evoked, though never explicitly stated, and this insight 
profoundly informs our reading of the second account of Keith’s escape.  In the second 
account, Rumsey is everywhere.  As others in his office move toward the exits, Keith 
seeks out Rumsey, who has already been gravely injured by falling debris.  As he 
attempts to lift Rumsey and carry him to safety, Keith sees “something outside, going 
past the window,” the image of a “man falling sideways, arm out and up” (242, 244).  
Rumsey dies moments later, a fact which Keith only partially apprehends as he begins the 
journey down alone.  As he descends the stairs, in flashbacks, the falling man he saw 
becomes Rumsey: “for an instant he saw it again, going past the window, and this time he 
thought it was Rumsey” (244).  Later, when he sees firefighters heading up the stairs, he 
again thinks of Rumsey.  “Rumsey was the one in the chair.  He understood that now.  He 
had set him back down in the chair and they would find him and bring him down, and 
others” (245).  This scene makes clear that, for Keith, the fact of his own survival is 
powerfully informed by that of Rumsey’s death. 
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In contrast to the emotionlessness and anonymity of the first account of Keith’s 
escape, the personal, human significance of loss and survival are central to the second 
account.  The earlier images of meaningless debris are transformed into deeply personal 
objects: Rumsey’s shattered coffee cup, still held in his hand, a child’s tricycle carried by 
a woman descending the stairs, and a briefcase that we recognize as Florence’s, though it 
is never named as such.  During his descent, Keith stops on the stairs, and despite 
encouragement from those around him, cannot be persuaded to continue.  But when given 
a briefcase dropped by its owner and passed down after her, he takes it and continues to 
safety.  At the time, Keith does not know Florence, but through the device of the novel’s 
repetition, readers recognize the briefcase in this account from the narratives of that day 
that Keith and Florence have shared with one another.  The significance of this moment 
goes unmarked in the text, but we as readers realize that Florence’s briefcase has just 
saved Keith’s life, a moment of recognition made possible by the knowledge that we 
bring with us to this final scene. 
By narrating Keith’s escape a second time, DeLillo allows readers to reevaluate 
what they took to be Keith’s isolation and emotional distance in earlier scenes.  His poker 
playing, in particular, takes on new meaning in light of his grief over Rumsey’s death.  
Juxtaposing Keith’s fragmentary memories of Rumsey with his desire for the “crucial 
anonymity” of the Las Vegas tournaments, his poker playing becomes not an empty, 
alienating act, but rather a desperate attempt to keep the painful memory of his lost friend 
at bay (204).  “I heard he went out a window, Rumsey,” recalls Terry Cheng, a mutual 
acquaintance and fellow poker player, whose comment, like Keith’s seemingly 
withdrawn response, takes on new meaning in light of the novel’s final scene (205).  
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Staring into the casino’s artificial waterfall, Keith is not so much embracing the 
artificiality of his environment as managing his powerful emotions; he stares at the 
waterfall because “if he closed his eyes, he’d see something” (205).  The intensity of 
Keith’s grief in this scene attests to the powerful bond he shared with Rumsey, who is far 
more than the mere “buddy” that the novel initially describes (22).  Their caring 
relationship offers an alternative to the detached, unfeeling masculinity that the novel 
attributes to Keith, a man who is never able to grow into the role of safe, domestic 
provider and “husbandman” that his wife imagines for him (70). 
The account of Florence’s briefcase, too, allows us to reevaluate their 
relationship, which at first seemed pathetically empty and predictable.  Initially, 
Florence’s confession that Keith “saved her life” by returning her briefcase appears sadly 
hollow and hyperbolic against the backdrop of their failing romance.  But the knowledge 
that Keith, too, was indirectly saved because of Florence suggests a more reciprocal 
connection.  In place of the oppressive gender roles their relationship seemed to 
reproduce—the needy, passive woman and the decisive, detached man—we are able to 
reimagine a more meaningful and sustaining connection that transcends their socially 
scripted roles as participants in a failed extramarital affair.   
Ultimately, Falling Man’s cyclical structure provides the starting point for a 
reevaluation of the entire novel, one in which isolation and emotional distance are 
replaced by intimacy, reciprocity, and profound grief.  The novel’s final image, the 
falling shirt, returns us to the opening scene, but its symbolism is entirely transformed.  
The previously empty shirt is now personified, its “arms waving like nothing in this life,” 
suggesting the human significance of the destruction that took place on 9/11.  In effect, 
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this scene allows us as readers to begin the novel again with a changed understanding.  
Although it does not invalidate the novel’s earlier critique, it allows readers the 
opportunity to imagine an alternative to the emptiness that most of the novel depicts.  The 
World Trade Center towers become, in addition to “fantasies of wealth and power that 
would one day become fantasies of destruction,” the locus for meaningful, defining 
human relationships which resist the alienating effects of the late capitalist society around 
them.  Objects, like a shirt or a briefcase, have incalculable value in their human 
dimension.  And Keith is no longer the kind of man who would “break up a table and 
burn it so he could take out his dick and piss on the flames,” defined by a masculine 
identity that precludes meaningful, intimate bonds with women and men alike (104).  The 
depth and intimacy of Keith’s relationship with Rumsey offers an alternative to the 
socially normative forms of masculine identity that the novel depicts, and his bond with 
Florence transcends its sexual dimension, standing as a counterpoint to the one-way, 
“automated teller sex” in which men like Keith are expected to engage.  These 
interpretations are not explicit in DeLillo’s text, but are enabled by a rereading or 
reconsideration of the novel in light of its final scene.  Through its cyclical structure, 
Falling Man rejects the nihilism of Martin and the terrorists and instead lays the 
groundwork for an alternative to the bleak, alienated social landscape it depicts—an 
alternative which can serve as the basis for a different vision of post-9/11 America. 
“Anti-anti-Utopianism,” the Best Working Strategy 
By analyzing the ways in which Beautyful Ones and Falling Man open 
themselves to rereading and reinterpretation, I hope to highlight a dimension of these 
works’ political and social engagement that is marginalized by a focus on the content of 
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the bleak realities they depict.  Although neither of these texts explicitly envisions viable 
alternatives, their use of structural repetition invites readers to pick up where the texts 
themselves leave off.  This strategy reflects and responds to a profound ambivalence on 
the part of Armah and DeLillo about utopianism itself, one that Jameson captures in his 
treatment of the subject: 
[F]or those only too wary of the motives of its critics, yet no less 
conscious of Utopia’s structural ambiguities, those mindful of the very 
real political function of the idea and the program of Utopia in our time, 
the slogan of anti-anti-Utopianism might well offer the best working 
strategy (xvi). 
As a strategy for thinking about the future, Jameson’s “anti-anti-utopianism” seeks to 
balance the urgency of imagining new and better alternatives to oppressive social 
conditions with a recognition of the perils of thinking in utopian terms, not least among 
them the risk that so-called “utopias” may only reprise the flawed social reality they seek 
to transcend. 
The deployment of dystopian form in Beautyful Ones and Falling Man echoes 
Jameson’s formulation and reflects a justifiable suspicion of the language of utopian 
vision.  At the time they wrote their novels, both Armah and DeLillo stood at a slight 
remove from the moments of radical rupture and potential transformation they depict, and 
they are able to reflect critically on the way events have since unfolded.  Armah’s novel 
can be situated in relation to two significant moments of potential change: Ghanaian 
independence, in 1957, and the ouster of Nkrumah, the nation’s first prime minister and 
president, in 1966.  At the time of his election, Nkrumah was widely respected as an anti-
colonial figure whose political vision for Ghana promised genuine independence, 
equality, and prosperity.  By the time of the coup that deposed him, however, Nkrumah’s 
plans for the nation’s economic development had proved largely unsuccessful, while his 
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rule had become increasingly authoritarian.  Although he is infrequently named in 
Beautyful Ones, Nkrumah is clearly the subject of Teacher’s lengthy reminiscences about 
an inspirational leader “grown rotten with such obscene haste,” a transformation which 
provides the novel’s defining context (88).  A more immediate reference point, the 1966 
coup, is another moment that would seem to hold the promise of change, but informed by 
the example of Nkrumah’s ignominious political career, it instead inspires a profound 
skepticism in Armah, and makes the continuation of present conditions seem inevitable. 
As a moment of potential transformation, the 9/11 attacks differ significantly from 
the landmark events of Ghana’s independence: while the latter inaugurated the freedom 
and self-determination of a population, the former was defined by massive loss of life.  
Despite the vastly different significance attached to these two events, they both hold the 
promise of inspiring a fundamental transformation in the life of a nation.  Like Armah’s 
text, however, DeLillo’s novel reflects hope for change, but also the recognition that such 
change has, to date, proved elusive.  Between 2001 and 2007, when Falling Man was 
published, the initial impulse that 9/11 represented a turning point in American history 
and a radical break with the past gave way to the emergence of an all-too-familiar 
international agenda.  Rather than calling America to conscience as a “power that 
interferes, that occupies,” mainstream discourse used the events of 9/11 to justify new 
interferences and occupations, once again entangled with the profit-seeking motives of 
American corporations (46).  Thus, in the contexts in which both Armah and DeLillo 
write, the very language of change and transformation has proven vulnerable to 
exploitation and is readily converted to serve conservative rather than transformative 
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ends.  Indeed, from the vantage points they occupy, the recent past makes the failure of 
utopian vision seem inevitable. 
This kind of overdetermined relationship to the past is one that Jennifer Wenzel 
addresses in her analysis of anti-imperialism in the Congo.  In “Remembering the Past’s 
Future,” Wenzel criticizes accounts of neocolonialism that describe a process of 
inevitable and uninterrupted exploitation by the West, as if anti-colonial movements had 
not offered the possibility of an alternative.  As she argues,  
commentators tend to frame contemporary conflicts in the Congo not in 
terms of challenges since the international derailment of decolonization at 
mid-century but rather in terms of a kind of postcolonial mimicry of the 
spectacular despoliation of land and people under King Leopold II, as if 
[revolutionary leader Patrice] Lumumba had never existed to pose an 
alternative (“Remembering the Past's Future” 5). 
To assume that the present circumstances in Congo were inevitable, she reminds us, is to 
deny the historical possibility of anti-imperialism, as well as the enduring consequences 
of its articulation.  Taken in a somewhat different context, Wenzel’s argument can 
productively inform our understanding of the dynamics at work in both Beautyful Ones 
and Falling Man.  In the moments in which these two authors are writing, not only have 
utopian visions of change and transformation failed to be realized, but what is more, 
viewing them in retrospect, it seems as though their failure was inevitable.  Through their 
cyclical narratives, however, these novels provide readers with a position from which to 
resist this kind of bleak determinism, allowing us to return to the moment in which the 
promise of a different future was not simply the prelude to its failure or foreclosure, but 
rather a vibrant possibility. 
Thus, these novels carry out a process of historicization analogous to that which 
Jameson calls for, contextualizing the bleak reality each text depicts as one among a 
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range of viable historical alternatives.  In doing so, they allow for the possibility of other 
outcomes, and perhaps more importantly, for different visions of the future that can be 
built on the foundation of such visions of the past.  This openness is essential to the 
novels’ ability to inspire hopeful visions of the future through their grim depictions of the 
present: through their cyclical structure, they remain open to the new narratives that 
future readers might construct.  As Jameson suggests, therefore, the utopian promise of 
texts like Beautyful Ones and Falling Man lies not in their immediate vision of the future, 
but in the subsequent visions they have the potential to inspire.  Indeed, through their 
structural open-endedness, these texts invite their future readers to take responsibility for 
imagining the alternative futures that elude their authors’ present grasp.  While we cannot 
reasonably assume that all readers will respond to these bleak visions in this way, the 
negative reactions that both texts frequently elicit suggest the likelihood of this kind of 
engagement.  For readers who react to these novels with frustration, disgust, or even a 
sense of betrayal, the dystopian presents depicted in these novels provide the impetus to 
imagine differently and search for alternatives.  Indeed, strategies like Armah’s use of the 
grotesque and DeLillo’s alienation encourage precisely such a reaction.  
To the extent that the moments of crisis to which these novels respond call the 
framework of the nation into question, they are haunted by the ghost of an emerging but 
uncertain transnationalism.  Armah’s novel reflects a rejection of literary and political 
nationalism, if not the nation as a unit of analysis.  As critic Kwame Anthony Appiah and 
others have pointed out, Armah belongs to a second generation of postindependence 
African writers whose novels, “far from being a celebration of the nation, . . . are novels 
of delegitimation: they reject not only the western imperium but also the nationalist 
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project of the postcolonial national bourgeoisie” (353).  In Beautyful Ones, we see both 
the rejection of triumphalist national narratives and also an awareness that international 
economic relations, like the culture markets they produce, are a central and inescapable 
element of the challenges facing an independent Ghana.  In Falling Man, 9/11 is framed 
as a quintessentially international moment for Americans and American identity.  In a 
nation that is no longer protected by inviolable borders, the World Trade Center is 
transformed into a site of international contestation.  This framing of 9/11 as an 
international American moment is underscored by DeLillo’s inclusion of characters such 
as Martin and Hammad, who are given equal prominence as interpreters of that day’s 
events. 
The new global reality that haunts these texts is uncertain.  But it is certainly not 
the Three Worlds system that contextualizes Armah’s writing, in which emerging Third 
World nations, like Ghana, were forced to choose sides in the political battles of the Cold 
War that neither reflected nor served their interests.  It is also not the transnational late 
capitalism that defines the America of DeLillo’s text as a cultural and economic 
juggernaut.  While seeking to imagine different and better futures, both Armah and 
DeLillo leave open the question of how readers will define, understand, and interpret the 
new eras that their texts augur.  Ultimately, by directing our attention forward into an 
unknown future, these texts invite us, and the readers who will succeed us, to consider the 




Ama Ata Aidoo’s play, “Dilemma of A Ghost,” is a meditation on displacement.  
In the play, a young African man who has gone to America for his education returns 
home with his new wife, an African American woman from Harlem.  The play’s central 
metaphor is a song about a ghost at a road crossing who cannot decide which direction to 
turn.  In different ways, each of the play’s major characters finds him- or herself facing a 
version of the ghost’s dilemma: Ato, the young man, must negotiate between respecting 
the cultural expectations of his family and pursuing the westernized life he has chosen for 
himself.  His wife, Eulalie, is a woman without family ties of her own, who comes to 
Africa with conflicting expectations, seeking both the excitement of an exotic land and 
the comforting embrace of a second family.  And Ato’s mother, Esi Kom, is torn in her 
allegiance, first denouncing first Eulalie as bad wife, then Ato as a thoughtless husband.   
In the end, Aidoo’s characters themselves are revealed to be the “ghost” referred 
to in the play’s title, interpellated by competing narratives of race, gender, nation, and 
modernity, but never quite at home in any of them.  This sense of dislocation leads to 
misunderstanding and conflict, but it is also the source of the responsibility to one 
another that these individuals ultimately embrace.  Eulalie’s own experience as an 
African American woman, the educated child of working-class parents, informs her 
complex understanding of what it means to be “African,” one which, flawed though it 
may be, allows her to identify and connect with Ato.  Likewise, Esi Kom’s culture shock, 
when she learns of Ato’s decision to delay childrearing, allows her to empathize with 
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Eulalie’s own uneasiness as a cultural outsider.  Ato’s own conflicted choices between 
two competing value systems give him the ability—and the responsibility—to bridge 
between them, a responsibility which the play suggests he has neglected.    
Aidoo’s play captures several of the ideas that have been central to this 
dissertation, especially the concept of cross-cultural reading as a “dilemma.”  In each of 
the literary comparisons that I have carried out, the act of reading itself becomes a 
problem, challenging us to consider questions no less significant than those with which 
Aidoo’s characters grapple: What can we believe is real?  Who can narrate the past?  
How is personhood established?  What shape will the future take?  The juxtaposition of 
works drawn from very different national and cultural contexts makes the difficulty of 
providing definitive, convincing answers to questions like these particularly evident.  
Like the characters in Aidoo’s play, the critical location I have attempted to construct 
through these comparisons is one of dislocation, for readers who are “at home” in some 
of these texts will almost certainly feel uncomfortably out-of-place in others.  
In the context of our contemporary global moment, cultivating a dislocated, 
uneasy critical stance might seem to be, at best, a gratuitously contrarian gesture, or at 
worst, a not-so-innocent strategy for placing the privileged “metropolitan” reader once 
again at the center of our analytical frame.  My intention, however, is quite the opposite.  
Through the readings in this dissertation, I hope to have shown how haunting can 
productively unsettle the boundaries of difference that define our cultural, political, and 
literary landscapes.  As it is for the characters in Aidoo’s play, being haunted is the 
condition of our time, for a globalizing world that is at once expanding and contracting 
challenges us all to recognize that of ourselves in the other, and that of the other in 
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ourselves.  But as each of these readings suggests, recognizing the limits of our ability to 
know can be the precursor for relationships of profound mutual responsibility that 
flourish across boundaries of difference.   
It is not surprising that one of the central issues in “Dilemma of a Ghost” is 
childbearing; although haunting often involves a troubled relationship with the past, the 
unknown and uncertain shape of the future is ultimately what is at stake.  To the extent 
that this dissertation engages questions of historical memory, tracing the ongoing effects 
of violence, erasure, oppression, and conquest, it is with a mind to the kinds of future 
possibilities that such engagements with the past enable.  Written in 1964, Aidoo’s play 
represents the beginning of the time frame under consideration here.  The fact that 
haunting has remained a prominent theme from the middle of the previous century to our 
present postmillennial moment attests to the continuing significance of the kinds of 
questions these authors pose.  The transformations and evolutions of its deployment, in 
turn, reflect the defining political changes that distinguish the colonial from the 
postcolonial, or the cultural nationalism of the sixties and seventies from the 
multiculturalism of the eighties and nineties and the putative “post-racialism” of the 
United States today. 
Responding to the many complex forms of contact and interconnection that define 
the world in which they write, the authors I have considered here, and many others like 
them, turn to haunting to imagine relationships across difference that are both urgent and 
imperfect, both powerful and conditional.  In doing so, they model the ways in which a 
genuinely global literature might most productively be read.  These texts do not begin as 
world literature, in that they are the products of the specific and particular national and 
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cultural contexts that give them their defining shape.  But they become world literature 
through the dynamic, dialogic relationships they construct with a wide range of possible 
readers.  By inviting us to be haunted by the stories they tell, and to experience both 
recognition and alienation simultaneously, these texts invite us to see our own acts of 
reading as a problem, a dilemma, or an act of negotiation, and prepare us to step into the 






Ahmad, Aijaz. “Reading Arundhati Roy Politically.” Frontline 8 Aug. 1997: 103-108. 
Print. 
 
Aidoo, Ama Ata. No Sweetness Here. London: Longman, 1970. Print. 
 
---. The Dilemma of a Ghost. Alexandria: Alexander Street Press, 2003. Web. 3 Mar. 
2011. 
 
Allen, Paula Gunn. “Special Problems in Teaching Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony.” 
Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony: A Casebook. Ed. Allan Richard Chavkin. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 83-90. Print. 
 
Amnesty International. Disappearances and Political Killings: Human Rights Crisis of 
the 1990s: A Manual for Action. Amsterdam: Amnesty International, 1994. Print. 
 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?” 
Critical Inquiry 17 (1991): 336-57. Print. 
 





Bell, Robert C. “Circular Design in Ceremony.” Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony: A 
Casebook. Ed. Allan Richard Chavkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
23-39. Print. 
 
Berlant, Lauren. “Intimacy: A Special Issue.” Intimacy. Ed. Lauren Berlant. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000. 1-8. Print. 
 
Booker, M. Keith. The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature: Fiction as Social 
Criticism. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994. Print. 
 
Bose, Brinda. “In Desire and in Death: Eroticism as Politics in Arundhati Roy's The God 
of Small Things.” ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature 29 
(1998): 59-72. Print. 
 
Brill de Ramírez, Susan Berry. Contemporary American Indian Literatures and the Oral 
Tradition. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999. Print. 
 
Brogan, Kathleen. Cultural Haunting: Ghosts and Ethnicity in Recent American 
Literature. 1st ed. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998. Print. 
 
Caruth, Cathy. “Preface.” Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Ed. Cathy Caruth. 




---. “Recapturing the Past: Introduction.” Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Ed. Cathy 
Caruth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 151-157. Print. 
 
---. “Trauma and Experience: Introduction.” Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Ed. Cathy 
Caruth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 3-12. Print. 
 
---. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996. Print. 
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Chavkin, Allan Richard. “Introduction.” Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony: A Casebook. 
Ed. Allan Richard Chavkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 3-15. Print. 
 
Cohen, Robin. “Of Apricots, Orchids, and Wovoka: An Interview with Leslie Marmon 
Silko.” Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony: A Casebook. Ed. Allan Richard 
Chavkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 257-263. Print. 
 
Cooppan, Vilashini. “Ghosts in the Disciplinary Machine: The Uncanny Life of World 




Corrigan, Maureen. “Don DeLillo's 'Falling Man'.” Fresh Air 16 May 2007. Web. 17 
Sept. 2010. 
 
Crowdus, Gary, and Lenny Rubenstein. “The Missing Dossier.” Cineaste 12 (1982): 30-
38. Print. 
 
Cvetkovich, Ann. An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public 
Cultures. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Print. 
 
Damrosch, David. What Is World Literature? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003. Print. 
 
Dawes, James. That the World May Know: Bearing Witness to Atrocity. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007. Print. 
 
DeLillo, Don. Falling Man: A Novel. 1st ed. New York: Scribner, 2007. Print. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
Print. 
 
---. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 




---. The Gift of Death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Print. 
 
Devi, Mahasweta. “Pterodactyl, Puran Sahay, and Pirtha.” Imaginary Maps: Three 
Stories. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. New York: Routledge, 1995. 95-196. 
Print. 
 
---. “The Author in Conversation.” Imaginary Maps: Three Stories. Ed. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak. New York: Routledge, 1995. ix-xxix. Print. 
 
Dimock, Wai Chee. “Planet and America, Set and Subset.” Shades of the Planet: 
American Literature as World Literature. Ed. Wai Chee Dimock & Lawrence 
Buell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 1-16. Print. 
 
Dorfman, Ariel. “Fictionalizing the Truth in Latin America.” The Nation 25 June 1983: 
794-6. Print. 
 
Dudai, Ron. “'Can You Describe This?' Human Rights Reports and What They Tell Us 
About the Human Rights Movement.” Humanitarianism and Suffering: The 
Mobilization of Empathy. Ed. Richard Wilson & Richard D. Brown. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 245-264. Print. 
 





Faris, Wendy B. Ordinary Enchantments. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004. 
Print. 
 
Franco, Dean J. “What We Talk about When We Talk about Beloved.” MFS Modern 
Fiction Studies 52.2 (2006): 415-439. Print. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. “The Uncanny.” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud. Ed. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1953. 217-
256. Print. 
 
Gikandi, Simon. “Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality.” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 100.3 (2001): 627-658. Print. 
 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993. Print. 
 
Goldman, Anne E. “'I Made the Ink': (Literary) Production and Reproduction in Dessa 
Rose and Beloved.” Feminist Studies 16 (1990): 313-30. Print. 
 
Gómez-Peña, Guillermo. The New World Border: Prophecies, Poems, and Loqueras for 




Gordon, Avery. Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination. 2nd ed. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Print. 
 
Herman, Judith Lewis. Trauma and Recovery. New York: BasicBooks, 1992. Print. 
 
Holland, Sharon Patricia. Raising the Dead: Readings of Death and (Black) Subjectivity. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Huggan, Graham. The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins. London: Routledge, 
2001. Print. 
 
Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978. Print. 
 
Ismail, Qadri. “A Flippant Gesture Towards Sri Lanka: A Review of Michael Ondaatje's 
Anil's Ghost.” Pravada 6.9 (2000): 24-29. Print. 
 
Iuliano, Fiorenzo. “Reading Gayatri Spivak Reading Mahasweta Devi: 'Draupadi'.” 
"Contact Zones": Rewriting Genre across the East-West Border. Ed. Donatella 
Izzo & Elena Spandri. Naples: Liguori, 2003. 227-47. Print. 
 
Jameson, Fredric. Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other 




Joshi, Priya. In Another Country: Colonialism, Culture, and the English Novel in India. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Print. 
 
Kakutani, Michiko. “A Man, a Woman and a Day of Terror.” The New York Times 9 May 
2007. Web. 17 Sept. 2010. 
 
Kaplan, Amy. “Manifest Domesticity.” Cultures of United States Imperialism. Ed. Amy 
Kaplan & Donald E. Pease. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 111-134. 
Print. 
 
Kibera, Leonard. “Pessimism and the African Novelist: Ayi Kwei Armah's The Beautyful 
Ones Are Not Yet Born.” Journal of Commonwealth Literature 14 (1979): 64-72. 
Print. 
 
LaCapra, Dominick. Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001. Print. 
 
Laub, Dori. “Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle.” Trauma: Explorations 
in Memory. Ed. Cathy Caruth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 
61-75. Print. 
 
Lazarus, Neil. Resistance in Postcolonial African Fiction. New Haven: Yale University 
 
 188 
Press, 1990. Print. 
 
LeClair, Tom. “The Sri Lankan Patients.” Nation 270.24 (2000): 31-33. Web. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. The Levinas Reader. Ed. Sean Hand. Wiley-Blackwell, 2001. Print. 
 
Lewis, Flora. “New Film by Costa-Gravas [sic] Examines the Chilean Coup.” The New 
York Times 7 Feb. 1982: 1. Print. 
 
Lutz, John. “Pessimism, Autonomy, and Commodity Fetishism in Ayi Kwei Armah's The 
Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born.” Research in African Literatures 34 (2003): 
94-111. Print. 
 
Lyons, Scott Richard. X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010. Print. 
 
McClintock, Anne. Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Conquest. New York: Routledge, 1995. Print. 
 
McFarlane, Brian. “It Wasn't Like That in the Book . . ..” The Literature/Film Reader: 
Issues of Adaptation. Ed. James Michael Welsh & Peter Lev. Lanham: Scarecrow 




Michalczyk, John J. “Costa-Gavras' Missing: A Legal and Political Battlefield.” Current 
Research in Film. 3 (1985): 215-230. Print. 
 
Mitchell, Carol. “Ceremony as Ritual.” American Indian Quarterly: A Journal of 
Anthropology 5.1 (1979): 27-35. Print. 
 
Moretti, Franco. “Conjectures on World Literature.” New Left Review 1.January-February 
2000: n. pag. Web. 
 
Morrison, Toni. Beloved: A Novel. New York: Plume-Penguin, 1988. Print. 
 
---. “The Site of Memory.” Inventing the Truth: The Art and Craft of Memoir. Ed. Russell 
Baker & William Knowlton Zinsser. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
1998. 183-200. Print. 
 
---. “Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American 
Literature.” Michigan Quarterly Review 28 (1989): 1-34. Print. 
 
Moylan, Tom. Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Needham, Anuradha Dingwaney. “'The Small Voice of History' in Arundhati Roy's The 
God of Small Things.” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial 
 
 190 
Studies 7.3 (2005): 369-91. Print. 
 
Nelson, Alice A. Political Bodies: Gender, History, and the Struggle for Narrative Power 
in Recent Chilean Literature. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2002. Print. 
 
Nelson, Elizabeth Hoffman, and Malcolm A. Nelson. “Shifting Patterns, Changing 
Stories: Leslie Marmon Silko's Yellow Women.” Leslie Marmon Silko: A 
Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. Louise K. Barnett & James L. Thorson. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001. 121-134. Print. 
 
Newton, Adam Zachary. Narrative Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
Print. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1995. Print. 
 
Ondaatje, Michael. Anil's Ghost. New York: Vintage Books: Random House, 2001. Print. 
 
Osteen, Mark. American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo's Dialogue with Culture. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Phelan, James. “Sethe's Choice: Beloved and the Ethics of Reading.” Ethics, Literature, 
and Theory: An Introductory Reader. 2nd ed. Ed. Stephen George. Lanham: 
 
 191 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 299-313. Print. 
 
Rand, Naomi R. “Surviving What Haunts You: The Art of Invisibility in Ceremony, the 
Ghost Writer, and Beloved.” MELUS 20.3 (1995): 21-32. Print. 
 
Ratti, Manav. “Michael Ondaatje's Anil's Ghost and the Aestheticization of Human 
Rights.” ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature 35 (2004): 121-39. 
Print. 
 
Retief, Glen. “Homoeroticism and the Failure of African Nationalism in Ayi Kwei 
Armah's The Beautyful Ones.” Research in African Literatures 40 (2009): 62-73. 
Print. 
 
Roemer, Kenneth M. Utopian Audiences: How Readers Locate Nowhere. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2003. Print. 
 
Rorty, Richard. Truth and Progress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Print. 
 
Rowe, John Carlos. “Transnationalism and American Studies.” Encyclopedia of 
American Studies Online. Web. 27 Dec. 2010. 
 





Ruppert, James. “No Boundaries, Only Transitions: Ceremony.” Leslie Marmon Silko's 
Ceremony: A Casebook. Ed. Allan Richard Chavkin. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 274. Print. 
 
Salgado, Minoli. “Tribal Stories, Scribal Worlds: Mahasweta Devi and the Unreliable 
Translator.” Journal of Commonwealth Literature 35 (2000): 131-45. Print. 
 
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985. Print. 
 
Schaffer, Kay, and Sidonie Smith. Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of 
Recognition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Print. 
 
Sequoya-Magdaleno, Jana. “Telling the Differance: Representations of Identity in the 
Discourse of Indianness.” The Ethnic Canon: Histories, Institutions, and 
Interventions. Ed. David Palumbo-Liu. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995. 88-116. Print. 
 
Silko, Leslie Marmon. Ceremony. New York: Penguin, 1986. Print. 
 
Slaughter, Joseph R. Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and 
 
 193 
International Law. New York: Fordham University Press, 2007. Print. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Afterword.” Imaginary Maps: Three Stories. 1st ed. 
Routledge, 1995. 197-205. Print. 
 
---. Death of a Discipline. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Print. 
 
---. Thinking Academic Freedom in Gendered Post-Coloniality. Cape Town: University 
of Cape Town, 1992. Print. 
 
---. “Translator's Preface.” Imaginary Maps: Three Stories. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
xxiii-xxix. Print. 
 
Stoler, Ann Laura. “Intimidations of Empire: Predicaments of the Tactile and Unseen.” 
Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History. Ed. 
Ann Laura Stoler. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 1-22. Print. 
 
---. “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and 
(Post) Colonial Studies.” Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North 
American History. Ed. Ann Laura Stoler. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 
23-67. Print. 
 
Suvin, Darko. “Radical Rhapsody and Romantic Recoil in the Age of Anticipation: A 
 
 194 
Chapter in the History of SF.” Science Fiction Studies 1.4 (1974): 255-269. Print. 
 
Swami, Praveen. “"A Tiger Woodsian Debut": Arundhati Roy's Novel Goes 
International.” Frontline 8 Aug. 1997: 100-102. Print. 
 
Sweeney, Megan. Reading Is My Window: Books and the Art of Reading in Women's 
Prisons. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Print. 
 
Taylor, Diana. Disappearing Acts. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. Print. 
 
Teuton, Sean Kicummah. Red Land, Red Power: Grounding Knowledge in the American 
Indian Novel. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008. Print. 
 
Versluys, Kristiaan. Out of the Blue: September 11 and the Novel. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009. Print. 
 
Wald, Alan. “The Culture of 'Internal Colonialism': A Marxist Perspective.” MELUS 8 
(1981): 18-27. Print. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004. Print. 
 
Watt, Ian P. The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding. Berkeley: 
 
 195 
University of California Press, 1964. Print. 
 
Wenzel, Jennifer. “Grim Fairy Tales: Taking a Risk, Reading Imaginary Maps.” Going 
Global: The Transnational Reception of Third World Women Writers. Ed. Amal 
Amireh & Lisa Suhair Majaj. New York: Garland, 2000. 229-251. Print. 
 
---. “Remembering the Past's Future: Anti-Imperialist Nostalgia and Some Versions of 
the Third World.” Cultural Critique 62 (2006): 1-32. Print. 
 
Wright, Derek. “'Dystropia' in the African Novel: A Critique of Armah's Language in 
The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born.” Commonwealth Novel in English 5 
(1992): 26-38. Print. 
 
 
